THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS

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ABSTRACT

By manipulating the screening and selection of executive bureaucrats, political leaders can indirectly control the policy preferences that are carried out and enforced within a polity. In this article, we argue that precisely for this reason, partisan conflict over public policies often generates partisan conflict over bureaucratic appointments. To assess the empirical merits of this proposition, we analyze a unique dataset tracing the careers of all agency heads appointed within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011. We find that agency heads are more likely to be replaced following partisan shifts in government. We conclude that even when political leaders are constrained by strict civil service regulations on personnel management, partisan politics tends to determine the appointment of executive bureaucrats.

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An extensive literature in American politics describes how political leaders often respond to the threat of a runaway bureaucracy by assuring that key decision-making positions are staffed by administrative officials whose preferences and priorities are similar to those of their own (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lewis 2008). As long as the parties in power can secure the most important administrative positions for bureaucrats with common interests, they can also keep opposing policy views off the agenda and effectively bias agency decision-making in their own favor. Conversely, if an agency were to be captured by bureaucrats with conflicting interests, then the parties in power also risk seeing their policies go unimplemented as expertise and resources are diverted for other ends. This ally principle—that all else being equal, political principals generally prefer to rely on bureaucratic agents with common interests (Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 2001; Huber and Shippman 2006)—drives policy-motivated coalitions to appoint, promote and support administrative officials that affirm their partisan ambitions, and to replace, marginalize and subvert those that deny them.

In this article, we bring the literature on the politics of bureaucratic appointments from the US system of separate powers to the parliamentary democracies of Europe. While scholars of American bureaucracy have conveniently couched their propositions and findings in general terms, from a comparative perspective US federal agencies often appear remarkably politicized, with new presidents having thousands of appointments to make at their leisure upon entering office (Lewis 2008; Lewis and Moe 2013). By contrast, the appointment opportunities of parliamentary executives in countries like Britain, Germany, and Sweden number in the hundreds and are constrained, first, ex-ante by meritocratic recruitment principles requiring that agency appointees be hired on objective measures of merit; and second, ex-post by stringent labor laws and civil service regulations that shield agency appointees from arbitrary dismissal (Peters and Pierre 2004). Whereas the power of appointment will often allow US presidents to aggressively seize control of central policy choke points, parliamentary executives will often find it more difficult to overtly align the policy preferences of key decision-making positions with those of their own.

Given the substantial differences in political and administrative institutions, can anything be learned about bureaucratic appointments in Europe from studying bureaucratic appointments in the US? In the field of public administration, many observers have answered with skepticism, opting instead to emphasize the cultural and historical dependence of contemporary arrangements (e.g., Painter and Peters 2010). However, alongside marked differences, there also exist important similarities. The
electoral connection ensures that parliamentary executives will face the same basic incentives to control policy implementation as US presidents do (Moe and Caldwell 1994). And even the most insulated of European civil service systems will generally provide political leaders with ample opportunities to influence the screening and selection of appointees at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, much like in the US federal bureaucracy (Boyne et al 2010). If the ally principle has universal merit, these are also the factors that should ultimately determine appointment strategies on both sides of the Atlantic: incentive and opportunity. To the extent that scholars of American bureaucracy have uncovered a truly general feature of political-administrative relations, then, we posit that it should also be possible to find evidence of partisan politics filtering into the parliamentary chain of delegation, just as it does in the US system of separate powers.

To assess the empirical merits of this proposition, we have assembled a novel event history dataset tracing the careers of all agency heads appointed within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011—a case conforming quite closely to an ideal-typical parliamentary democracy during the observed period (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2003). Additionally, unlike in the US where agency independence varies considerably from one case to another (Selin 2015), Swedish political leaders operate under strict and universal constitutional limits on their ability to manage agency personnel and review agency decisions. The temporal scope of our data allows us a rare opportunity to probe how changes in the partisan composition of governing coalitions over time affects bureaucratic turnover, and we do so in a context far removed from the institutions, cultures, and histories where the theory was conceived.

Our analysis shows that despite serving under a constitution stipulating that all bureaucrats are to be appointed on meritocratic principles, Swedish agency heads leave their posts at significantly greater rates when accountable to an ideological opponent of the appointing cabinet than when accountable to an ideological ally of the appointing cabinet. In line with reigning theories of delegation in American politics, these findings affirm that partisan politics colors not only the substantive contents of public policies, but also the organization of the administrative state. Because political principals will generally strive to secure the most important decision-making positions for bureaucratic agents with common interests, whatever policy conflicts that might exist between competing partisan coalitions will also be reflected in the politics of bureaucratic appointments. Future studies of delegation from politicians to bureaucrats in the parliamentary democracies of Europe would do well to take this possibility more seriously.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first explain in more detail how political leaders can use personnel management to constrain bureaucratic discretion, as well as why this strategy tends to invite partisan conflict over screening and selection mechanisms over time. Next, we turn to a discussion about the data, model specification, and methods. We then present the results, and finally conclude by considering the implications of the findings for theories of delegation and administrative design.

**Delegation and the Theory of Political Control**

Reigning theories of delegation in political science are deeply rooted in the new economics of organization, drawing particularly from agency theory and transaction cost economics (Moe 2012, Williamson 1985). From this perspective, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is understood as one of principal and agent. The politicians are the principals, the bureaucrats the agents, and the central question is what—if anything—the former can do to control the latter given the informational asymmetry that necessarily exists between the two.

The generic premise is that bureaucrats typically have access to two kinds of private information, which in turn cause two kinds of problems for the politicians. First, bureaucrats can have hidden information about their own motivations and capabilities; and second, since politicians cannot always observe what their bureaucrats are doing, they will sometimes have opportunity to take hidden actions. If politicians and bureaucrats have conflicting interests, then the bureaucrats also have incentive to exploit their superior information in order to make it appear as if they have the qualities that politicians desire—such as expert knowledge and loyalty—as well as to act in ways that make themselves better off even if it were to make the politicians worse off. The problem of hidden information is often referred to as adverse selection, while the problem of hidden action is often referred to as moral hazard (Laffont and Martimort 2009; Moe 1984).

In this most basic sense, the outlook is of course no different from a traditional Weberian understanding of public administration. Modern bureaucracies come staffed with highly skilled professionals who should be able to safely guide the implementation of public policies; however, the very expertise that make modern bureaucracies the effective machines that they are also present bureaucrats with opportunity to usurp public authority for their own ends (e.g., Downs 1967; Lowi 1979;
Niskanen 1976). What distinguishes contemporary theories from the old is the notion that even when faced with severe informational asymmetries and conflicts of interest, politicians need not be helpless. Rather, they can defend themselves by designing administrative institutions that alter the incentives and opportunities of bureaucrats to pursue harmful actions.

The earliest attempts at explicating the nuts and bolts of this process focused on *ex-post* controls—that is, institutions that operate after bureaucrats take action. By monitoring behavior, rewarding compliance, and punishing defection, politicians can continuously constrain agency decision-making and protect their policies from being subverted during implementation. As long as agency decisions can be credibly sanctioned, bureaucrats must anticipate the response of politicians when making decisions and accommodate their interests, lest they run the risk of seeing their programmes curtailed or careers ended (McCubbins and Schwarz 1984; Moe 1985; Weingast and Moran 1984; Weingast 1983). A problem with active oversight, however, is that it imposes costs not only on the agent, but also on the principal who performs it. And in the shadow of endemic collective action problems, sanctions may not always be credible. For these reasons, politicians will often find it more attractive to promote compliance *ex-ante* through strategic choices about procedures, organization, and personnel systems—that is, institutions that operate before bureaucrats take action. Inventive use of administrative appointments, structures, and processes can ameliorate both informational asymmetries and conflicts of interests by, for instance, demanding that bureaucrats reveal their policy ambitions in advance, take specific kinds of constituency or professional information into account, and have the burden of proof, as well as by enfranchising favored groups and granting special interests selective access to agency decision-making (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989). As long as political leaders choose administrative institutions wisely, the bureaucracy will proceed on autopilot, programmed from the outset to pursue the partisan interests of the political coalitions that were in power at the time of enactment.

The literature dealing with the dangers of bureaucratic drift and the institutional solutions that politicians can deploy to mitigate it has made marginal advances over time (see e.g., Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Huber and Shipean 2006; Moe 2012), contributing notably with more nuanced perspectives on the impact of policy uncertainty (Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999), political uncertainty (Lewis 2003; Wood and Bohte 2004), and the substitutability of ex ante and ex post controls (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Huber and Shipean 2002). But the core that was borrowed
from the new economics of organization some thirty years ago with its focus on conflicts of interest and information asymmetries remains largely intact: although hidden information and hidden action will always provide unruly bureaucrats with some room to pursue their own interests, politicians can use contract designs, screening and selection mechanisms, monitoring and reporting requirements, and checks and balances to counteract non-compliance and ensure that their policies do not drift too far from target.

**Partisan Politics and Bureaucratic Appointments**

A less recognized implication of the notion that politicians can use administrative institutions to at least partly determine policy outcomes, however, is that the choice of such institutions should then also attract the same kind of political disagreements as the choice of public policies often does (Horn and Shepsle 1989; Moe 1989, 1990; Shepsle 1992). If different administrative institutions lead to different policy outcomes, and different policy outcomes are preferred by different partisan coalitions, then different partisan coalitions should also prefer different administrative institutions. As Riker (1980) observed, in most cases, preferences over institutions tend to be inherited from preferences over policies. And if a given governing coalition is dissatisfied with a particular set of policy outcomes, then they can move policy in their preferred direction by reorganizing the institutions that operate in the relevant policy domain.

The most straightforward way for political leaders to shift the policy positions of an agency is by intervening in the screening and selection of its personnel (Boyne et al 2010; Doherty, Lewis, and Linbocker 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik 2014; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lewis 2008; Snyder and Weingast 2000; Wood and Waterman 1991). If bureaucrats with conflicting interests can be either forcibly dismissed or made to self-select out of the agency, while bureaucrats with common interests can be either directly appointed or made to self-select into the agency, then a hostile agency can also be turned into a friendly agency. As Richard Nixon (1978, 352, quoted in Wilks and Nelson 2003) put it to his cabinet, “I urged the new cabinet members to move quickly to replace holdover bureaucrats with people who believed in what we were trying to do. … [I warned that] if we don’t get rid of those people, they will either sabotage us from within, or they’ll just sit back on their well-paid asses and wait for the next election to bring back their old bosses.” Just as how the political leaders that were in power at the time of agency enactment can manipulate the partisan composit-
tion of an agency’s personnel in order to protect their own policies from bureaucratic drift, the political leaders that inherit the agency can use screening and selection mechanisms to reconfigure an agency for objectives that correspond more closely to their own ambitions.

While many contemporary democracies utilize civil service regulations that provide bureaucrats with protection from arbitrary dismissal, inventive politicians have found ways of working around the spirit of such constraints. In the US, the perhaps most notorious example is provided by the “Malek Manual”, circulated to officials within the Nixon administration with detailed advice on how to make civil servants voluntarily want to leave their jobs (Cayer 2009). These include frontal assaults where bureaucrats are told in private to leave their posts and with refusals being met with threats of adversely affecting future recommendations and personnel records, but also more subtle strategies such as transfers to new locations or activities that are known in advance to be unacceptable, assigning projects that require traveling when they are unable to do so, restructuring agencies to shift responsibilities, creating parallel processes that marginalize their roles, or offering “promotions” to new positions only to get them out of the way.

The outcome is an appointment process that tends to follow the ebbs and flows of partisan politics. For if the political leaders that were in power at the time of appointment are successful in assuring common interests with key bureaucrats ex ante, they will also unavoidably generate new agency problems for any future governing coalition with different preferences and priorities ex post. In this way, policy conflict between politicians and bureaucrats becomes inherited from policy conflict between competing partisan coalitions, because bureaucratic agents are typically appointed to serve the interests of their political principals.

Of course, identifying agents with common interests is no trivial matter (Spence 1973). And even if political leaders had the ability to perfectly align the policy preferences of bureaucrats with those of their own, they may not always find it prudent to do so (Huber and McCarty 2004; Gailmard and Patty 2012). But on the margins, we expect politicians in mature representative democracies to be both able and willing to politicize the appointment process— with appreciable implications. If political leaders can use institutions to assure common interests with bureaucrats at key decision-making positions, then all of the various appointments that are authorized on behalf of the ruling political elite should be particularly at risk of being replaced when there is a conflict of interest between the governing coalition that were in power at the time of appointment and the governing coalition that
currently holds office. Conversely, bureaucratic tenure should appear particularly robust as long as the appointing and sitting coalitions have common interests. This perspective on the politics of bureaucratic appointments can be summarized with a single hypothesis: *The more the policy preferences of the appointing and sitting political principal diverge, the more likely a bureaucratic agent is to be replaced; and the more similar are the policy preferences of the appointing and sitting political principal, the more likely a bureaucratic agent is to be preserved.*

We thus expect an appointment process in the spirit of the well-known ally principle (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). All else equal, legislators become more inclined to delegate and grant discretion to an agency the closer the agency’s policy preferences are to those of the legislative floor. And an agency is most likely to have policy preferences close to those of the legislative floor when its staff, structure, and process have been defined by a legislative coalition whose partisan composition mirrors that of the sitting coalition.

**Data, Covariates, and Methods**

To assess the empirical merits of our hypothesis, we have assembled a novel event history dataset with detailed information on the biographies and positions of all agency heads appointed within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011 (Dahlström, Holmgren and Björkdahl 2014). By “executive administration” we specifically refer to all administrative agencies (förvaltningsmyndigheter) whose heads are appointed by the cabinet. This includes a diverse set of public organizations, such as universities, county administrative boards, museums, government owned businesses, police authorities, regional archives, and general public service agencies, and excludes a small number of agencies accountable only to the parliament as well as judicial agencies such as the courts.

For our purposes, the Swedish case has several notable qualities. First, with Sweden’s long-lasting consensual political features (Anton 1969; Pettersson 2015) and low levels of administrative politicization (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012) it is compared with the US an unlikely case of partisan conflicts over bureaucratic appointments. Terry Moe and Michael Caldwell (1994) have persuasively argued that we should expect presidential and parliamentary systems to produce different bonds between politics and administration, with the former being more likely to generate wide-
spread politicization than the latter. Moe and Caldwell (1994, 186) discuss the US and the UK thoroughly, but explicitly take Sweden as an example that “…looks a lot like Britain on these scores – and both are poles apart from the United States.” The political context thus makes Sweden a welcome contrasting case, and if we can find empirical patterns previously found in the US also in Sweden, there are probably some universal merits to the argument.

Second, Swedish political leaders work under a set of institutional constraints that limit their ability to determine bureaucratic appointments, rather typical for European parliamentary democracies with civil service systems (Niklasson 2012; Pierre 2004). The only positions that are open to direct appointment by the cabinet are those at the very top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, such as agency heads and management boards. However, even the upper layers of agency positions are part of a constitutionally protected meritocracy, with the Swedish Instrument of Government explicitly stipulating that all bureaucrats are to be appointed on meritocratic principles (ch. 12, 5§). Moreover, all agency heads are contracted on fixed terms, which provide legal protection from arbitrary dismissal. The official stance is that heads should normally be appointed on six-year contracts with a possibility for three-year extensions, but not for longer than twelve years in total. Once a head has been appointed, they generally cannot be fired or demoted without reference to some form of serious misconduct, i.e. “for cause.” Disagreements over policy are not considered legitimate grounds for removal.

Third, although constrained, Swedish political leaders still have and enough room for maneuver for it to be meaningful to study the politics of bureaucratic appointments. In Sweden, all administrative agencies enjoy formal independence in the sense that no one but the agency itself is allowed to dictate how the agency should rule in specific cases or implement the law (ibid. ch. 12, §2). Insofar as Swedish political leaders want to direct agency decision-making, their only constitutionally sanctioned routes are through appointments of agency leaders, policy-relevant legislation, the enacting executive order or statutory instruction, and annual appropriations. Consequentially, controlling the composition of the top layer of executive bureaucrats is one of the primary modes of policy steering that Swedish cabinets have at their disposal. And to do so, they can pursue much the same strategies as US president do when dealing with unwanted career bureaucrats (e.g., Doherty, Lewis, and Linbocker 2014; Lewis 2008; Lewis and Moe 2013). In cases of only modest policy conflict or

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1 However, there are no laws or executive orders that regulate contracting periods, and as we show below, in practice tenure-times vary considerably.
limited salience, they can of course simply choose to wait until a given head’s term is up for renewal and hire someone else or informally signal that the head no longer enjoys the cabinet’s support (Ahlbäck Öberg 2012). In more pressing cases, they can transfer heads to other positions, circumscribe their authority and responsibility through structural reorganization, or buy them out with alternative job offers. The Swedish Government Offices, for example, typically hold around ten former agency heads who have been allowed to keep their title but with only minor, if any, formal obligations. In short, many of the backdoors to personnel management that have been identified by American scholars of bureaucracy are also present in the Swedish case, opening up for partisan politics to filter into the appointment process despite relatively strict civil service regulations.

**Data**

We have primarily relied on two sources when constructing the dataset: *Sveriges statskalender*, which is a compendium of operative public organizations and employees published annually by the Swedish government since 1812; and *Vem är det?*, which is the Swedish version of the reference publication “Who is Who?” with biographical information on most agency heads. In order to assure the reliability of the data, we have also further cross-checked and complemented these sources using a number of additional government publications (*Statsliggaren*, various years; *Statliga myndigheter*, various years; *Fakta om folksalda*, various years; *Enkammarräkndagen*, various years), as well as with CVs acquired through personal communications with agency staff.

The event history of each individual head is documented as a counting process that runs from the year of appointment until the year of exit, with one observation for each calendar year that the head remained on post. Heads in service are coded as zero. If exit occurs in a given year, the coding changes to one. Inactive heads subsequently drop out of the dataset while heads that are never observed to leave their posts remain at zero for the entirety of the observed duration. In total, the population includes 13268 yearly interval observations from 2084 unique appointments with 1855 observed exits. The median survival time is six years with the shortest spell lasting for one year and the longest for thirty-four years. The dataset ends after 2011, leaving nine percent of the heads right-censored (i.e., still in service when observation ceased).
In Figure 1, we present the total number of exits by years on post, with the tenure-times of all right-censored heads included for reference. As can be seen from the event count, most of the action is located on the left-hand side of the distribution, with the vast majority of heads leaving their posts within twelve years of being appointed. The patterns contrast sharply with the US case, where almost one-fourth of program managers leave their posts by the end of their first year of service (Wood and Marchbanks 2008). Swedish cabinets, then, do not appear to suffer from the same sort of attrition problem that US presidents do. On the other hand, for an appointment process where the baseline is supposed to be a six-year fixed-term, we also find considerable variation. There is thus good reason to suspect that the Swedish civil service may not be quite as rigid as official policy implies.

**Covariates**

We now take the further step of relating the longevity of bureaucratic tenure to partisan politics, and specifically to conflicts of interest between the cabinet that appointed a particular head and the cabinet with the right to hold the head to account. As argued above, if bureaucrats are appointed to serve the interests of their appointers, then turnover among the former should generally follow
from turnover among the latter. In order to put this proposition to task, we follow Berry, Burden and Howell (2010) and posit the appointment process as a general function of the form $S_{ijk} = f \left( (C_k - C_j), X_i, Z_k \right)$, where $S_{ijk}$ is the tenure-time of a given agency head, $i$, appointed by cabinet $j$ and currently accountable to incumbent cabinet $k$. Conflicts of interest are represented by $(C_k - C_j)$, which denotes the ideological distance between the cabinet responsible for appointing a given head, $C_j$, and the incumbent cabinet that decides the head's fate, $C_k$. Heterogeneity in the characteristics of individual heads enter the model through $X_i$ while heterogeneity in strategic environments at the time of the incumbent cabinet is represented by $Z_k$. To compute the primary quantity of interest, $(C_k - C_j)$, we first match each agency head to attributes of the political parties that were in power at the time of appointment, and then for each following year that a head was in service, we examine how those attributes compare to the attributes of the governing parties during that year. The characteristics that are captured by $X_i$ vary between heads but not over time. By contrast, the environmental conditions that are captured by $Z_k$ vary over time along with the parties in power but not between heads.

As a proxy for conflicts of interest between appointer and incumbent, $(C_k - C_j)$, we construct a binary covariate, Cabinet turnover, denoting whether or not the cabinet that appointed a given head has a different ideological affiliation than the sitting cabinet, with the appointer and incumbent respectively being either a social democratic or liberal-conservative coalition. We assume that when political leaders appoint agency heads, they do so strategically to satisfy their own policy preferences. Ideological turnover in the cabinet since the time of appointment increases policy conflict between agency and political incumbent because new partisan coalitions see the appointments of past partisan coalitions as representing interests opposed to their own. We expect that agency heads will be more susceptible to replacement when accountable to an ideological opponent of the appointing cabinet than when accountable to an ideological ally of the appointing cabinet.

In addition to the indicator of policy conflict, we also include a number of salient time-constant and time-varying regression controls to account for transaction-costs and factors unrelated to the theory. Since the range of covariates that could plausibly cause both ideological turnover in government and an increase in replacement rates is limited, they primarily serve to improve the precision of the
estimates rather than as checks for confounders. The selection is informed by previous studies of program and agency survival as well as of administrative reforms more generally.

To account for heterogeneity among agency heads, $X_i$, we first include four binary covariates. Private sector denotes whether or not a head has experience from the private sector, Party affiliation whether or not a head is affiliated with a political party, Uneducated whether or not a head lacks tertiary education, and Sex whether or not a head is a female. We include measures of political- and private sector experience to adjust for the possibility that outside recruits may be more inclined to voluntarily leave their posts in pursuit of alternative careers than heads recruited from inside the bureaucracy (James et al, 2013) and of education to capture varying levels of extant competence. Although we have no good theoretical reasons to adjust for sex, previous investigations of tenure times among agency heads in the Swedish bureaucracy have found substantial differences between males and females (Sandahl 2003), so we include it regardless.

To account for heterogeneity in strategic environments at the time of the incumbent cabinet, $Z_k$, we include one continuous and three binary covariates. First, we introduce a continuous covariate, Economic Growth, denoting the annual percent change in real gross domestic product. Government reorganization is almost always justified as a strategy for cost-containment (Pierson, 2001), but on the other hand, government reorganization is also itself a costly activity (Carpenter and Lewis, 2004). Second, we adjust for either of the blocs being more prone to reshuffle appointments by including a binary covariate, Liberal-Conservative, denoting whether or not the cabinet is controlled by a liberal-conservative coalition. Third, in order to account for the possibility that governments may front-load their most radical administrative reforms, we include a binary covariate, New Term, denoting whether or not it is the first year of a new electoral term. Fourth and finally, we also include a binary covariate, Pre-1987, denoting whether or not a given head was observed before 1987. The 1980s was a period of intense political debate over the relationship between the parliament, cabinet, and executive administration in Sweden. One result of this debate was Government bill 1986/87:99, which introduced a number of new escape clauses that the cabinet could invoke to

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2 As is well-known, unobserved heterogeneity is a particularly acute problem for hazard models since unmeasured risk factors may introduce bias even if uncorrelated with the observed covariates (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Therneau and Grambsch 2000). If there is heterogeneity among subjects that the model does not account for, the effects of covariates that reduce (increase) hazards can be increased (reduced) and spurious time-dependence become statistically significant.

3 Since all social democratic governments are one-party governments while all liberal-conservative governments save for one are not one-party governments, this covariate is also highly correlated with number of parties in the cabinet ($r = 0.91$).
transfer agency heads to other (not necessarily permanent) positions, if deemed necessary for “organizational reasons” or “the greater good of the agency.” In practice, this expanded the cabinet’s appointment powers considerably, and so we include it to adjust for the increase in opportunity to intervene in the appointment process compared to previous regimes.

Methods

We implement the covariates through a series of Cox regressions, which is a semi-parametric technique for estimating time-to-event that combines the proportional hazards duration model with the partial likelihood method for estimation (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Therneau and Grambsch 2000). The dependent variable is the hazard rate, which in our case loosely translates into the instantaneous probability that a particular head will leave her post, given that she has not yet done so. Compared to other techniques for estimating time-to-event, the principal benefit of Cox regression is that it leaves the functional form of the baseline hazard unspecified, allowing us to retrieve estimates of how the covariates affect replacement rates without need for strong parametric assumptions about the underlying probability distribution of event-occurrence. In addition, Cox regression is also flexible enough to handle time-varying covariates, time-dependent coefficients, and right-censoring with relative ease, making it the natural choice for modeling complex event histories.

To assure the robustness of our findings, we run Cox regressions with three kinds of extensions. First, we estimate models with shared agency-frailties. The logic behind these models is that some heads may appear more prone to leave their posts than others simply because some agencies carry unobserved attributes that make them intrinsically more risky to manage than others. Such risk factors can be modeled as a latent covariate, analogous to a random-effect in linear models (Hougaard 2000). The frailty variance is estimated from the data, but assumed to follow a gamma distribution, and draws on variation in hazard rates both within and between different agencies. As with any random-effect, the agency-frailties are generally required to be independent of the ob-

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4 Important to note here is that Sweden had forty years of uninterrupted social democratic rule between 1936 and 1976. Adjusting for a possible structural break in 1987 thus makes for a rather ungenerous control, since if our theory is correct, before 1987 is exactly where we should expect to find abnormally long tenure-times.
served covariates. This is a restrictive assumption, but less so than the assumption of complete homogeneity that underpin frailty-less models.

Second, we stratify our heads by agency. Although Cox regression leaves the functional form of the baseline hazard unspecified, whatever shape the hazard function does have it is assumed to be the same across all subjects. Stratification allows us to relax this assumption by letting each agency have its own distinct baseline hazard, while coefficients are constrained to be the same across agencies. Analogously to fixed-effects in linear models, this eliminates the influence from all unobserved, time-constant, agency-level factors by collapsing them into the unspecified hazard function of each agency (Allison 2009). For our purposes, the main drawback of these models is that since they only consider variation within agencies, they are also prone to underestimate the effects of covariates that change slowly or only rarely over time—which holds true for most of the covariates we consider.

Third and finally, we also stratify our heads by cohort. The models with agency frailties and stratification both adjust for the fact that heads are clustered within agencies. However, neither considers that heads are also ordered within agencies. Yet, since a new head cannot be appointed until all previous heads have been dismissed, the occurrence of future events necessarily depends upon the occurrence of past events. Pooling all the heads of an agency into the same risk set is inherently suspect because they could not possibly have been at risk of replacement at the same time. Stratifying heads into different event-rank cohorts allow us to preserve the order of the appointment process and adjust for the timing and sequence of appointments within agencies. The results of our modeling efforts are reviewed below.

**Results**

We present results from seven sets of Cox regressions. We begin by including only the Cabinet turnover covariate in Model 1 and then add the agency head, cabinet, and full set of regression controls in Model 2, 3, and 4 respectively. As robustness checks, we then add the shared agency-frailties, agency stratification, and cohort stratification in Models 5, 6, and 7. Scaled Schoenfeld residuals

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5 However, since many of our agencies are left-truncated, this measure is based on observed rather than actual cohorts.
reveal no significant violations of the proportional hazards assumption and graphs of the Cox-Snell and efficient score residuals suggest that the models generally fit the data well with no influential outliers. As is often the case with hazard models, however, the fit is worse in the right-hand tail due to subjects dropping out over time. With this caveat, we report hazard ratios and standard errors for each model in Table 1. A hazard ratio above one implies that a one-unit increase in the relevant covariate is associated with an increase in the rate of replacement; a ratio lower than one that replacement rates are decreasing when the relevant covariate is increasing.

Consistent with theoretical expectations, we find evidence that ideological turnover in the cabinet since the time of appointment affects the tenure times of Swedish agency heads. In all seven models, the hazard ratios for cabinet turnover show that agency heads leave their posts at greater rates when accountable to an ideological opponent of the appointing cabinet than when accountable to an ideological ally of the appointing cabinet. In all seven models, moreover, the differences are statistically significant at the 0.001 level using a two-tailed test of significance. These results indicate that partisan politics is one important part of the explanation behind why some agencies lose their heads while others don’t.
TABLE 1. PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF BUREAUCRATIC HAZARDS IN SWEDEN, 1960-2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
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<td>1.59***</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>1.50***</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
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<td>1.21*</td>
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Agency frailties  Yes
Agency stratification Yes
Cohort stratification Yes

Agency Heads 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 13268 13268 13268 13268 13268 13268 13268
Exits 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
\( \chi^2 \) 95.9*** 138.8*** 213.9*** 240.9*** 250.0*** 151.3*** 178.2***

Note. Hazard ratios for listed covariates with standard errors in parenthesis (conditional on frailty in model 5; clustered by agency in Model 6 and 7). Efron method for tied events. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed).

The point estimates are also of substantial size. As can be seen in Model 1, with no regression controls included cabinet turnover is associated with a sixty-one percent increase in the rate of exit. The difference is reduced on the margins when we adjust for manager and cabinet characteristics in Model 2 and 3, and finally lands on a fifty percent increase when we include the full set of regression controls in Model 4. The robustness checks change the results only slightly, with Model 5, 6,
and 7 all producing point estimates within one standard error of the estimate in Model 4. Agency frailties and cohort stratification respectively shifts the point estimate upwards to a fifty-two and fifty-four percent increase in Model 5 and 7, while agency stratifications makes for the overall most conservative estimate, bringing the hazard ratio down to a forty-seven percent increase in Model 6.

To provide a better view of how the risk of replacement varies over time, we also present an estimate of the hazard function in Figure 2 based on Model 4 (with all binary covariates at their modes and all continuous covariates at their means). The hazard function charts the instantaneous likelihood of replacement for each year in a given head’s career, conditional on having remained in service until that point. Decreasing hazard rates implies a decreasing risk of replacement, while increasing hazard rates implies an increasing risk of replacement. As can be seen from the rising hazard, tenure becomes an increasingly fragile affair the longer a head remains in service. Even in times of no political turnover, the conditional probability of an agency head leaving their post increases dramatically, from a five percent chance in their first year of service to almost twenty percent by their tenth year. These hazards rapidly accumulate over time, with each individual head having
about a fifty percent chance of remaining on post for six years. And as already indicated by the regression results, the risk is considerably higher following partisan shifts in government.

Numerous contemporary and historical cases throughout the studied time period substantiate these general conclusions. When the liberal-conservative Reinfeldt cabinet entered office in 2006, for example, they made several disputed dismissals. Employment policy was among the most salient issues for the new government and the head of the Swedish Public Employment Service, Bo Bylund, had a background in the labor union and as State secretary under a previous social democratic government. The liberal-conservative parties had already signaled their disapproval of Bylund’s appointment in the run-up to the election, with Reinfeldt openly referring to Bylund as a social democratic campaign aide⁶. And following social democratic defeat in the general election, Bylund’s contract was abruptly terminated three years in advance, with the dismissal being justified as a natural part of organizational reform and nothing out of the ordinary. Similarly, when the social democrats lost control of the cabinet in 1976 after four decades of uninterrupted rule, the new State secretary in the Ministry of Education, Bert Levin, claimed that they were met by “a forest of red needles” upon entering office, with many of the sitting agency heads in the cultural sector being deeply rooted in the labor movement (Levin 1983, 91).

Several of the regression controls also suggest interesting relationships, but a full discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Of the covariates measuring the attributes of individual agency heads, only Uneducated performs well across all specifications. Both Party affiliation and Private Sector show signs of having an impact, but neither survives the fixed-effects specification in Model 6. We can of course only speculate why these patterns occur but it seems reasonable to think that both private and political careers have a fairly strong pull on agency heads with previous experience from these sectors (e.g., James et al 2013; Wood and Marchbanks 2008). Another possibility is however that it picks up a predisposition of these individuals to seek new challenges, or in other words to be less risk averse. They have obviously already changed sector once, which might be a sign of a relatively low threshold to take on new tasks. Sex seems at first to be associated with a higher risk, but the impact decreases below conventional thresholds of statistical significance when the Pre-1987 control is introduced. We suspect that the reason for the initial significance is a spurious relationship between increasing levels of female agency heads and decreasing tenure times.

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As for the covariates measuring changes in the strategic environment at the time of the sitting cabinet, only Pre-1987 performs well across all specifications. New Term initially appears to have an impact in Model 3 and 4, but these differences are not robust to the extensions to the basic Cox regression in Models 5 to 6. That New Term lacks a stable impact might seem surprising at first, but is only natural since agency heads have contracts with fixed terms, which means that the exact timing of replacement will often not be in the hands of the cabinet. And there is, finally, no evidence of a relationship between either the ideological affiliation of the cabinet or economic growth and the durability of bureaucratic tenure. The absence of statistically significant associations of the ideology indicator is notable because there has been an ongoing discussion, both in Sweden and in the US, that certain parties are more prone to reshuffle appointments, something that is not supported by our analysis (Dahlström and Niklasson 2013; Lewis 2008).

**Conclusions**

This article builds on the rather sophisticated literature on political delegation, which constitutes much of what we know about bureaucratic appointments in the public sector. While well-developed, a serious limitation of the established wisdom is that it has been substantiated almost exclusively through empirical studies of the US case. As a consequence, little is currently known about the dynamics behind bureaucratic appointments in other institutional settings, such as the parliamentary democracies of Europe where we often find more robust civil service systems. Yet, if the literature on delegation in the US has uncovered principles of truly universal merit, then political leaders in other democracies should be equally at risk of finding their policies subverted by bureaucrats whose preferences and priorities are different from those of their own. And for the same reasons that US presidents have incentive to manipulate screening and selection mechanisms in order to mitigate that risk, parliamentary executives should also have incentive to assure that their bureaucracies are staffed with personnel whose policy priorities they can trust. And finally, to the extent that they do manage to staff their bureaucracies with ideological allies, this should also invite partisan politics to the appointment process over time, just as it does in the US case.

By tracing the careers of all agency heads appointed within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011, we provide rare evidence that this is, in fact, also what happens. Contrary to what might be expected of an ideal typical civil service system, to which the Swedish case comes
quite close, we show that there is a strong relationship between changes in the partisan composition of governing coalitions over time and the durability of bureaucratic tenure—agency heads leave their posts at significantly greater rates when accountable to an ideological opponent of the appointing cabinet than when accountable to an ideological ally of the appointing cabinet. These findings affirm that partisan politics colors not only the substantive contents of public policies, but also the organization of the administrative state.

Research on the relationship between partisan politics and bureaucratic appointments in the parliamentary democracies of Europe should not end here. In this paper, we have focused on the average effects of partisan shifts in government on the replacement rates of executive bureaucrats. Yet, such estimates may hide considerable variation. On our argument, politicians politicize the appointment process to control policy implementation. Clearly, however, all countries have policy issues on which there is no real disagreement between the various factions that are in competition for public authority. Put differently, policy conflict between parties tends to be issue-specific rather than universal (Lavertu 2013). The inclination of the parties in power to intervene in the appointment process should therefore differ systematically between different policy areas. This should be of particular relevance in countries with multi-party systems and unstable majorities where the key players often have common interests on some issues while at the same time disagreeing vehemently on others. In the Swedish case, for example, the social democrats sometimes appoint conservatives as agency heads and vice versa. If our argument has merit, this should be unremarkable—but only as long as those appointments are made in exactly the agencies that are working on issues where there is little to no policy conflict between the parties.

We have also ignored a central aspect of the appointment process in the US, namely that many bureaucrats are appointed for reasons that have little to do with policy and much to do with patronage. Yet, the fact that turnover among bureaucrats tends to follow turnover among politicians is explained equally well by an appointment process swamped with patronage as an appointment process determined by concerns over policy. American scholars of bureaucracy have already gone some ways towards adjudicating between these explanations by looking more closely at the kind of positions that bureaucrats of different backgrounds are appointed to (e.g., Hallibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014). The results suggest that patronage appointees are generally placed in agencies that are off the President’s policy agenda, agencies that already share the President’s policy views, and in positions where they are least able to affect agency performance. European scholars should build
on these efforts by distinguishing more clearly between the agencies that are electorally salient and those that are merely acting as turkey farms for the parties. If politicians are playing fast and loose with the civil service when it comes to policy preferences, there is little reason to believe that they cannot do the same for patronage.

This article thus adds to a small but growing literature on the politics of bureaucratic appointments in Europe (Boyne et al 2010; Christensen et al 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik 2014), which not only notes the importance of these dynamics but also conclude that appointment powers are of increasing relevance for European politics (Kopecky and Mair 2012). Therefore, when this study indicates the general merits of delegation theories developed on the US case, it is part of a broader research agenda which underscores how future studies of European politics would do well to take delegation from politicians to bureaucrats more seriously.
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Statsliggaren, various years.


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Vem är det?, various years.


