STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE CONDITIONS OF MILITARY CRISSES:
The case of defence volunteer movement in Ukraine

Oleksandra Kryshtapovych
This thesis investigates relations between civil society and state in the conditions of military crises from civil society perspective.

On a theoretical level, the thesis aims at determining whether classic understanding of state and civil society relations, conceptualised primarily with an assumption of a strong state and relatively peaceful times, is also applicable at times of military crises and when the state is weak. The following ideal types of civil society and state relations as described by Chambers and Kopstein constitute basic analytical framework: civil society apart from the state, civil society against the state, civil society in dialogue with the state, civil society in partnership with the state and civil society in support of the state. To make the analysis more nuanced, this typology is amended with an additional dimension of quality of experience during the relations.

On an empirical level, the research aim is addressed through a study of the case of the Ukrainian volunteer movement, which emerged as a civil society’s response to the ongoing military crisis in the East of the country. This movement was chosen because of its large scope and activity in the sphere of defence, conventionally perceived as the state domain. The case study focuses on three groups of the defence volunteer movement: volunteers officially interacting with the state, formal and informal volunteers. Volunteer movement’s collective identity and future ambitions towards the state are also addressed in the analysis.

The thesis employs qualitative methods for data collection and analysis since it is intended to capture insights from civil society, its perceptions of and experiences with the state. Thus, field work in Ukraine in March 2016 resulted in 17 semi-structured interviews, which were then processed with the help of conventional and directed content analysis.

The thesis concludes that Chambers and Kopstein’s typology of state-civil society relations, despite assuming a strong state and relatively peaceful times, was applicable even in the case of military crisis. Moreover, as the theory predicted, the ideal types overlapped and were not mutually exclusive. Still, there were dominating patterns of civil society and state relations for two groups of respondents: volunteers officially interacting with the state described their relations as in ‘partnership’, while formal volunteers – as ‘in dialogue’. The third group of respondents, informal volunteers, had no dominating type. As it became evident from the analysis, collective identity of the volunteer movement is yet to be developed, but volunteers do formulate a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (state) around cognitive abilities and honesty. In terms of future ambitions towards the state, the research pointed to movement’s potential to transform into more sustainable forms of civil society and engage in social issues. The analysis also revealed respondents’ understanding of the need of political participation, but many of them were reluctant to join national politics, which echoed negative perceptions of the state.

The thesis contributes to the theory of state and civil society relations by introducing a dimension of quality of experience, which captures volunteers’ perception of the state reaction towards their initiatives as the relations unfold. This dimension helps to create a more nuanced understanding of the state and civil society relations in the conditions of military crises and has the potential to be applied to cases outside Ukraine. The study also makes contribution to understanding civil society in Central and Eastern Europe by introducing Ukrainian volunteer movement into the pool of literature.

Finally, the thesis produces questions for future research such as the need to do similar study to capture state perspective as well as to understand the reasons behind different dominant types of relations among different groups of volunteers.
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**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorist Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ</td>
<td>Research question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAH</td>
<td>Ukrainian Hryvnia (national currency)</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

In March 2014 Crimea, autonomous republic in Ukraine, was annexed by Russia (Czuperski et al, 2015), and Russian-backed separatists soon activated in the East regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, which resulted in the armed conflict there (see map in Annex I) (EP, 2015). Despite proclaiming Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in those areas in April 2014, the Ukrainian government at that moment had hard times taking leadership in defence mostly because of corruption and neglect the army has been facing for the last 20 years (BBC, 2014; Gorelov and Korniyevskyi, 2015).

Simultaneously, civil society responded to the aggression by engaging into the sphere of national defence. Its engagement took the form of a social movement, which participants either formed separate from the state armed groups to fight in the separatist-controlled areas in the East, so-called volunteer battalions, or undertook to supply regular army and those armed groups with food, wearable items, equipment, medical supplies, machines, construction materials, military IT developments or support them in receiving medical care and legal advice. Monetary value of the Ukrainian citizens’ contribution to the Army of Ukraine is estimated at USD 18 million in 2014 only (Dunnett, 2015). The social movement came to be referred to as ‘volunteer movement’ or ‘defence volunteer movement’ and its participants as ‘volunteers’, because they normally do not receive any formal or informal remuneration for their work.

Defence volunteer movement gained wide support among the population, which contradicts historical accounts of the Ukrainian society as weak and unable to mobilise (Stepanenko, 2006; Ghosh, 2014). According to the survey on volunteerism conducted by the sociological research agency Gfk for the UN in Ukraine, 23% of the Ukrainian citizens have had a volunteer experience in 2014, and 9% of them started volunteering in less than 12 months before the survey (Gfk, 2014). Helping the Ukrainian army was the most widespread form of volunteering among survey participants who volunteered (70%). According to other estimation, there have been formed 25 volunteer battalions, which collaborated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 41 battalion, which cooperated with the army, while total participants of the volunteer movement amounted to 1,5 million supporters who provided help to the army through 14,000+ volunteers and 2,350 organisations (Arahamiya, 2015). Moreover, the movement participants encouraged establishing in 2014 an advisory organ at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) called the Volunteer Council, which was invited to discussions about reforming MoD (Kaplun and Tatarska, 2015:72).

Some commentators explain the scale of the movement with state’s inability to react to the external existential threat due to structural issues, which empowered civil society to conduct activities neither encouraged nor facilitated by the state (Kaplun and Tatarska, 2015; Dunnet, 2015). Defence and security as a sphere of engagement of civil society contradicts traditional argument of

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1 There is no single term for the military crisis in the East of Ukraine. Due to availability of facts of using Russian military personnel and equipment in the conflict (Informnapalm, 2016), in the Ukrainian public discourse it is referred to as “undeclared war of Russia against Ukraine”. This line is supported by some Western think-tanks, like the Atlantic Council (Czuperski et al, 2015). In the Western media there is no consistency either, so some refer to the “Ukraine conflict” (Die Welt, 2016) or “Ukraine crisis” (BBC, 2015), while others to “the war in Ukraine” (Epp, 2014). The European Parliament mentioned in resolution P8_TA(2015)0225: “Russia…waging an armed conflict against Ukraine...” (EP, 2015). In the thesis, main term to be used is “military crisis” as the most inclusive; however there will be references to the “armed conflict” and “war”, depending on the source.
functional boundaries between state and civil society, derived primarily from the studies of Western developed democracies (Bowden, 2006). Therefore, this is the puzzle in the center of this thesis.

Although the amount of studies of the volunteer movement in Ukraine is still limited, some researchers highlight the role of volunteers that goes beyond their engagement in the supply of the army, naming them the new leaders of society (Knyshenko, 2015:76). Survey figures from GfK (2014) may support this view. According to it, when asked about the role of volunteers in socio-political changes on 2013-2014, 62% of respondents considered that these changes would not have happened without the volunteers, which points to social importance assigned to the movement by the public. Moreover, volunteers enjoy second highest level of trust in the Ukrainian society, with only a minor gap from the Church (Novikova, 2015).

To sum up, the development of the Ukrainian volunteer movement has taken place in the sphere of defence, which is a contestation of the state domain, in a situation, when the state is weak because of long-term structural issues. The movement also challenges wide-spread understanding of the Ukrainian civil society as weak from the mobilisation perspective and initiates interaction with the state rather than expects it. However, we do not know how these interactions with the state really happen and what experiences volunteers’ relations with the state bring to them. Moreover, the perception of the movement by general public suggests that the movement may play a role beyond provision of goods and services to the army, perhaps, in socio-political sphere. Considering the above, the questions of the relations between this movement and the state and movement’s ambitions towards the state become relevant from the perspective of cooperation between civil society and state. On top of it, looking at this case will provide a more nuanced understanding of civil society and state interaction at times of military crises.

The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: after formulating research aim and questions in the next chapter, I show that within extensive literature on civil society and state relations, there is a lack of research into these relations during military crises (chapter 3). I continue by introducing a theoretical framework, which was developed primarily for peaceful times and strong state. Adapting it for my research I nuance it with an additional dimension (chapter 4). After a presentation of research and analysis methods, including critical discussion thereof (chapter 5), I lay out my findings according to each research question (chapter 6). Finally, I draw conclusions about the applicability of the theoretical framework to the conditions of military crises, current relations between civil society and state in Ukraine as well as discuss avenues for future research (chapter 7).
2. RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS

The research on civil society and state relations has been ongoing through centuries, and such prominent minds as Aristotle, Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, Kant, Hegel, Paine, Weber, Gramsci and many others have touched upon this interaction in their works.

What came as a surprise is that the literature on state and civil society relations in the process or in conditions of military crises is quite limited. Despite significant amount of research on the role of civil society in preventing violence and war or in post-war reconciliation, there is a lack of research on how state and civil society interact if there is a war on the territory of the state. The most relevant account I was able to find is in Megan Meyer and Simon Stacey’s (2010) summary of civil society and war, where it was noted that during a war, civil society may co-opt with the state to the effect that the former loses its autonomy or, on the contrary, the state limits the scope of civil society activities. Although it may be true for a strong state, in the case of corruption-hit Ukraine with weak institutions, including military ones, the state did not co-opt or limit civil society, even when the latter entered into its functional domain.

Thus this thesis aims to make both theoretical and empirical contribution. On theoretical level, the thesis aims to discover whether existing understanding of state and civil society relations, derived primarily for peaceful times, also applies to the conditions of military crises.

On empirical level, this thesis aims at investigating relations between civil society and state in the specific conditions of military crisis on the territory of the state from the perspective of civil society. Although ideal design would be to look at both state and civil society, in light of time and resource constraints, only one side could be covered in the thesis. Thus, it was decided to cover civil society perspective, because the movement is special in its functions, scale and dynamics as well as very fluid, that is why it was necessary to capture it in development. Simultaneously, the thesis makes a contribution into research of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe by showcasing volunteer movement of support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereafter – army) and volunteer battalions (paramilitary) hereafter referred to as “volunteer movement” or “volunteers”.

The research will cover representatives of the volunteer movement, both from formal and informal groups, who provide support to the army or paramilitary in either form, related to defence, such as food, medical and wearable items supply, supply of equipment and its maintenance, as well as those, who are engaged in the work of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GS)².

Research questions (RQ) are the following:

RQ1. How do the participants of the volunteer movement present themselves and the state?
RQ2. What is the participants’ perception of their relations with the state? What experiences do they have when interacting with the state?
RQ3. Does the volunteer movement have any forward looking ambitions towards the state?

² The General Staff of Ukraine oversees operational management of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and is accountable to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.
RQ1 will investigate whether there is a volunteer collective identity and, if yes, how the volunteers distinguish themselves from the state. The focus of this question is on the characteristics and features that the volunteers assign to themselves and the state, which allows them to differentiate from the state. This question will directly contribute to RQ2 in a way of detailing and bringing content to the types of relations volunteers have with the state.

RQ2 will be addressed through applying existing understanding of the state and civil society relations, derived from the literature, to determine whether it is relevant for the conditions of military crisis. I am especially interested in not just determining, what are the relations, but also in uncovering what kind of experiences with the state these relations bring to volunteers.

RQ3 will cover the vision of the volunteer movement participants’ of their future development beyond service provision, if there is any. It will cover potential aspirations towards the state in two main dimensions: social, which includes prospective of movement’s development into more traditional spheres of civil society, and political, which covers ambitions to enter formal politics.

Answering these research questions will provide a relevant picture of the current Ukrainian civil society and state relations in the conditions of military crisis as well as make a more general contribution to the theory related to state and civil society relations.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section will briefly outline previous knowledge in the four related spheres of interest of this thesis: civil society and state relations, civil society at times of war, military-civil relations and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), specifying Ukraine. The section’s conclusions will identify gaps in the research and this thesis’ contribution.

3.1. Civil society and state relations

There is a tremendous amount of literature about civil society and state relations, but surprisingly it almost exclusively takes well-functioning and strong state by default for analysis. The origins of this approach lie in the understanding the state by prominent Western scholars as ultimate development form of the society, making it ‘civil’ as opposed to the ‘natural’ one, which caused using terms ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ interchangeably (Keane, 1988a:35-37). Later Hegel contested equating state and civil society and viewed the state as dealing with the problem of public goods while civil society, separated from the state and family, was busy resolving private economic conflicts. Still, he viewed civil society as weak and in need of the state interference to maintain justice and order (Keane, 1988a:52-53). Interestingly, theoretical discussion focused on the extent to which the state should be involved in civil society, and its non-involvement was rarely discussed (Keane, 1988b:3-4, 11). In such conditions, civil society became a “battlefield… [of] individual private interests” which requires the supervision, and at times intervention, of the state to maintain civil order” (Bowden, 2006:162).

John Keane (2010:461) summarised how ‘civil society is still understood today: it is a term that both describes and anticipates a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected nongovernmental institutions that tend to be nonviolent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension, both with each other and with the governmental institutions that “frame,” constrict and enable their activities’ (emphasis added). Keane’s idea that government institutions ‘frame’ civil society activities is echoed by the social movement literature which conceptualizes state as creating or delimiting opportunity structures that determine the development of social movements (Tarrow, 1995).

Michael Walzer (1998:3) was stressing the importance of a strong state, which ‘rooted in associational life of civil society, … [would be] regulating the associations – so as to maintain a fair distribution of welfare and opportunity’. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (Klein, 2010:389) underline that the only way to contribute group-specific interests to the political process is for civil society to act according to the procedural rules of the political society, which inevitably assumes the state to have set up these rules. And according to Charles Tilly, the very existence of civil society is impossible without well-functioning modern state (Meyer and Stacey, 2010:466).

With regards to the roles and functions of civil society, the most wide-spread understanding may be attributed to the behavioural theorists of civil society. Tom Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville viewed civil society as a form of social interaction that is expressed in independence, finding compromise in a conflict without resorting to violence, acting out of public interest and recognizing diverse attitudes and lifestyles (Baumgarten et al, 2011:291). Stemming from this line of thought, current understanding of the functions of civil society may be summarised as follows: ensuring social integration, legitimization of political order, protection of individual expressions and ensuring individual participation in social and political life (Müller, 2006:318; Klein, 2010:388).
As a counterweight to these social-integrative functions, the ‘keeper of the peace’ function is attributed to the state (Bowden, 2006:158). This means that the state with its monopoly for legitimate use of violence has the responsibility to ensure national security. As an example, the state for Gramsci is different from civil society by its monopoly for coercion and thus consists of ‘the armed forces, law courts and prisons together with all the administrative departments concerning taxation, finance, trade, industry, social security, etc.’ (Bowden, 2006:169). This, consequently, puts defence sphere in the domain of the state (Malešević and Malešević, 2010:405).

In summary, existing literature on state and civil society relations has developed with reference to, and comprises empirical studies of, developed democracies with a well-functioning state. Moreover, available account of functional differentiation between civil society and state puts the sphere of defence clearly and exclusively into the domain of the state.

### 3.2. Civil society at times of war

As the analysis takes place in the context of Ukraine being in a situation of military crisis, it is worth looking at functions and roles that civil society may take with regards to violence and war, in general.

In a useful summary of around ten major works on the topic dated between 1999 and 2008, Meyer and Stacey (2010) show that previous research mostly focused on preventive and reconciling roles of civil society with regards to violence and war. Conceptualizing civil society in terms of civil society organisations (CSOs3), they find that CSOs try to have an impact on the debate before the countries decide to go to war, support or oppose declared wars as well as influence specific methods of war, such as land mines. In terms of opposing the war, CSOs may take action against particular war, such as in the US during the Vietnam War, or oppose the war as such, e.g. the disarmament movement. According to Meyer and Stacey (2010), there are also cases of supporting the war, such as the US ‘home front’ during the World War II, when activists called for sparing resources and buying war bonds or support the US invasion of Iraq received from neoconservative think tanks (Meyer and Stacey, 2010:466).

Meyer and Stacey (2010) give no example of civil society supporting the war on its own territory, but the mobilisation of civic population at times of national wars may be a historical phenomenon, relevant to the contemporary Ukraine. Such an example is the activities of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Russia during the First World War. This party created various associations and non-profit organisations to supply the Russian (imperial) Army with food and ammunition, to build hospitals and take care of the wounded (Zolotaryov, 2015).

Ukraine itself has a history of a pro-war movement as a resistance movement during the Second World War. Ukrainians participated in the partisan movement, which provided irregular resistance to the enemy army. However, as Leonid Girenkevich and David Glantz (1999:71) note,

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3 A working definition of CSO is provided by UNDP (2004:3): “CSOs are non-state actors whose aims are neither to generate profits nor to seek governing power. CSOs unite people to advance shared goals and interests.” Terms “CSO” and “NGO” are often used interchangeably, especially with regards to developing countries. However, there is a growing agreement that CSO category is wider than NGO, because it comprises community-based and faith-based organisations, trade unions and even academia. Social movement is different from both CSO and NGO, because it can develop either from the institutional framework or informal associational networks and it can include CSOs, but also individuals (McAdam et al, 1996:13). Civil society may be seen as an umbrella term for CSO, NGO and social movement.
authorities in Ukraine were instructed to prepare for formation of partisan groups by stockpiling weapons and food, and some army officials were trained as partisan leaders. Therefore, although similar in its national resistance nature, partisan movement is only partly comparable to the current situation. The Ukrainian volunteer movement, and not the state, ensured the resistance in the first weeks of the current armed conflict (Dunnett, 2015). Moreover, a well-organised, while largely informal, army supply chain has been established by the volunteers and has been deemed at times more effective than the state-managed one (Holub, 2015:41).

Another relevant finding by Meyer and Stacey (2010:466) is that at times of war states limit activities of CSOs and citizens ‘either by altering their legal environment or by intimidation’. This is an interesting quote, because in the case of the volunteer movement in Ukraine, the state either did not interfere with their actions or sometimes supported by legally allowing the volunteers, who have travelled to the warzone, to get a status of war veteran and even decorating some of them with the medals (Kaplun and Tatarska, 2015:73).

Finally, an important role is assigned to civil society during post-conflict reconciliation and transition from war to peace. When violence ends, the CSOs may provide support to victims of violence, because they are often used to operating in harsh conditions and may also be better accepted not being a party to the conflict; some CSOs launch or contribute to transitional justice processes and mediation between rival groups in peacebuilding process. According to scholars of democratisation and peacebuilding, civil society is important not just for increasing social trust within and between communities, but they also may complement or even substitute state in provision of public goods, when the state is too weak or not interested in doing so (Meyer and Stacey, 2010:466-477). The latter point is, however, labelled an ‘ideal vision’ by Roberto Belloni (2008:186) who stresses that civil society bears a lot of traits of ‘uncivility’ and therefore is often more fragmented, delusional and less ‘civil’ than we may expect, so one may rely on its ability to substitute the state with a great caution.

The mentioned literature only slightly touches upon the role of civil society at times of war and does not bring clarity into what specific relations it has with the state in war conditions. Moreover, the literature discusses public goods provision, reconciliation, conflict-prevention, but nothing about volunteer groups’ participation or supporting the army of the state with food, wearable items, equipment and IT solutions. In the presented above literature overview, no research, which would explicitly describe a situation when civil society takes up a defence function of the state by organizing volunteer battalions and supplying them with everything from socks to hi-tech arms, has been identified.

3.3. Civil-military relations

Since the object of the thesis, civil society and state relations at times of military crises, is operationalized as the relations between defence volunteer movement and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of Ukraine, a brief insight into literature on civil and military relations is useful.

The literature on civil-military relations is typically focused on discussions about ensuring civil control over the military. The importance of this topic is explained by the fact that states need powerful army to be able to defend themselves from external threats, but civil administrations have to make sure that the army, nevertheless, follows its orders and does not become a threat for state’s own society (Michael, 2007:518). Consequently, there is a tension, which is resolved through
different governance schemes, such as in the UK, where the Prime-Minister has to consult the military commanders, even if he ultimately does not follow their advice. In Ukraine, the President, elected at general elections, is also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, so that civil control is crucial in military decision-making. Yet, researchers outline four major problems of such relations: curbing political power of the military, ensuring that the military is subdue to the civil power, protecting the military from the political elites that would like to use it for their personal benefit, and the issue of relationship of ‘expert to the minister’ meaning that civil authorities may not even possess enough knowledge to be able to make informed decisions in the military sphere (Bland, 1999:12-14).

Despite comprehensiveness, this literature is only concerned with formal governance models of civil over military powers, while the volunteer movement, especially at its inception, was an informal phenomenon. Thus, this literature is relevant only partially, when official platforms of civil society and military interaction are in sight.

3.4. Civil society in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

The body of research on civil society in the CEE is massive and has been conducted in three waves: in 1980-90s, when the resistance movements opposing the authoritarian state gave hope for democratization and civil society was seen as the driving force for change by mainstream researchers and media (Hirst, 1991; Keane, 2010); in 2000s, when optimism was much reduced and researchers labelled civil society in CEE as ‘weak’ mainly due to the absence of strong organisations like it existed in the West (Howard, 2003), and new developments in 2010s, when academic society started to consider more diverse forms of civil society, such as informal movements (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2012; Fröhlich, 2012) and social economy (Laine, 2014).

The line of thought of the second wave of research was dominating CEE civil society literature for a long time, inspired by the Western vision, which focuses on institutional forms of civil society. The ‘weaknesses’ were primarily seen in low levels of participation in the formal organisations, explained by general distrust and avoiding participation as a bad memory of forced membership in industrial trade unions, Komsomol⁴ and so on (Howard, 2003). An idea of a ‘homo sovieticus' mentality that was marked by passivity, was dominating the research (Giza-Poleszczuk, forthcoming:10). A scholar from Ukraine suggested that the post-Soviet societies suffered from distorted societal structures, where main deficiency was ‘the weak development of the values and traditions of civicness’ (Stepanenko, 2006:577).

This approach has been criticized by the most recent research, such as Kerstin Jacobsson and Elzbieta Korolczuk (forthcoming:3). They challenge the established evaluation of civil society in CEE, revealing and discussing several existing theoretical dichotomies, one of which is of particular relevance to this study. This dichotomy is represented by organisational forms of civil society, where only well-structured, formal organisations become objects of research, while informal and semi-organised types of civil society engagement are left behind. Anna Giza-Poleszczuk (forthcoming:7) reveals how the measurement of civil society engagement in terms of membership in various non-government organisations creates a distorted image of Polish civil society as weak, while Stepanenko (2006) shows how inaccurate is describing civil society of Ukraine in 2000s in terms of organisations, considering that many were created as government’s protégés. He also makes a

⁴ The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League – political youth organisation of the former Soviet Union
valuable point for this research by stating that due to a reduction of civil society to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), its important elements, such as social capital, civic values, culture and ethics, are simply ignored.

Geographically, most of the current research on civil society in CEE is conducted within the EU boundaries, in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia (Bernhard, 1993; Celichowski, 2004; Osborne et al, 2005; Jacobsson and Korolczuk, forthcoming; Giza-Poleszcuk, forthcoming) or in the largest East European country – Russia (Hemment, 2004; Chebankova, 2012; Fröhlich, 2012). The relevance of such research calls no doubt, but it is surprising that Ukraine, a large country at the EU border, which has recently signed the EU Association Agreement, has been studied so little in this respect.

With regards to Ukraine, there are some rare, but detailed historical accounts of civil society developments, such as a comparative study of civil society in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine (Lutsevych, 2013) or the study outlining main development milestones, risks and opportunities for the Ukrainian civil society (Ghosh, 2014). Orysla Lutsevych (2013) focuses on the role of civil society in sustaining and promoting democracy in Ukraine as well as Moldova and Georgia. This study, published in early 2013, when there were no signs of the Revolution of Dignity5, concluded that civil society had little capacity to influence policy-making, because of lack of individual citizen engagement, corruption and a network of Western-funded pro-democracy NGOs, which are disconnected from the public. This paper also notes new civic voices, which use public places and social media to invite broader public, other than NGOs, to policy discussions. Mridula Ghosh (2014), focusing on CSOs in her study, describes the Ukrainian civil society as the most rich and diverse in the former Soviet Union, despite issues of underfunding and lacking institutional capacities. This research acknowledges civil society’s ability for spontaneous large-scale grass-roots mobilisation of resources and social capital, as it was during the Orange Revolution 2004-2005 and the Revolution of Dignity 2013-2014, but points that civil society’s systemic approach to influence policy making is yet to be developed. The research concludes that civil society is in place to meet current social challenges, such as the need for more transparency and overcoming current social and political divide. These two studies, even though focused on CSOs, indicate that civil society goes beyond these forms of organisation and acknowledge the importance of less formal engagement channels, such as social media and public places. In light of these studies, it becomes evident that the volunteer mobilisation for defence, although unusual, is logical for the Ukrainian civil society due to its social capital and mobilisation potential.

It is the mobilisation potential of the Ukrainian two revolutionary events in modern history that gained somewhat special scholarly attention: the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014). The Orange Revolution was actively analysed from different perspectives: youth mobilisation (Kuzio, 2006), nationalism and identity (Kuzio, 2010), the role of external influences (McFaul, 2007), the extent to which it was an action of civil society or elite-sponsored putsch (Lane, 2008) or in comparison to Georgia (Laverty, 2008). The most recent Maidan uprising generated an attempt of a comprehensive overview of the Ukrainian revolutions from 1991 to 2014 and analysing Maidan 2013/14 aftermath (Kowal, 2014; Lyubashenko, 2014;

5 Another title of the Maidan uprising in 2013-2014, triggered by the refusal of then-president V. Yanukovych to sign EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It has also been referred to as Euromaidan.
Mikhail Minakov’s (2015) account of the role of civil society after Euromaidan is particularly interesting for this thesis, since he summarised the spheres, where according to Cohen and Arato’s theory of legitimate boundaries, Ukrainian civil society stepped into the state domain. These are defence, where volunteer battalions were formed against Russian intervention and separatists in the east, which were fully autonomously supplied with everything from socks to hi-tech equipment by volunteers; internal security, where self-defence groups, mostly formed during Maidan, continued to police cities across the country even after the uprising; counter-propaganda, when activists formed online resources aimed at countering Russian propaganda about the annexation of the Crimea and conflict in Donbas⁶ (e.g. Facebook group ‘Dyvanna sotnya’ (‘Sofa hundred’), Inforesist, InformNapalm); and illustration, where activists were pushing for change among power elites, mostly in public service, such as local administrations and courts or in rare cases raided offices of the former ruling party to reveal documents confirming corrupt activities without court authorisation.

The present-day defence volunteer movement has not been, to my knowledge, addressed in the Anglophone academic literature. There are media and think tanks accounts, which provide a useful primary data to understand the scope and nature of the movement. For example, a media observer Chris Dunnett (2015) traces back the formation of the movement, presenting its roots in Maidan self-governance and describing its contribution, the most active organisations, nature of support that they provide to the army. However, the few existing academic articles trying to paint or explain the movement were mostly found in Ukrainian. Some of them are available as materials for the International conference ‘Volunteer movement: history, present and perspectives’ held in April 2015 in Ukraine. Containing some information about volunteer movement’s support to the army, they either focus on factual aspects such as what materials the volunteers supply, what structures have been created to facilitate state and civil society interaction (Kaplun and Tatarska, 2015) or on the role of the movement in the social change (Knyshenko, 2015). Types of interactions with the state or experiences that the volunteers have during those interactions remain out of scope of these materials.

To conclude, civil society in CEE has been researched rather extensively, yet the most recent scholarly works contain criticism of the general approach, which is focused on organisational forms of civil society. Ukraine’s civil society became an object of research mostly when it demonstrated large-scale spontaneous mobilisation, such as during the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. There are some accounts of the Ukrainian civil society in general, but like mainstream research on civil society in CEE, they are focused primarily on CSOs. Finally, there are indications in the literature that in the aftermath of the Maidan uprising, civil society assumed functions that it is not supposed to have, and defence is one of them.

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In summary, existing literature of state and civil society relations has developed with reference to, and is based empirically on studies of developed democracies with a well-functioning state and

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6 Cumulative term for Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine
does not provide enough account of the state and civil society relations at times of military crises, especially when the state institutions are weak. Consequently, it is a relevant question to ask whether traditional functional distribution holds in the conditions of an armed conflict on the territory of a weak state. Moreover, functional distribution between civil society and state, according to the literature, should result in the state having monopoly for defence. But in case of Ukraine, it is evident from empirical accounts that civil society has contested the state monopoly for the sphere of defence. So another question is thus what kind of relations have developed between the state and civil society actors, when civil society stepped outside its legitimate boundaries, and how civil society positions itself towards the state in such a situation. Available literature on civil-military relations does not provide an answer as it concerns formal, designed military governance models rather than military authorities’ interaction with loosely institutionalised civil society, so this literature is not going to be used further.

There is also a limited amount of studies of contemporary Ukrainian civil society, aside from the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan), and almost no scholarly articles about the defence volunteer movement. Thus the thesis will contribute to empirical research of Ukrainian civil society and, subsequently to understanding the CEE civil society. Making it a case for further conceptualization of CEE civil society will contribute to the literature that calls for avoiding organisational dichotomies, because of which significant, but unorganised and diverse elements of civil society disappear from the research radar.
4. THEORY

Informed by the review of previous literature on state and civil society relations as well as the events in Ukraine, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the relations between civil society and state in the conditions of military crises on the territory of state. The research is being conducted from the perspective of civil society.

4.1. Definition and functions of civil society

For the sake of clarity, it is important to acknowledge several criticisms of civil society definitions: reliance on a strong state as a counterpart of civil society, tendency to give normative-coloured definitions and too much focus on organisations as actors of civil society. This section will address these issues step by step, and then conclude with a brief summary of civil society functions, important for RQ3 (future ambitions towards the state).

As was briefly covered in the literature review, mainstream analysis of the state and civil society relations relies on understanding of the strong state that, on one hand, enables civil society, and on the other hand, needs to be balanced by it. The general agreement has been effectively summarised by Ghosh (2014:11): “State institutions lay down the terms of cooperation with civil society and not vice versa”. The idea of a strong state is so widespread in civil society research that it comes as part of civil society definitions. For example, Ernst Gellner defines civil society as:

“that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (Bowden, 2006:158, emphasis added).

Without doubting that separating civil society from the state is helpful both theoretically and methodologically, an emphasis on a strong and well-functioning state presents an issue for the research into young democracies, which is the case of Ukraine. According to Philip Keefer (2007) young democracies are characterized by corruption and clientilism, which is directly opposite to the concept of a well-functioning state. Still, the fact that the rise of civil society in Ukraine in the form of the defence volunteer movement has taken place precisely when the state was weak brings about the first issue of traditional definitions of civil society: assuming a strong state.

The second issue is the tendency to give positive normative colouring to the definitions of civil society, which significantly reduces scope of the analysis (Meyer and Stacey, 2010:464) and may lead to ‘invisibilisation’, i.e. exclusion from the academic and policy considerations, of certain movements and groups, such as far right, conservative religious groups or conservative-nationalistic movements (Jacobsson and Korolczuk, forthcoming).

The third issue has been summarised in the literature review as the organisational dichotomy (Jacobsson and Korolczuk, forthcoming) and refers to neglecting informal groups and even individuals in evaluating civil society. Typical definition in this tradition is the following: ‘Civil society refers to the realm of organisations, groups, and associations that are formally established, legally protected, autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens’ (Howard, 2010:187, emphasis added). Lack of citizens’ formal membership in CSOs leads to labelling CEE civil society as weak; this is contradicted by empirical evidence from the region and Ukraine, in particular. In
case of Ukraine application of this approach would mean that 67% of volunteers would not be covered by the research, because they have been volunteering independently from any organisation – this is, according to rough estimations, around 2 million people (Gfk, 2014:7). These volunteers are very diverse, and the group may include anyone from worker to top-manager and jobless person who either do not trust official organisations or prefer to remain incognito, because of personal reasons such as having relatives in separatist regions, helping with tax-evaded money or buying equipment and supplies through illegal or semi-legal channels. That is why it is challenging to estimate the size of this group, but excluding them completely from the research will not provide full picture of civil society in Ukraine.

This thesis will take into account criticism of organisational dichotomy, because it allows going beyond the limits of researching organisations and looking at other forms. This is the reason why more inclusive social movement was chosen as object of research, rather than CSOs. This approach, according to Jussi Laine (2014) is more promising in explaining the nature and mechanisms of civil society.

Stripping off the normative component, an idea of a strong state behind civil society and going beyond focus on formal organisations, the following definition of civil society is applicable to the thesis:

“the sphere of actors, values, and institutions “that is analytically independent of and, to varying degrees, empirically differentiated from” family, state and market (Alexander, 1998:6 in Meyer and Stacey, 2010:465).”

Finally, since this thesis is interested in future ambitions of civil society towards the state (RQ3), participative function of civil society in relation to the state will be used as analytical framework. According to it, civil society should be able to ensure more effective citizen engagement in public causes by forming interest groups (Müller, 2006:318). Types of potential participation were derived inductively: social and political participation, civil control and entering a pool of state officials.

4.2. Collective identity

RQ 1 about the collective identity of the volunteer movement is informed by the importance of this phenomenon both for inception of collective action and as its product. Collective identity for the purposes of this thesis is understood as ‘a shared sense of “we-ness”’ (Snow, 2001 in Hunt and Benford, 2004:440). The definition to be used:

“individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connections with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:284 in Hunt and Benford, 2004:440).

According to this definition, it makes sense to look at two aspects creating collective identity: connections to the practices of the volunteer movement, which would be formulated through their description of themselves and the movement in general, and a description of the state, which also could potentially be perceived as shared and create ground for movement’s cohesion (Ibid., 2004:440).
As to how collective identities are shaped, theory of ‘othering’ is useful for this thesis. This theory explains how more powerful social groups impose particular characteristics onto subordinate ones thus shaping their own and ‘the other’s’ collective identities. This process is based on setting clear border lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to establish social distance (Lister, 2004:101). Even though this process is largely used to explain the processes between different power groups, its tools are applicable even for this research of civil society and state relations. It is because as a result of othering, the othered group is reduced to stereotypical characters, often described as intellectually incapable and granted with only few negative features and nearly nothing positive, which in turn, solidifies the “we” group (Jensen, 2010:65).

In light of civil society taking up some defence functions, which the state was not capable of, it is plausible to expect that some traces of othering could be present in the volunteers’ narratives.

4.3. Typology of civil society and state relations

The analysis of state and civil society relations (RQ2) is informed by the Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein’s (2008) types or perspectives on the relations between civil society and state and nuanced with an additional dimension of quality of experience during those relations.

Chambers and Kopstein (2008:364) formulated the following ideal types of state and civil society relations:

- civil society *apart* from the state;
- civil society *against* the state;
- civil society *in support* of the state;
- civil society *in dialogue* with the state;
- civil society *in partnership* with the state;
- civil society *beyond* the state.

These types are not mutually exclusive, but they reflect particular interesting characteristics of the relations between civil society and state. Such approach is useful for this thesis, because it opens the opportunity to single out several perspectives specific to the current situation rather than bluntly and mechanically reduce complex relations to one ideal type. This is also a useful framework, because the authors provide guidance for each type, which can actually be tracked for any civil society case, so it makes this typology empirically applicable. Below there is a discussion of each type of relations.

Understanding of civil society as *apart* from the state is based on the concept of freedom of association and negative boundaries to the state, guaranteed by the liberal constitutional order. It originated from the Western state-civil society models, where civil society gradually separated from the state, and mechanisms to prevent state interference were incorporated into the state law, creating western liberal democracies. The authors point that if the associations are tolerated rather ‘by default than by design’, then it cannot be considered a civil society apart from the state. Finally, they clearly state that army is not civil society (Ibid., 365-366).

The perspective of civil society *against* the state is illustrated by the examples of the Central and Eastern European countries in 1980s, where dismantling of totalitarian regimes is attributed to the power of civil society (Chambers and Kopstein, 2008:367). According to Konrad’s concept of ‘anti-politics’ and Havel’s ‘power of the powerless’, citizens of the totalitarian countries curved out
niches, where state could not interfere and also the citizens could protest against the regime in their everyday activity rather than by mobilising in associations. This later created a platform for national movements such as Solidarity in Poland and ultimate relatively smooth overthrow of the socialist regimes. This perspective is one of the most widely discussed in the literature on social movements, where their relations with the state are described in terms of protest (Della Porta, 1995). Even if the protest does not result in open manifestations, the relations against still refer to autonomy of civil society, where it seeks to avoid interaction with the state or supporting it, also by politicizing non-political, such as everyday routines (Chambers and Kopstein, 2008:368).

Another way of looking at state and civil society relations is through the prism of a public sphere, where civil society engages the state into a dialogue and where ‘the ideas, interests, values, and ideologies formed within civil society are voiced and made politically effective’ (Habermas 1996:367 in Chambers and Kopstein, 2008:370). This is a kind of dialogue, where the state has to account for its actions before civil society, and the enlightened citizens are ultimately able to remove unjust practices and unnecessary state domination. According to this line of thinking, successful social movements not just reach their particularistic interests, but they establish civil society as a legitimate participant in dialogue with the state and make different voices heard. In practice this results in creating new political opportunity structures for other movements (Tarrow, 1996:58). Somewhat idealistic, this approach is thought of more like a goal to strive for than a realistic perspective.

The forth type of relations as outlined by Chambers and Kopstein (2008:373) is civil society in support of the state meaning that civil society serves as a ‘school of citizenship’. This argument, especially developed in the US context, follows neo-Tocquevillian approach to civil society and considers reciprocity, characteristic of civic associations, as the foundation for democracy. In this understanding, civil society supports the state. Same theorists, however, argue against increasing intrusiveness of the state, which may deprive citizens of their ability to perform their civic responsibilities. Unlike the ‘civil society apart from the state’ category, the ‘in support’ type suggests that in pursuing pluralistic goals, associations create common values of cooperation, trust, reciprocity and thus represent a school of citizenship for democracy. Chambers and Kopstein then challenge this argument by stating that the feelings of respect and reciprocity may be created in both pro-democratic ‘good’ civil society and in an aggressive, chauvinistic and violent ‘bad’ civil society, underlying that reciprocity on its own between the members of the association does not guarantee development of democratic values.

Another approach described in Chambers and Kopstein (2008:374) is that of partnership with the state, which would be the result of decentralization and devolution of some of the state functions to citizen associations. They discuss this mostly as a state’s conscious decision, dictated by the fact that the centralised state either simply cannot provide goods locally in a proper manner or that it tries to increase own legitimacy through involving citizens in policy decisions. In the case of goods provision, the phenomenon is understood as ‘hybridisation’ and refers to mostly education and healthcare sectors, while civil society in this case is viewed in its neoliberal understanding as including corporate actors (service providers) (Brandsen, 2010; Önnerfors & Pålsson, 2014). Civil society is sometimes empowered ‘by default’ – when the state is simply not there. Civil society may then view the state as an unwilling partner, and the partnerships will be characterized by tensions. Another issue of the partnership relations is that questions of responsibility remain open – are the
partners equally responsible for malfunction or does one of them bear ultimate responsibility? (Chambers and Kopstein, 2008:374).

Final type, civil society *beyond* the state, refers to the global or transnational civil society, and therefore is not in scope of this thesis (Chambers and Kopstein, 2008:376).

These types have been constructed on a significant amount of research, which is why they are useful. Yet, since the authors did not set criteria for assigning certain relations to a particular type, the following analytical framework was developed to assist in empirical part of the research:

*Figure 1. Operationalization of Chambers and Kopstein's state and civil society relations typology*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations with the state</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apart</td>
<td>Freedom of association is guaranteed by the constitutional order and civil society does not experience interference from the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Civil society seeks autonomy and actively avoids interaction with the state. Or, clearly states about its opposition, when asked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In dialogue</td>
<td>In connection to the concept of public sphere by Habermas, these relations are marked by using public channels, such as media or advisory board, for interaction with the state. It is important that the state has to account for what is being said in the public sphere and expected from it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In partnership</td>
<td>Civil society is assigned or gains itself certain role in the areas, where the state is not able to deliver goods or services. When it happens at the initiative of the state, the phenomenon is called 'hybridisation' and refers to education and healthcare. Sometimes civil society is empowered 'by default', which means it stepped in the areas where the state failed to act, and did not ask the permission of the state for interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In support</td>
<td>Civil society, because of reciprocity created within it, lays down foundations for a more democratic society. Experience of associational life will serve as a prerequisite for creating a state based on democratic values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the examples and cited cases in this theory suggest that this model is valid for relatively peaceful times. It is therefore the purpose of this thesis to investigate, if this typology is applicable to the situation of an armed conflict on the territory of state and, if yes, whether any type is prevailing.

Despite Chambers and Kopstein's (2008) types being comprehensive and built on strong theoretical and empirical background, they do not provide account for how these relations are perceived either by the state or civil society. They only hint at it in reference to 'in partnership' relations, mentioning that when civil society is empowered by default, partnership can sometimes be 'unwilling' (Ibid., 2008:374). Yet, these subjective perceptions are important for understanding how actors evaluate their interactions, which ultimately would give a more nuanced picture of state and civil society relations. Therefore, the dimension 'quality of experience', which will additionally characterise each type of relations, is introduced for this thesis. It is important to note that although this dimension is theoretically applicable to both state and civil society in relation to each other, it
will be only used empirically to describe perception of civil society representatives’ of their relations with the state, because it is civil society perspective that is in focus of this thesis.

Thus, quality of experience will reflect civil society representatives’ subjective perception of how state treats them as they engage in certain types of relations and will potentially help match the kinds of relations to better or worse subjective evaluations of experiences by civil society. Consequently, matching types of relations and quality of experiences will help nuance the state and civil society relations in a situation, when civil society has engaged in the traditional state domain of defence. The quality of experience has been assigned the following types:

Figure 2. Types of quality of experience with the state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actively negative</td>
<td>A perception of relations, where the state tries to establish illegitimate superiority over volunteers or where it opposes their activities in any way, such as legal prosecution, dissemination of controversial information, procedural obstacles within MoD etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passively negative</td>
<td>A perception of relations, where officials are believed to cover up their inaction behind demands of bureaucratic system and/or abuse volunteer help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passively positive</td>
<td>A perception where the state is granted certain receptiveness towards volunteers’ claims or may assist in some issues, if asked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively positive</td>
<td>A perception of relations, characterised by proactivity and openness of the state towards volunteers’ initiatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, the research of state and civil society relations in case of military crises is informed by Chambers and Kopstein’s (2008) types of relations: civil society apart from the state, civil society against the state, civil society in partnership with the state, civil society in dialogue with the state, and civil society in support of the state. Civil society beyond the state will not be used in this thesis since it refers to transnational civil society. This is a useful typology specifically for this thesis since it explains civil society-state relations primarily from civil society perspective, which is also the chosen perspective of this thesis. The aforementioned typology was enriched with a dimension of “quality of experience”, which will help nuance the relations between civil society and state and make the typology more applicable for empirical purposes.

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In the chapter above, the analytical perspective guiding this thesis has been presented. This theoretical framework covers all three research questions, focused on volunteers’ collective identity, their perceptions of their relations and experiences with the state and future ambitions. Theory-informed answers on these questions will help reach the aim of the thesis, which is to investigate civil society and state relations at times of military crises from civil society perspective.
5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Considering that the research questions are intended to better understand what kind of relations between civil society and state established in Ukraine in the situation of military crisis, the study employs qualitative research. The study approaches this social phenomenon ‘from the inside’ by capturing and analysing experiences of different volunteer groups and their interactions with the state ‘in the making’, therefore qualitative research design is used (Flick, 2007:ix).

The research is approached from an interpretive paradigm, acknowledging that it is specifically focused on the perspective of civil society, and is not aiming at generalizing findings to include state perspective. As the research concerns issues of identity, relations with the state and participants' own thinking about volunteer movement's future potential, the conclusions are to be derived in the tradition of verstehen, i.e. drawn from experiences and opinions of the members of the movement (Tracy, 2013:41). Such approach results in employing the method of interviews as the most suitable data collection method.

Due to a relative lack of research on civil society in CEE and Ukraine especially, the study combines deductive and inductive approach. Such a combination is not rare, and has been used previously for studying CEE civil society (Uhlin, 2006:5). Chambers and Kopstein (2008) typology of civil society and state relations serves as a theoretical framework for analysing volunteers’ relations with the state, while inductively derived category of quality of such relations, as described by a respondent, helps to paint a more nuanced picture of the relations.

5.1. Case selection

The case of Ukraine was selected because the topic of the study is the relations between civil society and state in the conditions of military crises, which is currently the socio-political context of life in Ukraine. Also, the peculiarities of the Ukrainian civil society and its proactivity present an interesting object of research. On one hand, it has been considered weak since the collapse of the Soviet Union. On another hand, in 2014 there has been a significant increase in volunteer participation, with a shift towards helping the army, which is clear because of current political situation. At the same time, the volunteer movement is considered by a big part of population a source of the recent social changes (GfK, 2014), while the volunteer movement engaged in activities, which interfered with one of the main state functions, security (Minakov, 2015).

While some qualitative research design scholars insist on comparative case selection (Flick, 2007:40), choosing a single case is preferable, when more in-depth analysis and an empirical contribution is intended. Some examples for civil society research using a single case are: a case study of state-civil society relations in Leipzig (Olivo, 2011), a study of disability NGOs in Russia (Fröhlich, 2012), or a research on animal rights movement in Poland (Jacobsson, 2012).

5.2. Data collection and sampling

Considering its interpretative paradigm, the research is based on analysing experiences of the participants of the volunteer movement in their everyday interaction with the state, which would be addressed by ‘analyzing everyday knowledge, accounts and stories’ (Kvale, 2007:ix)). Therefore 16 semi-structured real-world interviews, and 1 phone interview, were conducted during March 2016 in
Kyiv, Ukraine, in Ukrainian and Russian languages (Kvale, 2007:10-11). Translation of quotes into English was done by the author.

In order to study civil society ‘in the most instructive way’ and cover reasonably broad range of possible forms of volunteering for the army, a purposive sampling of volunteers for three categories – officially interacting with the state, formal, and informal – was used to construct a maximal variation sample (Flick, 2007:27-29). These categories were created in consideration of criticism of organisational dichotomies that is why informal volunteers are included (Jacobsson and Korolczuk, forthcoming).

The three groups of volunteers also represent, broadly, three levels of interaction with MoD. Officially interacting volunteers are engaged at the highest decision-making level in Kyiv, where they get involved in the meetings up to presidential and ministerial level. Formal volunteers are active in media with regards to MoD affairs and in profile committees, such as the technical committee of the tender division of MoD or committee on reforming the Special Operation Forces of Ukraine, where they interact with middle management of MoD central apparatus; in rare cases they may personally interact with top MoD officials. Informal volunteers are either engaged in the zone of ATO\(^7\), indirectly through correspondence and hotlines or do not engage at all with the state apparatus. In the two former cases, volunteers generally deal with field staff or low-rank central officials.

Selection criteria for the groups:

- **Officially interacting** – private persons, either members of NGOs or not who are engaged with the state through official platforms or hold official positions as volunteers. The platforms are the Volunteer Council at MoD\(^8\) and the Association of Volunteers of Ukraine\(^9\); the positions are within MoD.

- **Formal volunteers** – private persons who are members of an organisation (fund, NGO), which supplies goods or services to the military units without any fee. The organisations, represented in the sample, are “Narodny Tyl” (“People’s Home Front”), “Wilni.UA” (“Free.UA), “Combat.UA”, “Povernys zhyvym” (“Come Back Alive”), “People’s Project”, which are among the most well-known in Ukraine (Volunteer database, 2016).

- **Informal volunteers** – private persons who are not part of any formal fund or NGO and who are directly supplying to military units or even other private persons serving in the army.

Two volunteers were engaged owing to personal contacts directly\(^10\), while the rest needed to be approached through ‘gate-keepers’, who happened to be among personal contacts. Although obtaining contact details worked as a snowball (Tracy, 2013:135), the volunteers were interviewed only if their profile met the abovementioned criteria. Only respondent interviews were conducted, because the participants’ own experiences are in focus.

\[^7\] Anti-Terrorist Operation – the name of the Ukrainian military operation in the East of Ukraine against pro-Russian separatists.

\[^8\] Public, relatively autonomous structure at MoD with a formal right to advise on reforms; may not be dissolved by the Minister.

\[^9\] NGO comprising most of defence volunteer organisations.

\[^10\] According to good practice, I did not know most participants personally before I invited them for interviews. There are two exceptions: one formal volunteer who visited Sweden in December 2015, where we met the first time; and one informal volunteer, whom I knew from my work experience in Ukraine, but did not keep any personal contact.
Sampling refers not only to selecting participants, but also picking up elements of interviews for analysis (Flick, 2007:80). To make the selection more structured an interview guide, built on previous knowledge about the movement and theoretical framework, was developed (Tracy, 2013:143). It included questions about volunteers’ background, previous volunteer experience, current relations with the state and plans for the future. The full interview guide is available in Annex II.

All of the volunteers have been in the movement since its beginning in 2014. Below is the anonymised list of respondents, indicating their age, gender, occupation outside volunteer activity and belonging to one of the analysed groups of volunteers. This sample illustrates a wide gender and age span as well as diversity of occupations, characteristic to the movement participants.

Figure 3. Anonymised list of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview number</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Occupation (outside of volunteer activity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers officially interacting with the state (5 respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>IT developer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Manager at a large company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Industrial project-manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
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<td>Formal volunteers (6 respondents)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>female</td>
<td>Psychologist, retired</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Informal volunteers (6 respondents)</td>
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<td>Human Resources at a bank</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>female</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>male</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Administrator at a retail chain</td>
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<td>female</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
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Interviews were held at either offices or public places, and were recorded, upon obtaining respondents’ oral informed consent. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes, while some exceeded 2 hours. Transcribed interviews amounted to 100 pages of text. Most of the interviewees are people in their 30s, and their occupations are very different, with an exception of entrepreneur, which was the most wide-spread occupation in the sample. The majority of occupations listed above assume good project and people management skills, which sheds light on skills, required to be a
part of a social movement. Entrepreneurs’ flexible working schedule could also create conditions for their active involvement.

Most of the interviews were emotionally charged, sometimes involving rough language. All of the interviewees were very open to the research, even if questions seemed controversial to them.

5.3. Data analysis methods

To process the interviews and provide answers to research questions, a software-assisted conventional and directed content analysis was performed (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1279-1283). MAXQDA 12 is the qualitative data analysis software, which allowed to conveniently code and then analyse all 17 interviews as well as obtain visualizations of conclusions.

At the first step of the analysis, all texts were coded with the first-level codes using constant comparative method (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Participants’ own words to describe what they were doing or what kind of relations they had with the state authorities, were used to code data and compare it with each other, looking for similar patterns. Lumping was the way to summarise any fact-based information, such as what kind of items volunteers supplied to the army, because it was hardly dependent on interpretations. Fracturing was used to code segments of texts, were respondents talked about themselves, their future ambitions or relations with the state. Such breaking the text into smaller pieces ensured that covered interpretations were more nuanced (Tracy, 2013:181). First level codes were obtained through conventional content analysis by noting any references to the relations with the state, from mentioning any collaborative platforms to simple conversations with responsible MoD officials or attempts to influence MoD decisions from inside or via media. Then, these segments were grouped into second level codes either deductively or inductively, depending on their content. For example, second level codes for types of relations with the state are based on the typologies of Chambers and Kopstein (2008), meaning they were obtained deductively and matched to first-level codes. On the contrary, second level code ‘quality of experience with the state’ has been created inductively, since the theory on civil society-state relations used as a background for research does not account for how certain types of relations are experienced by civil society representatives, but it was important for the respondents. Comprehensive codebook is available in Annex II.

5.4. Critical reflection on methodology

Before proceeding to analysis, it is important to critically discuss the chosen methodology and analytical framework.

I am aware that the ideal design of research into relations between civil society and state should include both sides of the equation. Yet, due to practical reasons as well as unusual development of defence volunteer movement in Ukraine, only civil society is in focus of this study. This means that the findings of the research should be treated with caution and generalised only to indicate civil society perspective, while any claims of the state’s perceptions of volunteers should not be made as a result of this research. This, however, does not prevent us from investigating the opinions of civil society about the state and state’s treatment of the volunteers.

Interviews as methods of data collection allow the research to be based on primary data, which reduces risk of distortion of conclusions influenced by mediators, such as in the case of using secondary data. Especially when the goal is to capture subjective experiences and perceptions,
interviews are preferable method, since talking tête-à-tête, respondent and researcher build relations of mutual trust, allowing respondent to open up and share genuine information. There is, however, a risk that such trust-based relations might result in researcher’s unintended favouring of one respondent over another and, consequently, prevailing of their experiences in the analysis. So, in order to make volunteers’ voices, rather than researcher’s perception, heard, I double-checked frequency of use of citations from the same respondent and did several rounds of coding.

The sample of respondents is not statistically representative; therefore generalisation in statistical terms is not possible and is not intended by the thesis. When constructing the sample, the goal was to cover maximal diversity of forms of volunteers’ interaction with the state. Therefore the number of respondents in the sample was established on the principles of theoretical saturation, when adding another respondent did not bring new knowledge (Tracy, 2012:197).

17 interviews produced 100 pages of texts for analysis. Because of such amount of data, a decision was made to use content analysis software MAX QDA 12. Although it helped coding the texts and matching coded segments to types of volunteers, the capacities of this software also created a temptation to quantify the results. In fact, this software allows the researcher to see and compare amount of coded segments per each code, which might create an illusion of quantitative method and result in analysis based on majority or minority of quotes. But as the sample is not representative of the volunteer movement in statistical terms, such an approach would jeopardize this research, therefore only very limited amount of visualizations was used in the analysis rather to demonstrate the patters than to confirm the argument quantitatively, and should only be perceived so.

At the stage of coding and analysis, some of the types were more difficult to separate than it appeared from the theory; it is especially valid for ‘in partnership’ and ‘in dialogue’ types. Partially, this is because theory does not provide clear criteria for assigning certain type of relations, and the types were operationalized for this research. At the same time, the boundaries between these two types of relations are indeed blurred, and this is acknowledged by Chambers and Kopstein (2008). To minimize the confusion, the questionable segments were coded and re-coded several times and compared to other coded segments within the type; once they created a coherent group, they were attributed to one or the other type.
6. ANALYSIS

Analytical scheme, discussed in Chapter 4 and methods, discussed in Chapter 5, have been used to conduct the analysis for the thesis. The results below are grouped according to the research question.

6.1. RQ1: Collective identity of the social movement

This section addresses volunteers’ perceptions of themselves (‘us’) and the state (‘the other’), based on the analysis of respective narratives in the interviews. The perceptions of ‘us’ are grouped around characteristic features that the volunteers ascribe to the movement and their perception of their role towards the state. The section is finalized with analysis of the volunteers’ description of the state, “the other”.

In describing themselves, all of the respondents mentioned several characteristic features of the movement: cohesion – ability of the volunteers to agree on various matters despite differences in scope of their work, ambitions – willingness to become more popular or enter government offices among the volunteers, distrust towards each other, knowledge – possession of specific knowledge with regards to defence, and reciprocity – mutual support and help. Formal volunteers were typically concerned with issues of cohesion and distrust; officially interacting volunteers paid a lot of attention to the issues of ambitions and knowledge, while informal volunteers were most notably referring to reciprocity as a characteristic feature of the movement. These themes are visually represented in the Figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Visualisation of the self-ascribed features of the volunteer movement

Source: MAX QDA, the more prevailing is the category, the bigger is the circle

With regards to cohesion, dominating thought was that volunteers have a very limited ability to agree with each other, and personal conflicts represent a significant issue for the movement. The quote below summarises controversies around volunteers’ ability to collaborate with each other:

“Volunteers are surely not united. Volunteers started to split long ago, around 2 years ago. Those, who followed their own personal interests, first came seemingly out of pure motivations, to become members of the Volunteer Landing, most of whom, in my opinion, not all of them, but most of them, jeopardized volunteer movement, but anyway they made some push to change and reforms in the army. There is also an Association of Volunteers, where collaboration is much better set up, and with them we ["People’s Home Front"] communicate really well” (Respondent 11).

According to the respondents, challenges to cohesion may be linked to another feature of the movement – the ambitions of some of the volunteers to take up higher state positions or earn or maintain higher social status, which ultimately leads to interpersonal conflicts. Respondent 4 gives such a summary of the issue of ambitions:
“Every volunteer is a leader. Those volunteers, who work in a more or less organised way, they are like a ministry themselves: they know where to get money, they know what is needed and how to find it and they know how to deliver it. …Each of them is a king himself, that is why it is very difficult to get united”.

At the same time, reciprocity was cited among all of the volunteers, when it came to helping the soldiers at the frontline. Respondent 2 provides a representation of this feature:

“If the volunteer, with whom I would never do any joint projects, because I know that this person is not trustworthy, asks me for help for a soldier, l, of course, will help”.

The quote above reveals another issue, which has been discussed by volunteers – distrust. Although, according to one of the respondents, the volunteers have a common goal of ‘protecting the country from the military threat from the East’ (Respondent 9), there is a lack of trust between the representatives of the movement outside of their own inner circle. Some cite the issue of transparency of reporting or suspicion of the hidden agenda as the reasons for not trusting other volunteers. The quote below reflects these considerations:

“When he stood with you together on barricades just yesterday, and today he says that we are wrong, he says it has to be done in such and such way, you understand that the person is trying to enforce the values of the state apparatus on you” (Respondent 6).

Finally, volunteers paid much attention to evaluation of the movement’s ability to substantially engage in defence issues, such as reforms at MoD, grouped under ‘knowledge’ (Figure 4). While there is a general agreement that volunteers have gained ‘empirical knowledge in selecting military suppliers’ (Respondent 1) or understanding of processes within particular military brunch (because they had worked with them), there is typically a doubt that volunteers possess enough knowledge for deeper engagement, both because they are not fully aware of how the state apparatus works and because they lack technical military knowledge. Typical doubts about volunteers’ fit to manage defence matters from within the state have been summarised by Respondent 10:

“Volunteer is not always a person that has competencies to work at a certain level. If I am offered to become the Minister of Defence tomorrow, I will refuse, because I don’t fit [this position] due to my knowledge, life and professional experience…To take such big positions, one should have particular education and work experience…and see the system from inside for a relatively long time”.

The volunteers, however, use opportunities to learn as much as they can. For example, Respondent 4 told about having set up courses about the internal processes within MoD specifically for volunteers, in partnership with MoD and international donors.

In terms of their role, volunteers tended to describe themselves as drivers for change by using various analogous expressions for ‘drivers’, such as ‘lifts for ideas’, ‘pusher’ or ‘locomotive’. Being especially typical self-perception among officially interacting and formal volunteers, this role is summarised as follows:

“They [volunteers at the Volunteer Council] are the lifts for ideas. Because we are accepted by the minister, the heads of the departments and even president or his administration, we use this opportunity. But not for our personal good, but to change the situation. We take the problem, bring it on a higher level, implemented the solution and the problem starts to be taken care of” (Respondent 4).
Self-perception as transmitters of goods to the frontline was not generally a big topic among volunteers, though it was more common to notice a quote like this one among small-scale informal volunteers:

“…there are two paths in volunteering – you dig into the system, try to change laws, go to court or on manifestations, demand something, or you simply buy gasoline and deliver it to the frontline. These are two mutually exclusive paths …and we chose the path of gasoline” (Respondent 13).

Non-typical were also self-descriptions of volunteers as generators of useful ideas for MoD. This dimension concerns the fact that volunteers are active members of society, who also spend part of their time on the frontline and talk to the army officers and soldiers, thus they are able to bring ideas from the frontline to headquarters. Quote below represents this point of view:

“Normal officials, such as our Minister of Defence, consider the volunteers to be a creative chain, which can’t perform grand tasks by itself, but is capable of being the source of undistorted information. And is capable of bringing out-of-the-box ideas, which the officials are incapable of” (Respondent 10).

The quote above is also exemplary of the way how volunteers describe the state, impersonated by MoD officials, as intellectually incapable. It is typical among the respondents to refer towards the state officials in negative terms, with explicit distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a narrative, using sometimes derogative language. Such an attitude is partially predicted by the theory, where the very concept of ‘othering’ is built around diminishing positive features and exaggerating negative ones of the ‘other’ group. Such moods were even harsher at the beginning of the volunteer movement, when some volunteers ‘treated the state as losers’ (Respondent 1). Further quote illustrates current tendency:

“We have to watch them [state officials] all the time. They are rare douchebags. They are always trying to steal something, they are always competing between each other for power, but it brings no result” (Respondent 6).

Somewhat paternalistic judgments about the state are also reflected in the reasoning behind some of the volunteers to join the movement:

“I said let’s show the state how to take care of its soldiers” (Respondent 1).

Similarly, state officials have been generally blamed for non-performing their functions and laziness, and sometimes even pretending to be working:

“It [internal pressure] worked very well in 2014, and now works worse. Because officials learn too – they learned to put smoke into your eyes, create visibility of work, but not perform actual work” (Respondent 2).

Positive evaluations of the state officials were virtually non-existent, but a couple of narratives, showing emotional solidarity with the state officials and describing them as regular people, attracted my attention. Such as this one:

“My friends-politicians who have more experience, who are older than me, because of our good relations, could tell me: “Please, don’t play with my head…this should be so and so”. This is a normal conversation. If it’s constructive, then it’s constructive. If these are just pompous words…but I never encountered animosity” (Respondent 5).
In this quote, “the other” receives a human face, contrary to dehumanizing that is generally characteristic of the narratives using negative descriptions of state officials.

In connection to describing officials, the volunteers tend to talk about the need to reform MoD, both from structural and human resources perspective. A typical reasoning of that would be similar to this:

“To destroy everything with a shovel, and build from scratch. To change the whole defence system. It would have been perfect” (Respondent 11).

In conclusion of this section, it is perhaps too early to speak about the existence of a collective identity among the volunteers. Nevertheless, based on volunteers’ own accounts, there are certain common traits in the self-perception of the movement, such as its role as a driver for change, lack of cohesion and concerns that some of the participants place personal ambitions too high, from the point of view of the others. At the same time, volunteers remain reciprocal towards each other when it comes to the initial purpose of the movement – supply to the frontline. Interestingly, volunteers are reasonably aligned in their description of the state officials, ascribing them rather limited intellectual abilities, lack of initiative and clearly distinguishing ‘us’ (volunteers) from ‘them’ (state). This holds even for most of volunteers interacting with the state officially. Such a perception of the state explains why the volunteers mostly perceive themselves as drivers of change rather than simple service providers.

6.2. RQ2: Volunteers’ relations with the state

In this section, the analysis of the volunteers’ relations with the state is presented in two subsections. In 6.2.1. volunteers’ relations with the state are analysed according to Chambers and Kopstein’s (2008) typology. The findings that volunteers engage in all types of relations with the state (‘in partnership’, ‘in dialogue’, ‘against’, ‘in support’, and ‘apart’) support the theory, where it predicts that these types are not mutually exclusive. Yet, some of the types were dominating the respondents’ narratives and were linked to particular groups of volunteers. In 6.2.2., a dimension of quality of experience is addressed. The subsection finds that all four categories ‘passively and actively negative’, ‘passively and actively positive’ were present in the narratives, but negative categories dominated.

6.2.1. Types of relations according to Chambers and Kopstein

The visualisation below is a summary of volunteers’ perceptions of their relations with the state, discussed further.

![Figure 5. Visualisation of volunteers' relations with the state](image)

Source: MAX QDA, the larger the circle, the more mentions are there of a type of relationship

**Partnership** as relations with the state was predominantly cited by volunteers officially interacting with the state. They typically referred to joint projects with or within MoD departments or
their work as advisors for MoD officials. For example, a group of volunteers initiated the Volunteer Council, a relatively autonomous structure at MoD, which has the formal right to advise on reforms, and may not be dissolved by the minister. This opportunity to engage with the state had to be carved out from the state rather than was created by it, which is typical for accounts of the interactions with the state by the volunteers:

“When we started creating the Volunteer Council, we worked with legal advisors, [and] MoD first did not want to register it in such format [that we insisted upon], because the Council had quite good powers, but ultimately it was established and now serves as connection hub between MoD, its officials, and external parties, public sector” (Respondent 1).

Aside from formal advisory rights granted by its legal status, the Volunteer Council serves as a platform, which volunteers try to use in order to push and encourage reforms from within the structure of MoD, while sometimes substituting state officials:

“Our role is public control and partial implementation of certain functions instead of them [MoD responsible persons] there, where they are not ready to do something” (Respondent 4).

Other volunteers were invited for an advisory role once their track record was known by an official. The Respondent 2 recalls an invitation she received from the former Deputy Minister of Defence, himself a former volunteer:

“We talked with him [former Deputy Minister of Defence] about the problems of military medicine; he saw how much I know, because I have encountered this, both in practice and theory. …We got acquainted and literally the next day he invited me to work at MoD…to become his advisor”.

Within their partnership interactions, formal volunteers try to influence MoD with the available official channels and by doing joint projects, where they sometimes literally drag the official participants into. They are using their positions within MoD system yet without being directly accountable to the minister, to push through the projects that they deem necessary, usually by trying to make officials do their job or lifting the initiatives ‘from below’:

“I see the issue, I am told that it is solvable – then I take people, responsible for this issue in the ministry, discuss all possible outcomes, and then they tell me if they are ready or not to change anything. Some may say that they have too much work. I say, ok, but I need your presence, and everything else will be done instead of you. And then, the person becomes gradually engaged. The most important is to attract them to those meetings” (Respondent 4).

Among informal volunteers, description of relations as ‘in partnership’ was extremely rare, and in those cases state officials were framed as usual people that needed help as the rest of us:

“They [MoD] were happy to help, were easy to contact, they are normal people, it’s just no one was ready for the war” (Respondent 12).

Being in dialogue with the state was the most recurrent theme among formal volunteers. It was typical to hear that high-rank officials at MoD were sensitive towards public opinion and media reports about their activities to such an extent that it reminded some of the interviewees an ‘employee of the year’ competition. An illustration of this peculiarity was given by the Respondent 6:
“Thanks God that the Head of the General Staff and the Minister of Defence have the same soft spots – [it is important for them] to surpass each other in the media space. That is why we can moderate them somehow. For example, we say that in two years the Navy Commander has not done anything [for navy staff], he has treated them like trash, but they fight every day. We have been told at the headquarters that yes, we understand, but without the signal from the public – this is such a Soviet understanding – we will not do anything...”

It was not possible to single out particular group of volunteers, who would mainly describe their relations with the state in terms of being against it. Yet, this type of relations was more characteristic of the narratives of formal and informal volunteers.

Among formal volunteers, there is a sense of frustration about the perceived inability of state to conduct reforms in the defence sector. This happens because formal volunteers, due to their interaction with MoD, consider that it possesses massive resources, which are not used to the full. Some of the opinions about it were striking:

“It is completely unclear for me why the state, being in possession of such resources, can’t do this… I don’t even know how to help this country. It has cancer” (Respondent 6).

Informal volunteers were relatively more vocal about being against the state. One of the reasons for this may be that unlike officially interacting with the state and formal volunteers, informal volunteers either interact with the state through its field personnel or have to bear the consequences of MoD decisions, on which they do not have impact. Relatively often informal volunteers talked about undefined status of volunteer battalions, which formed in the beginning of military crisis, but not all of them have joined the army or Ministry of Interior yet. The inability of volunteer battalion fighters to receive a status of combatant veteran and subsequent benefits as well as increasing instances of criminal charges against these fighters, legitimacy of which is questioned by informal volunteers, creates background for informal volunteers being against the state. Such thoughts about the volunteer battalions and the state were not rare:

“MoD was afraid and still is afraid of these organised, cohesive, armed groups, which from the very start were not very positive towards the state, so actually there is something to be afraid of” (Respondent 13).

Another reason for informal volunteers being against the state is the issue of discharging the soldiers from the previous mobilisation wave, which was indefinitely postponed, though initially it was planned they would serve one year. Respondent 14 framed it as a ‘lie’. And Respondent 7 so described her efforts to get explanations from the state:

“We have been in correspondence and conflict with MoD since May 2015. We have Brigade 56, who were to be discharged from the army 2 months ago, but they wouldn’t be let go home”.

11 It is important to note that after the public and internal efforts of volunteers, the president of Ukraine dismissed the mentioned Navy Commander. The narrative, which accompanied this announcement was unexpected and unprecedented for Ukraine: “Considering the position of volunteers and the public and accounting for the systemic underperformance as well as due to low authority among the personnel, I took a decision to dismiss Sergii Haiduk from the position of the Navy Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (UP, 2016).
A few voices among formal and informal volunteers were pointing towards the value of experience of associational life, gained by the movement over two years of the armed conflict. This echoes the theoretical type of civil society being in support of the state by creating reciprocity and developing democratic values among its members thus laying foundations for a democratic state. The strongest ‘in support’ sentiment was observed among informal volunteers:

“I think that volunteers are the new formation, people are tired of being grey mass and executors of somebody else’s will; perhaps, volunteers will be one of the driving forces, which will start doing something” (Respondent 12).

The importance of using the momentum of the movement and urgency to capture its transformative potential for a better, more democratic Ukraine filled the narratives of those who thought of the movement being in support of the state. It was well summarised by Respondent 8:

“There are many people who are trying to do something, who enter state institutions, participate in competitions [for official positions]...All of this, sooner or later, will lift the state to another level, otherwise we are screwed” (Respondent 8).

The rarest, yet interesting account of the relations with the state was ‘apart’. Found only among formal and informal volunteers, according to the theory, it means that civil society boundaries from the state are guaranteed by the constitutional order, which is true for Ukraine even in situation of military crisis. In the interviewees’ narratives, it was typically expressed in terms of being ‘in parallel’:

“We never wanted to reach the higher management [of MoD] – if the commander of battalion is adequate, we come and bring [goods]. I think it is something in parallel” (Respondent 8).

Generally speaking, there is no single type of relations with the state that could be assigned to all of the volunteers. Moreover, the less formal were the volunteers’ relations with the state, the more variation in opinions within the respective groups was observed. Small variation in opinions among officially interacting volunteers may be explained by the fact that they are the smallest group in the volunteer movement, who received the largest access to the state, and collaborating with each other and the state almost daily, they have opportunities to exchange their views. On the contrary, large variation among informal volunteers’ perceptions could be the consequence of them being scattered around the country and often not communicating with each other beyond providing their services. Nevertheless, ‘in partnership’ was a dominant theme among officially interacting volunteers, while ‘in dialogue’ dominated the narratives of formal volunteers. There was no dominant view on the relations with the state among informal volunteers. The dominant types may be explained by the level of access to decision-makers: being physically the closest to MoD, officially interacting volunteers can build more meaningful relations there and push through their agenda, while formal volunteers, like any CSO, have to rely on other tools, such as media. Informal volunteers do not have access to central decision-making military authorities, but they have to deal with field personnel, so the result of interaction becomes heavily dependent on an individual MoD official.

As was mentioned in section 5.4., the categories ‘in partnership’ and ‘in dialogue’ are very closely intertwined in speakers’ narratives, because in practice they enter into combinations of relations to reach their goals. A vivid example of this connection is the case of volunteer pressure on the Minister of Defence to dismiss the Navy Commander who was deemed corrupt and unskilled.
to fit this position. This quote notably points to using both media pressure and internal cooperation for achieving the goal:

“Big scandal now, when big groups of volunteers have publicly stood [in the social media] against the Navy Commander, trying to influence. And we are trying to influence directly through MoD and the minister” (Respondent 1).

Another notable overlap in the volunteers’ narratives was between categories ‘in support’ and ‘in dialogue’. It is a very important indicator, pointing at volunteers’ understanding of their power to lay down the foundations for a more democratic state by collaborating and exerting pressure through public channels, by including general public in their activities. Respondent 16 made such a note about this development:

“Combat.UA and other volunteers have launched an information campaign regarding the Navy, it is an unprecedented case of mass coordination of efforts of the whole volunteer movement. I can’t recall that there has ever been such a scale”.

6.2.2. Quality of experience

As stipulated in section 4.3., just establishing the types of civil society and state relations will not reflect the whole complexity of this interaction. That is why for a more nuanced picture, a dimension of quality of experience was introduced. It may be perceived as actively or passively positive or actively or passively negative.

When actively negative experience was mentioned, it was illustrated by examples when volunteers became objects of prosecution, were not tolerated in the authorities or were blamed for non-professionalism in the media. Several volunteers had criminal cases opened against them; here is an illustrative example:

“I had a personal achievement, when there were attempts to appoint Yanukovych’s close ally to the department of capital construction, where budget is UAH 4 billion, she would cut and cut it [meaning she will install corrupt schemes]. Nobody could do anything because she was invited by the military prosecutor, but I and [another volunteer] started such a campaign, and she disappeared in one day…So it was a kind of payback. Criminal case was opened against me” (Respondent 1).

Another quote highlights that even volunteers, officially interacting with the state, meet active opposition from within MoD, when introducing reforms, approved from the top of the ministry:

“While we were moving on with the agreement, we met the resistance, when there was an attempt to bury it deep in the ground” (Respondent 4, describing his experience in arranging from within MoD signing of strategically important agreement).

It is noteworthy that informal volunteers were particularly attentive to how the state diminished the role of volunteers. Respondent 7 bitterly recalls the infamous address of president Poroshenko,

12 President of Ukraine in 2010-2013, ousted after Euromaidan
when he said that even without help of volunteers Ukraine would have won the war (later he apologized) 13:

“So Poroshenko said we would have won the war without volunteers, great, he won – let him be happy”.

Passively negative experience is the most typical for volunteers in all three groups. Volunteers point to significant bureaucratic obstacles, officials’ negligence and unwillingness to follow their commitments, indifference and reluctance to accept changes or too opportunistic approach to their duties, which results in doing only those actions, which would allow immediate political benefits or positive media coverage. This quote is illustrative of the general sentiment of the volunteers officially interacting with the state via partnership formats:

“Our flexibility and activity was immediately reduced nearly to zero, but nevertheless we managed to set up many initiatives” (Respondent 1, when talking about his experience with the Volunteer Council at MoD).

Formal volunteers have similar experiences when participating in the reform committees, which is a part of a dialogue format:

“When it is being said at the committee that you will undergo a reform, you will be more effective, but the officials of the General Staff sit behind us and comment that they don’t need it, that they couldn’t care less. These are the people who have been called to conduct reforms. They not just don’t want to do this; they don’t even want to change themselves” (Respondent 6).

The fact that the research has covered several levels of interaction between civil society and MoD, and still volunteers’ typical experience is negative, points to a conclusion that, despite public statements and formal steps for facilitating partnership, political leadership has not been successful in including volunteers or at least this is how they experience it. It is not the matter of this thesis to speculate on the reasons for negative experiences, but some of the volunteers blame middle management of MoD, while others – indifference and non-professionalism of MoD top-management. Respondent 2, who was quick to accuse middle-level MoD officials of inaction, summarised her experience quoting an official:

“I am so fed up with these volunteers. When will they finally get out, so that we could put everything back on its wheels?!”

Despite negative experience being dominant in the relations between state and civil society in scope of this research, other experiences were also present. There were some limited accounts of passively positive experience of volunteers with the state, denominating state’s receptiveness to volunteers’ claims or requests. One example is the case, when volunteers had to attract MoD’s attention to inappropriate conditions at one of the training fields via media:

“MoD was working simply under constant pressure from the local Mykolayiv volunteers who left all their other activities aside and came to the training field day and night. Once it

13 This commentary refers to a controversial statement of president Poroshenko: “I want to thank volunteers, who in the first hours, days and months of the war, when it was the most difficult time, gave away the last what they had. We would have won even without this contribution, but it would have been more difficult” (Huzenko, 2015, emphasis added).
disappeared from media, the situation froze. Yes, the commander was dismissed and the new one appointed. Yes, there are chances to change the situation as they [volunteers] see it right, but only until pressure in the media remains” (Respondent 16).

In some cases, passively positive experience with MoD manifested against the backdrop of inaction of other authorities. One account of this referred to the evacuation from Debaltseve14, where, according to the respondent, she had to take care of the process, because local authorities were unprepared, but the military 'understood it really well':

“The green corridor… was not the initiative of the authorities; it was our [volunteer] initiative. We came to the coordination headquarters and made them write a letter to DPR/LPR15, authorized and confirmed that there will be a convoy of 25 vehicles. Thanks God, the military, who implemented this, both Russian and Ukrainian, understood it really well. That is why when this convoy went to Debaltseve, there was a forming-up, the Russian general addressed his [people], the Ukrainian – his, and all said to me – please, command…Because we worked on this” (Respondent 2).

Almost as a surprise against the background of the dominant theme, come descriptions of relations with the state, pointing onto ‘actively positive’, when the volunteers have access to the officials and when the latter invite them to collaborate, such as this one:

“[It has never been before] that the president invited volunteers, discussed problems with them, noted down what they say, gave orders to particular ministries… There is openness and readiness to collaborate, and was there before” (Respondent 5).

Actively positive experiences refer, however, mostly to the beginning of the volunteer movement in August 2014, while later experiences are described in more negative terms. A plausible explanation may be that at the beginning of military crisis the state was not ready to perform its defence function and had to rely on volunteer support, which resulted in more positive experiences for the volunteers (Kaplun and Tatarska, 2015). This interesting point was summarised by a formal volunteer:

“At the first stage everybody loved us and expected that nobody would manage anything…It didn’t happen so. Then everybody was sick with us, and then some kind of love appeared again” (Respondent 4).

To sum up, the analysis has shown that all theoretical types of civil society and state relations are applicable to the case of the country in a situation of military crisis, and that the understanding of these relations is indeed enriched by adding the dimension of quality of experience. While dominating relations, as described by volunteers, were those of partnership and dialogue, the most typical experiences with the state were negative.

6.3. RQ3: Future ambitions of the volunteer movement

In this section, the volunteers’ ambitions towards the state are presented, using theoretical participation function of civil society as a basis for analysis. The volunteers were asked very broad

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14 In February 2015 this town in Donetsk region was seized by the separatist forces, and Ukrainian army had to withdraw. The area found itself under separatist control (BBC, 2015a).
15 DPR – Donetsk People’s Republic, LPR – Luhansk People’s Republic. These are two unrecognized formations, controlled by pro-Russian separatists on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, respectively.
questions about their ideas on the future of the volunteer movement. In general, they do not think about it much and there are very few who have strong opinions about it. Some explain it by the urgency of current situation:

“When your house is on fire, you think how to fight the fire, but not how you will raise your children there” (Respondent 10).

Still, there is an understanding that volunteers have the capability and will to drive social changes in the transitional society of Ukraine:

“Volunteers, as active part of the society, can set an example of or become organizers of certain processes in very different spheres...It is such a Ukrainian phenomenon meaning...you can’t stop volunteering, it is an absolute drug” (Respondent 5).

Referring to volunteering as a drug suggests the volunteer sees it as something addictive, so she will probably continue doing it, when the current form of engagement is no longer needed.

Large chunk of narratives about the future role of volunteers focuses on their role in supporting the society in post-conflict reconstruction and solving humanitarian issues. This is in line with the role of civil society as prescribed by the literature on civil society and war:

“Helping the army is being gradually reshaped into helping peaceful citizens in the war-torn areas, especially, children’s institutions” (Respondent 17).

Relatively uncommon were the ideas of professionalization of the people in the movement, who would engage into civil control over the state and activism or will become full-fledged state officials. Transformation to civil control function is seen to be implemented through strengthening civil society as the third sector, empowering individuals to construct the new society and creating strong, publicly accessed and society-driven NGOs (opposite to clientilist NGOs in the understanding of Lutseyvych, 2013):

“Now it is time when some of the volunteers should professionalize, become an NGO-sector, the third sector; choose specialization on something, on control or humanitarian programmes. Part of them should “discharge”, return to civil life and work with the state, learn to do it professionally and become perhaps future officials” (Respondent 1).

This quote also refers to the idea of entering the sphere of state by becoming state official. Becoming part of the state apparatus is, however, a rarely quoted idea. And even when cited, it is related to the issue of low remuneration for the job, showing respondents' concern over the corruption-prone system, where officials' low salaries sooner or later result in bribery. This volunteer honestly explains his choice, which was also typical for other respondents mentioning state jobs:

“Such people like myself – we don’t have any financial security...To say that I want to have some official position, I would certainly have to devote my whole life to it. I won’t be able to earn as much as my wife, support my family. In the best case official’s salary is UAH 20,000 [ca EUR 700, a month]: when going to Brussels for a symposium I could only afford to drink two cups of coffee. ... We ... need a decent diet and decent living” (Respondent 6).

Another type of ambition towards the state, which this thesis is interested in, is political participation. Respondents were asked general question about their thoughts on volunteers' political participation and more detailed questions about their perception of the volunteers joining existing parties, creating their own one, and participating in national or local elections.
There is no unified attitude towards political participation among volunteers, though the dominant thinking about it is that it is problematic. The main issue with political participation is that volunteers consider big politics a ‘dirty place’, with which they are not ready to associate themselves:

“In people’s eyes politics is a dirty business and volunteer symbolizes purity” (Respondent 1).

There is also a typical opinion that once volunteers join the system of state institutions, it will enforce existing rules on them, and they would rather become a part of it than change it:

“Politics in Ukraine – is such a reality, it’s a kind of slough, if something is dipped into it…you can’t wear suede shoes, step into a puddle, then leave it and have your shoes clean and dry. … Same here” (Respondent 16).

At the same time, some respondents think that political participation may be an acceptable development trajectory for those volunteers who ‘don’t sell themselves for titles and positions’ (Respondent 15). There are also some ideas on what kind of persons those should be:

“If there are professionals among volunteers, especially with Western legal, economic or journalism education, and the person is ready and wants to try oneself, and is delegated by the volunteers, s/he can try politics” (Respondent 5).

There were also several voices, which considered political participation a chance to transform the country:

“It [volunteer movement] ought to become political. If it doesn’t, it will be yet another mistake” (Respondent 4).

Nevertheless, it was typical among the respondents to admit that they were not ready to personally become involved in politics, such as become a member of an existing party or create/join potential volunteer party. The quote below illustrates typical concerns of corrupt environment they would have to face, if undertook to join big politics:

“No, I don’t want to. Why? Because as of now…I don’t want to find myself in the [parliamentary] session room. Perhaps, beside those who sit there now. Because it is their world” (Respondent 3).

A question of individual’s ability to change rules of the game was inevitably linked to the narratives about political participation, and general doubt that participation of one or very few individuals with new values, would not radically change principles and processes of decision-making even in the legislative brunch, was expressed by the respondents. Respondent 10 puts it simply:

“I alone could be useful, but there are 450 members in the parliament. I would be simply lost there” (Respondent 10).

A standing out opinion was that it was not the right time to talk about politics at all, while the military crisis was still going on:

“While the war is still on, I won’t go [to join politics]. It is more important for me to help the guys at the frontline than join politics and wash that dirt” (Respondent 7)
Finally, the question of political participation sooner or later resulted in respondent’s contemplation about joining existing political party. The quote below is quite exemplary of the dilemma that politically active volunteers expressed to be facing. Despite understanding that the corrupt governance system should be addressed from its roots, in political sphere, the issues of distrust in existing parties and among volunteers created a deadlock, where people agreed there is a need for political participation, but they felt uncertain about who they could collaborate with in this regard:

“I think that it [joining politics] is possible, but I don’t know any party I could join. Perhaps it would be my own party, because many say they would join me, but I don’t know with whom I would unite. I know several people, but I don’t trust anyone and don’t know the party, which I could join” (Respondent 12).

When asked directly about the creation of a political party rooted in volunteer movement, the answers did not provide any dominant opinion about it. The typical sentiment was that creating a volunteer-based political party might sound like a good idea, but it has to face the realities of the Ukrainian party politics, identity challenges that the volunteer community faces (see section 6.1.) and personal issues of potential party leaders. A typical concern about the potential of the party is presented below:

“I think that it [volunteer party creation] would be normal, most important is that dishonest, rent-seeking [people] and turncoats don’t get in on the act” (Respondent 14).

Interestingly, those who said that creation of political party was desirable were mostly concerned with personal issues connected thereto. Respondent 6 gives an exemplary account:

“Half of us are simply scared. Not because of any physical threats, but because of reputational risks. When you become an MP, you get a black spot from the society. And you will never prove that you have done something good, that you have tried, but not everything was successful”.

The quote above is an illustration of a strong ‘we’ and ‘they’ division, where there is a clear line between volunteers and state, drawn in the process of creating volunteers’ collective identity. Moreover, volunteers believe that the rest of the society shares the same vision of the state. All this together creates a situation, where many volunteers cannot even imagine crossing the borderline between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and join the state. Those, who did it, only prove the fears, but consider such a public attitude not constructive:

“…a man wrote on [my] Facebook [page]: “You are all morons, I wish you died sooner”. With such actions you push out of the system those people who care about their reputation” (Respondent 5).

Financial issues of dual nature were often quoted as obstacles to creating a volunteer-based party. On one hand, low remuneration of MP makes a potential candidate for party leader wonder how it is even possible to have a decent life as an MP and ‘combine it with work and law’ (Respondent 1). On another hand, it is an issue of establishing independent funding schemes for a party itself, because as Respondent 6 points out:

“Every party is created for somebody’s money; this money has to be worked off” (Respondent 6).
Joined together, financial pitfalls create either pressure for engagement in corruption or lead to significant reduction of level of life of the volunteer, neither of which they are ready for.

Almost as important were, according to the volunteers, issues of trust. This echoes their descriptions of the identity of the movement in general (section 6.1.). Respondent 10, summarizing volunteers’ capacity to create a party, points out that it is very few whom he could trust and who, according to him, would be capable of performing party work:

“There will be around 10 volunteers, whom I know and whom I trust. Add perhaps 30 volunteers, whom I don’t know.”

In conclusion, the most typical ambitions of the volunteer movement towards the state may be grouped around two strands of civil society’s participative function: social, encompassing charity and volunteering for the vulnerable people and environment, and political, relating to participation of volunteers in national and/or local elections or creation of the nation-wide party with roots in volunteer movement. Less widely cited ways of possible development of the movement were the ideas of civic control and entering the pool of state officials.

In the social strand, volunteers were vocal about the need for post-war reconstruction and those supporting this line of development, thought that it was logical for the volunteers to engage in these processes. It is interesting to note that there were no referrals to post-war reconciliation – another typical role of civil society in relation to war according to the literature. Maybe, an explanation is that in the hype of a conflict it is psychologically acceptable to talk of post-conflict reconstruction, but not reconciliation with someone whom one considers an enemy. Or, perhaps, the defence movement volunteers, as being so close to the frontline, are not that sector of civil society that would be ready to involve into reconciliation at all – because they have been deeply involved emotionally, seeing the disasters of war and their friends dead or wounded.

In the political strand, volunteers’ ambitions are not as grand or vocal as it could be assumed. It was typical for the respondents to cite the importance of political participation to foster changes in the whole governance system, but only on rare occasions were they ready to participate in politics themselves as they saw it a ‘dirty place’. As to the possibility of creating a volunteer-based political party, it was mentioned that such idea existed and a few of the respondents personally considered implementing it. However, they were confronted with issues of lack of joint vision, issue of trust among volunteers and their ability to agree between each other as well as individuals’ fear to lose reputation and issue of combining political work and decent lifestyle without breaking the law.

As we saw, some respondents stressed that volunteering has become addictive, ‘a drug’. This makes it possible to suggest with some caution, due to the fact that these are declarations about potential future developments, the volunteers expressed a will to continue their engagement in civil society activities, which could mean that more sustainable forms of civic engagement could evolve after the military crisis is solved.

***

The analysis of the field data from interviews with 17 participants of the defence volunteer movement was presented in this chapter. The analysis was implemented using theoretical frameworks from chapter 4 and relevant methods described in chapter 5.
In relation to RQ1 the data has shown that it is too early to speak about existing collective identity of the movement. Yet, its solidifying has begun, and volunteers’ ‘we’-group is emerging through the process of ‘othering’ the state. In this process, volunteers ascribe such characteristics as intellectual creativity, proactivity and honesty to themselves (‘us’) as opposed to officials’ corruptness, passivity and low intellectual capacities, ascribed to the state (‘them’).

To answer RQ2, an analytical framework consisting of ideal types of civil society and state relations (Chambers and Kopstein, 2008) enriched with inductively created dimension of quality of experience, was used. Research findings support the theory, namely, that different types of state and civil society relations co-exist and overlap. Still, for the case of Ukraine the data showed that different groups of volunteers have different dominating types of relations. Officially interacting volunteers’ dominating theme was partnership relations, while formal volunteers’ typical relations were “in dialogue”. No dominating type of relations was present among informal volunteers. The dimension of quality of experience provided additional insight into how the interaction with institutionally weak state is perceived by the volunteers. Typical experience was described in negative terms, citing bureaucracy, negligence, and apathy among the officials’ reactions to volunteer initiatives.

Regarding RQ3, the data provides a surprising insight that volunteers typically do not contemplate much about the future of the movement since they focus all their capacities on meeting current needs. Yet, when asked, they cite social and political participation as typical possible development strands. From the social dimension, volunteers mostly see the movement’s future in the areas of post-conflict reconstruction and helping vulnerable people. In terms of political participation, the data revealed a dilemma. The volunteers generally agree that to launch changes in the corrupt political system, which they despise, they should enter politics and perhaps even create a party, but only very few of the respondents were ready to do it personally. Their reasoning echoes traits of volunteers’ collective identity, found in response to RQ1, where state and volunteers are portrayed by volunteers as opposite to each other. Consequently, joining politics is perceived as joining corrupt system and thus becoming one of ‘the other’.

The results provide enough background for making conclusions about the research aim, which will be presented in chapter 7.
7. CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this research was to investigate the relations between civil society and state in the conditions of military crises, focusing on civil society perspective and using the Ukrainian defence volunteer movement as a case.

On a theoretical level, this thesis concluded that types of civil society and state relations, created mostly for peaceful times and strong state as described by Chambers and Kopstein, are also applicable to the conditions of military crisis and weak state. However, adding the dimension of quality of experience enabled the typology to reflect the complexity of the relations between these two agents and made the research more informative. Thus, quality of experience dimension is a contribution of this thesis into existing theoretical perspective on civil society and state relations, because it nuances the main existing types of interaction.

On an empirical level, the research questions covered defence volunteers’ collective identity and perception of the state (RQ1), volunteers’ perceptions of their relations with the state and experiences as these relations unfold (RQ2) and any forward looking ambitions towards the state (RQ3).

All types of state-civil society relations were found in the case of the Ukrainian defence volunteer movement: civil society in partnership, in dialogue, in support, apart and against the state. However, formal volunteers cited dialogue as their main type of relations with the state, while volunteers officially interacting with the state were primarily engaged in partnership relations. Informal volunteers had no dominant type of relations. The research has covered several levels of interaction between civil society and MoD and found that volunteers’ experience remains mainly negative (actively or passively). The reason for such quality of experience may be that civil society became so active in the face of existential threat that it nearly forced the state to collaborate, thus challenging state’s regular practices and setting unwanted demands. Negative quality of experience hints at a mismatch between declared intentions of political leadership at the beginning of anti-terrorist operation to increase volunteer inclusion and the existing practices as perceived by the volunteers. Thus, these findings may be useful for identification of systemic trouble spots to be addressed by the state in order to improve perception thereof by civil society and make collaboration more mutually satisfying.

The research has identified the formation of volunteers’ collective identity, which is now taking place primarily by othering the state and its representatives, picturing them in negative terms. The analysis of political and social participation ambitions among volunteers suggests that volunteer movement has a chance of transforming into more sustainable forms of civil society since many participants could not imagine remaining indifferent to societal issues. There are certain musings about political future of the movement, but at this stage they have not shaped into visible initiatives.

From a methodological perspective, this research could perhaps be done through a quantitative design by asking volunteers to participate in a survey. Indeed, such approach may be helpful in increasing the sample, but given the virtual impossibility of accurate mapping of the movement, the issue of sample representativeness would remain and thus cause problems for statistical analysis. Also, considering volunteers’ tempo of life, it is highly unlikely that they would fill in surveys. Even contacting them through their e-mail and Facebook pages asking for interview did not bring any results; only being introduced through ‘gate-keepers’ allowed for a response. Besides, interviews,
contrary to surveys, allow for building relations of trust, which result in respondents’ genuine answers, offering insight into their experiences and perceptions, which is not possible with quantitative methods. Therefore, chosen methods are relevant for the aim and research questions, and have been able to provide answers. At the same time, as much as for qualitative research in general, the findings should be taken with caution. The sample of respondents was not representative from the statistical perspective and content-analysis is always a subject of researcher’s bias, despite all the effort to minimize it, therefore it is a challenge to generalise results. But the benefit of conducting this research is that it gives an opportunity to create new theories or make contribution to existing ones, as is the case with the present study.

What is next? Obviously, to make the research complete, it should account for the state, thus a study with similar research design should be conducted with the representatives of MoD to picture their part of the story.

Current findings that officially interacting, formal and informal volunteers have different dominating types of relations with the state provoke a need to investigate reasons for such differences. Some data in this research suggests that volunteers’ proximity to state decision-making processes may determine their dominant type of interaction, but it is not in the scope of this thesis and should rather be addressed as a separate research project. Same project could address the strategies that civil society uses during its relations with the state, and which of them it considers the most effective. Qualitative research design is preferred for this kind of study since volunteers are unlikely to share their strategies and methods of achieving goals in impersonal long survey, but short questionnaires will not reflect the complexity of state and civil society relations.
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Annex I. Map of the military crisis in Ukraine, April 2014

Note: Control of Mariupol regained by Ukraine
Source: BBC, 2015b
**Annex II. Interview Guide**

**Warm-up questions (mark gender and age)**

1. What is your occupation?
2. Have you volunteered before?
3. How and why did you join the defence volunteer movement?
4. How long have you volunteered for the army?

**RQ1&2. Perceptions of the state and relations with the state**

1. Why are you volunteering (have volunteered) specifically for the defence (army supply)?
2. Do you have any contact with the state as a volunteer? (If yes, how do they happen? Do you contact [MoD] or you are being contacted?)
3. How would you describe the interaction you have? (dialogue, avoidance of answer from the state, trying not to interact)?
4. Is it possible to substitute what the volunteers do by the state programmes? (Do you think the state could substitute you and your organisation in doing what you do, with the same quality? If yes, when and how? If no, why?)
5. Are you aware of any cases when state officials were volunteers for the defence?
6. Does the state learn from the volunteers? Does it employ technical or logistical solutions of volunteers for official use?

**RQ3. Is there any forward-looking ambition of the volunteer movement participants towards the state?**

1. Do you see any potential of the movement to influence state policies in defence or related spheres? How?
2. What do you think is the future of the volunteer movement? How do you think it should develop or should it at all? Should it evolve into something?
3. Do you see the need to continue with the movement while the war is still in place? Or after? (Or, should the state take back what you are doing now?)
4. Do you see a possibility for you to become a part of the state institution that would be responsible for what you are doing now as a volunteer?
5. Do you discuss with any other activists of the volunteer movement the visions of the future of the Ukrainian state? Is there any common vision of the future?
6. Would you personally, as an opinion leader, consider the possibility that volunteers join party politics by setting up a volunteer-based political party?
### Annex III. Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2nd level code</th>
<th>Summary of content included in 1st level codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of the movement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifts, trains, pushers, drivers</td>
<td>Speed up the processes, bring up ideas from below of the institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative</td>
<td>Volunteers bring ideas to the state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Transmitters              | - Volunteers collect resources and deliver to frontline  
                            | - Volunteers create resources (masking nets, money, food etc)                                              |
| **Relations with state**  | As experienced by the volunteers                                                                      |
| Apart                     | We and the state are something in parallel                                                              |
| Against                   | - “It’s better that they don’t interfere”; “we do our thing, they do their thing”; “Thanks God, we don’t interact”  
                            | - “Shoot’m all”  
                            | - “Intelligent person must be always in slight opposition towards the state”                              |
| In dialogue               | - Influence state via media pressure                                                                   |
|                           | - Influence via participation in public consultancies, which have certain autonomy and can exert public pressure |
| In partnership            | - Advisory role (Volunteer Landing, Association of Volunteers and Volunteer Council; minister’s advisors)  
                            | - Pushing the state to do its job by showing it how to work                                                |
|                           | - Volunteers serving as social elevators within MoD                                                    |
|                           | - Mentions of joint projects                                                                          |
| In support                | - New society, “something is out there”, we are “no longer a grey mass”                                |
| **Quality of experience with state** |                    |                                                                                                              |
| Actively negative         | - State tries to exert control                                                                        |
|                           | - State tries to scare volunteers (threaten)                                                           |
|                           | - State puts obstacles on purpose, sabotage of reforms                                                  |
|                           | - Diminishes impact of volunteers in public                                                            |
| Passively negative        | - Too regulated, bureaucratic system                                                                   |
|                           | - “Dump with no initiative”                                                                           |
|                           | - Volunteer help is overused, no own initiative                                                        |
|                           | - “No wish” to do anything                                                                            |
| Passively positive        | - Accepts volunteers passively                                                                        |
|                           | - Sensitive to volunteers (reacts on claims/requests)                                                   |
|                           | - Helps if contacted, does not initiate contact itself                                                  |
| Actively positive | - Invites volunteers  
|                  | - Cooperates with volunteers  
|                  | - Progress is seen in certain issues  

| No experience |  

### Future of the movement

| Civic activities | - Organs of public control  
|                 | - Activity in other areas, such as control of quality of roads  
| State employees | - Volunteers are seen as a reserve for the next generation of officials  
| Dissolution     | - Volunteer movement as it is should dissolve  
|                 | - In a "normal country" this volunteer movement is not needed  
| Social          | - Helping people is a drug, people will continue with social projects  
| Political       | - Active people should ultimately unite into political power  
|                 | - Volunteers are active citizens, and some of them will involve into politics  

### Political participation of volunteers

| Desirable       | - Volunteers should join no matter what  
|                 | - It’s the only way to change corrupt system  
|                 | - We need critical mass to make changes  
| Acceptable      | - Some people are good at it  
|                 | - Better than not doing nothing at all  
|                 | - Uncertain of the outcomes, but let them try  
| Problematic     | - Politics described as a dirty place and games  
|                 | - Difficult to be a minority to influence decisions  
|                 | - Volunteers “sold themselves to politicians”, if they join  