CHANGES IN JAPAN'S STRATEGIC CULTURE – THE SEVEN SINS TO PACIFISM

Japan’s Move Away From Pacifism Explained With Strategic Culture.

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0. Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the changes within Japan’s Strategic Culture that have led Japan to move away from their previous pacifist mindset and become more militarily active in, for example, the South China Sea. I have first done a thematic analysis to get access to Japan’s strategic culture and then used Greathouse (2010) Strategic Culture method and theory to explore and explain the changes that have happened to Japan’s Strategic Culture. I have come to the conclusion that Japan is moving away from its pacifism to what Prime Minister Abe is calling proactive pacifism. Japan will probably only keep taking defensive military actions, as they have done this century, but the nature of the defensive actions has changed to be more offensive and provoking. The change to Japan’s Strategic Culture is mainly rooted in the change of the interpretation of their Constitution, but six other aspects have also affected this change. Some of them are connected to the shift in the Constitution while some are not. The six other reasons are: China and North Korea increased threat, Japan aiming to take their proper place within the international community, Japan’s alliance with the U.S., religious groups and conservative politicians gaining more power, trade and Japan’s dedication to the Freedom of navigation, and Japan’s change in peace identity.
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0.5 Abbreviations

SC = Strategic Culture.
PM = Prime Minister.
SCS = The South China Sea.
LDP = Liberal Democratic Party.
JSDF = Japan Self-Defence Forces.
WW2 = World War Two.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In this thesis, I am going to examine the reasons behind why Japan since 2010 has started moving away from their pacifist mindset.

I will do this by examining Japan’s Strategic Culture (SC), meaning Japan’s elite’s view on the use of military force within the international system (Greathouse, 2010, p.59).

Japan has a short history of external conflicts but a long history of internal conflicts. Apart from the invasions of Korea (1592–98) and minor, but important, attacks on Japan, like the Shimonoseki Campaign (1863-1864), Japan has not been involved in external conflict up until 1894. After that, they started conquering parts of East Asia and were involved in around ten armed conflicts, including WW2 (List of wars involving Japan, 2017, 9, April).

Japan have since the end of WW2 been a pacifist country (Columbia University Press, 2005) and their constitution forbids them from even having a military force (Nihonkoku Kenpo, 1946). This pacifistic mindset seems to be changing as Japan’s PM Abe is making moves to change the Constitution (Rich, 2017). This change became especially apparent when Japan in 2015 for the first time had a naval exercise with the U.S. in the SCS and with Japan’s maritime activities increasing after the deployment of Japan’s new helicopter carrier (Panda, 2015).

The South China Sea (SCS) is a highly-contested area where China has made claims over territories that are seen as belonging to other countries (CFR, 2017). Tensions this year (2017) have been high as China has built up their presence and asserted their claim over practically the whole region (CFR, 2017). Yearly there is 5 trillion dollars’ worth of trade goods passing through the SCS, including Japanese trade goods (CFR, n.d).

Japan is not a central actor in the conflict (Jennings, 2017), but they play a significant role in the SCS conflict as a nation dependent on the trade passing through the sea and an ally of the U.S. who is a highly-involved actor (Japan Mod, 2016). The U.S. first started to get involved in 2010 (Landler, 2010) and has since then increased their involvement in the conflict (Japan Mod, 2016).
Japan does not have, nor do they claim they have, any claims over the waters of islands in the SCS and their involvement could be provocative to China (Jennings, 2017). It is an interesting paradox as Japan has previously been highly pacifistic. It is interesting from an IR perspective to look at why Japan, a country with a seeming strong pacifist ideology, with limited military capacity and no claims in the SCS, would engage in actions that could be perceived as offensive against a trade-partner that they are highly dependent on (Rusdy & Muhamad, 2016, p.881).

In 2014 Oros (2014b) made a similar observation as I did, as Japan’s SC was starting to change, yet in 2014 the change had still not taken form. Oros concluded that the institutionalised anti-militarism Japan had was enough to stop the political actors moving to change Japan’s SC to a more militaristic one. He meant that Japan would not develop their military further and would not increase their international presence, despite actors propagating for it (Oros, 2014b, p.245-246). His conclusions have been proven wrong, and I want to see if I can, with the sources and methods I have used, come up with something different than his conclusion without being affected by the perspective he presented his research. I will not be using his research rather, as his results have been proven wrong, I will use another method with new data to try to answer a similar question. My methods are better as they are adapted for detecting change and as I have new and better data than Oros (2014b) I can gain more insight into the question.

The definition of SC I has used is taken from the works of Greathouse (2010) where he presents theories and his method of studying SC. I will be using his approach to answer my research question.

In Greathouse’s theory and method, SC is held by the policy creating elite. The meaning of this is that the elite is the ones that are affected by SC but that they also create the SC of a country.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to examine and understand the changes to Japan’s Strategic Culture to one that departs from Japan’s seemingly pacifistic mindset.
The reason I want to understand this change is that it might contribute to the overall understanding of Japan, their involvement in the SCS and their future actions in the international field. This understanding is now limited, as the movement away from Japan’s pacifism has not been studied or discussed in depth. My study could help future researchers better understand how Japan could act in different scenarios. I am also hoping to with this thesis contribute with a puzzle piece to the understanding of what Japan’s move away from pacifism will mean in the region.

1.3 Research Question
What changes within Japan’s Strategic Culture has made, and allowed, Japan to move away from their previous seemingly pacifistic mindset?

1.4 Delimitations
In this thesis, I will establish the Strategic Culture of Japan to start with. The change in Japan's SC I have looked at are the ones that have happened since 2010 but to first establish Japan's SC I need to look back at different events taking place throughout history and changes that have happened to establish the SC that Japan is moving away from. The starting point of my research to establish Japan's SC is primarily going to be right before the world wars started. The reason for this is that the SC of Japan experienced a significant change right after WW2 which drastically changed Japan’s course away from the one that had developed throughout history.

This delimitation have limit my research and made it doable in the timeframe I had, but it might have affect the research negatively as I might have miss important events that contributed to the way Japan’s SC is today. I also risk stretching too thin when it comes to explaining all the different aspects needed to examine my research question.

I am hoping to get around the issue by using Ruth Benedict's book “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword” (1946) as a base source material to gain insight into Japan's SC before the period I have researched. To avoid stretching thin, I am going to try to only bring up necessary aspects in SC.

I have only looked at factors related to primarily political, bureaucratic and military elites.
The economic elite might have a relevant effect upon Japan’s SC, but I have no way of studying them. This might affect my research negatively as I might miss important aspects, but generally, SC does not focus on economic factors (Greathouse, 2010).

I have examining the elites, as the elite are the holders of a countries SC (Greathouse, 2010, p.70), but not the attitude of the people if it has not contribute to the understanding of the elite. This will limit my knowledge of the issue as it will not include the way the attitudes of the people play a part in the conflict.

2. Theory

2.1 Previous research
Benedict’s (1946), has previously done extensive analysing related to the culture of the Japanese elite up until the end of WW2. I will use her book to understand this period better and find material that can be relevant today. The negative consequences of this are that my dependency to Benedict's book will make me vulnerable to possible mistakes or misunderstandings she has done.

There is research on Japan I will be using that focus on different parts of Japan’s SC. These articles I have found often do not have an overall perspective and usually lack the cultural relevance that should be processed.

Some of the articles I have used are: Mcneill (2013) is a writer that have helped me get an insight to the religious groups of Japan. The article, which seems to be a first-hand and second-hand source is one of the articles which filled the gap of the lack of academic research.

Hagström and Hanssen (2016) have written an academic article about Japan’s security and defence policy and how Japan’s perception of peace has developed in recent years. In the article, peace and militarisation are not exclusive. It is an interesting article that I used together with, among others, Benedict's (1946) to explore the development of Japan’s SC.
Oros (2014) discuss the peace identity of Japan and try to explain its relevance in creating the Japanese national security documents. His academic article has provided me with an insight into the defence policies of Japan and given me something to build upon. Oros research is once again close to what I have done in this thesis, yet it is limited and does not include aspects that are found as relevant within the SC, such as elite groups and their indoctrination.

Hara’s (2012) Academic article has primarily given me an insight to the different territorial conflicts Japan is involved in. The arguments Hara have in the article are deep and contain useful insights. I am mainly basing my understanding of Japan’s territorial issues on Hara’s article.

I am basing parts of my knowledge of the Japanese elite on Rothacher (2006) academic article. He writes about how the LDP (ruling political party) is influencing the entirety of politics in Japan in different ways.

Muramatsu and Krauss (1984) writes about the Japanese bureaucrats and politicians role in policymaking. The academic article compliment the one Rothacher (2006) have written, and together both articles also give me an insight to what actors I should consider.

In my analysis of SC, I combine Rothacher’s text and Scartozzi (2017) journalistic article, that discuss political families in Japan, to give a insight into how the Japanese political system works.

The analytic article of Larsson (2014) together with the discussion on Shinto in Benedicts (1946) book has been a prominent part of my analyses on the role of Shinto and political-religious groups influence on the Diet (parliament of Japan). This has contributed to my understanding of how Japan’s power elite have been indoctrinated to Japan’s SC.
2.2 Strategic Culture

To start looking at the changes to Japan’s Strategic Culture I first need to define what SC is and the theory around it. The SC theory I am using is taken from Greathouse (2010) who has presented different takes on SC. The one I am using is related to the first generation of SC who is connected to Gray (1999), Greathouse’s (2010) own theory, Meyer (2005), Longhurst (2004) and Lantis (2002). These theories allow me to look at aspects, through my method, that I have found better suited to Japan, while other theories such as Johnston (1995) who would require me to look into Japan’s entire history.

Gray defines SC as a “shorthand expression to denote the emotional and attitudinal environment within which the defence community operates” (Gray, 1999, p.138).

To add to this, Longhurst argues that SC is an encompassing concept that influences and affects decision making and behaviour (Longhurst, 2004, p.17).

Strategic culture (SC) examines the values and ideas of a society and provides a means of influencing the decisions of when and how to deploy force within the system. It also restricts and limits decision-makers for when or how to use force (Greathouse, 2010, p.65). It is a highly relevant aspect to consider when one is analysing a country, or actor’s actions. It contributes to our understanding of why a country acts in a way and what to expect from a country in the case of a conflict or military incident (ibid).

SC brings the concept of culture, which is idea driven, into the study of security that traditionally has been focused on physical elements to explain why things happen in the system (Greathouse, 2010, p.64).

Greathouse argues that culture is a broad concept that influences the inputs and the outcomes decisions that are made by elites. Even though that the term culture still has no, one, agreed upon definition, the ideas illustrated by culture have become important, Greathouse means (2010, p.60).

One definition he brings up is: culture deals with norms and values of an actor and affects how human activity occurs. Culture is a spectrum of shared rules, recipes for actions, standard operating procedures, and decision routines that create some amount of order in individual groups conceptions and their relationship to their environment. Both social, organisational, and behavioural (ibid). This concept of culture explains to us how an actor will react to a
situation, how they view the world, how they will achieve their goals and how they interact with their surroundings (ibid).

In contrast, Geertz (1973) writes that culture is historically transmitted patterns of meanings embodied in symbols. Culture is a system of inherited beliefs expressed in symbolic forms by means of communication, preserve and develop their knowledge about life and attitudes towards life (ibid).

Another element that is relevant for SC is the state’s geopolitical position (Lord 1985). A state’s geopolitical position will have created certain historical influences and have defined the threats that the actor should include in the process of creating new policies about the use of military forces (ibid).

2.2.1 Strategic Culture and Elites
The holders of SC are the policy creating elites. This means that they are the ones forming and being influenced by the SC. They determine, directly and indirectly through laws and decisions, when a state deploy force, and it is different variables connected to them that matter for understanding the SC of a country (Greathouse, 2010, p.70-71).

One need to explicitly specify the actor’s elites that matter for the actor’s SC. Depending on the actor, the influence of the elite on policy may be narrow or broad (ibid). Actors such as: journalists, participants in policy debates, people with direct access to the security decision-making process, think-tanks, academics, and other policy networks that influence the socialisation process of the elites within a government need to be analysed as well. During times of crisis more members of the process become active. The more complicated the decision-making process is, the more access points will be available for SC to influence the decision process (ibid).

2.2.2 Defining the Sources of Strategic Culture
To establish Japan’s SC I will look closer at different elements that together create a countries SC. Greathouse (2010) brake these down into: change over time(history), military and non-military foundational documents, geopolitics, and culture which has already been discussed. Without these elements of SC, the effect of SC on decision-makers will be under-reported (ibid).
1. The SC of an actor is going to change over time (Gray 2007). One needs to understand these changes to be able to establish a country's SC (ibid). This change is usually going to be relatively slow, but at times, change will occur more quickly due to a significant shock to the actor (Lantis 2002+a & 2005). Elites within the actor will be affected by historical narratives and will, therefore, take those into account when making decisions (ibid). By looking at history, one will also see the changes in a country's SC, in times of significant shocks and times of normality, one can discuss the changes that are occurring to it. In the case of Japan and this thesis, this is an aspect I will lay a lot of focus on to answer my research question.

2. Formational elements of SC continue to emerge over time as SC changes and can be used to understand these changes (Greathouse, 2010). By looking at foundational military and political documents, one can detect different aspects of SC that influences Japan’s elite’s view on the values of when and how to use force (Greathouse & Miner, 2008). These elements will appear either out of significant shocks (Lantis 2000) or through evolutionary changes in SC (Meyer 2005 & 2006). Foundational documents emerge throughout the actors’ development and life. Both at the beginning, at specific events, such as government reforms, and throughout its experiences (ibid). It is these foundational documents I will look closer at as they contribute to my understanding of the legal and cultural aspects of Japan’s SC and the process of socialising elites. The change to them is another focus point, as the change will allow us to understand the changes to Japan’s SC.

3. The geopolitical position of the state will have created historical influences as well as the primary threats to the actor. These threats need to be addressed in the policy creation process regarding the use of force as they decide the vulnerabilities of the state and when the state must protect itself for its survival (Greathouse, 2010, p. 62). I will be looking at changes that have happened to the Geopolitical climate around Japan to get a better understanding of why Japan has moved away from its pacifist mindset.

2.2.3 Elements Affecting Strategic Culture

Gray (2007) argued that several issues must be accounted for when studying SC. For example, trying to explain too much, the problem of evidence, the idea that culture is diverse,
SC is not entirely exclusive, SC borrow and adapt, and policy and strategy are negotiated outcomes. Each of these are an issue for the use of culture in general and particularly SC. It illustrates the difficulties of studying SC (Greathouse, 2010, p.64). I will be countering these issues Gray has identified, by taking help from an expert on Japan and a Japanese diplomat, to focus my research on the relevant aspects while using a proper method, thematic analysis, to provide evidence to my conclusions.

3. Methods

This thesis is a thematic analysis and a theory consuming study where I will analyse and establish the Strategic Culture of Japan and then examine changes that have happened to it that allow, and make, Japan move away from pacifism (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p.41-42). Because of my implementation of SC as a theory to understand the actor I am studying by using different qualitative sources, my research is deductive. My epistemology is hermeneutic as I base my research on interpreting of meaningful phenomena that could explain the SC of Japan. My analyses are also based on the hermeneutic practice of studying the whole phenomenon by studying parts of it and vice versa. The issue with this methodology is that my interpretation or my perception of what a meaningful phenomenon is could be incorrect. I am hoping to counter this issue by discussing my research with experts on Japan (Gilje, & Grimmen, 2007, s. 178-179).

Within the SC method, there is an embedded process of looking at changes within SC. By doing an SC analysis and putting a bit more focus on the change part of the method, I will be able to answer my research question (Greathouse, 2010, p.87).

As a researcher, I am not familiar with Japan on a deeper cultural level. Therefore, it will be hard for me to get the correct material to use in my works without talking with the experts on the matter beforehand. I started my research with talking with an academic expert on Japan and a Japanese diplomat to find out what historical events, foundational documents and elites I need to study to be able to locate the SC of Japan. Other than that, I have also used search engines such as Google to find information. After studying them and other documents that I might find referred to in the texts, I will establish what SC the countries have by applying the method provided by Greathouse (2010).
combined with doing a thematic analysis. After that, we will see the changes that have allowed and made Japan move away from its pacifist mindset.

3.1 Search engine methodology
Online research would not be possible without the use of search engines. Search engines allow researchers to enter search terms to lists web pages on which information about the terms might be found (Miller & Salkind, 2002, p.288).
I will be using Googles super search settings to gather information about the different sources I am looking for. This is the most effective data gathering method in my case as Google searches in documents, books and web pages. I will also be using Google to search through different news websites and other pages to easier collect news articles.
I will also use the search engine provided on www.ub.gu.se. It is the Gothenburg university library search engine that among other things search through different databases that are not available on the open web. Primarily I should find research and other scholarly reports by using this engine.

By applying this method, I will be gaining large amounts of publicly available data in a small amount of time. All my sources are found via these two search engines as I have searched terms that became apparent in my thematic analyses, for example “Nippon Kaigi”. The downside of it is that I will only be able to gain access to public written down and digitalized data that is in English or Swedish as I cannot search in other languages and as the search engines cannot access data that is offline or not written down which will limit my search options significantly (Miller & Salkind, 2002, p.288).

3.2 Framework for Studying Strategic Culture
To determine the SC of Japan, I am going to use Greathouse (2010) method. He has combined different theories and methods and developed them into a diverse methodology that includes more than other theories I found. Johnston, for example, uses a methodology that allows falsifiability by applying two specific tests. The first is if SC has extended over time and across different actors, and the second is whether SC affected decision-making processes in the past (Johnston, 1995, p.32). Greathouse methodology focuses on an SC that is changing and is an encompassing concept (2010). This makes it more suitable in my opinion as it is this change I am trying to analyse and as I am not able to make a long historical analysis.
The policy creating elites of Japan need to be identified first, as the holders of SC. This will be done through conversations with my experts and by finding them through my thematic analyses.

The causal elements necessary to determine Japan's baseline SC are:

(1) Japan’s geographic setting and influences,
The physical position of an actor in the international system affects how they view the use of force and their reactions to the use of force within the system. This element will address part of Longhurst’s formative stage for the development of SC. The geographic advantages or disadvantages will play into any actor’s view about the role of the use of force in the system (Greathouse, 2010, p. 79-81).

To study the geopolitical aspect of SC, I will use research already done on the matter.

(2) The values of society and elites towards the use of force illustrated by formative/foundational documents or debates relating to the use of force.
The views of elites about the use of force are the second element that must be examined. Actors are formed by society and restricted by it. SC views will be found within major documents that the actor has created or which it uses as foundational elements. To examine this, one needs to consider military and political writings and debates that represent the actors’ views. Looking at these political documents along with security-based documents will provide a complete understanding of how an actor will approach the use of force within a society. To effectively do this, one must select important and persistent documents that represent not only persistent values but also influences that form the formative stage of the actor (ibid).

(3) Historical evolution of the actor and its views on the use of force.
This element will partially be addressed by doing the document evaluation, but that will only give part of the story. There is also need to look at the historical development of the actor. One element is how an actor has previously used force.

Each country through its past use of force or due to previous wars will have developed certain elements within their SC, which will influence how they view the use of force.

One needs to study the reaction to past conflicts and the preparation for new conflicts and how the conflicts produce discussions within society about the role of force and the use of the military. This debate will involve traditional values and where and how these values may need to be changed to address the emerging world (ibid).

Greathouse (2010, p.80) means that this debate is society engaging in discussions that will produce some slight changes in the SC. The discussions will also produce new foundational documents to represent the changes accepted within society with, regard to their use of force within the international system (ibid).

When examining an actor in detail, researchers must look past the initial SC of an actor, but rather must look for important foundational documents and ideas that influence supporting or evolving the SC of that actor. While this expands the necessary elements for determining the formational elements of an actor’s SC, it also more accurately can identify the formational element of SC which then sets the boundaries in which the policy elites will operate (ibid, p.70).

(4) Significant shocks to the actor that may have changed its evolutionary pattern.

The last thing that needs to be examined is the significant shocks that cause a major change in the SC of the actor. Greathouse (2010, p. 81) means that significant shocks create the option for radical changes in an actor’s SC. In case of an external major event that creates an external shock, the evolution of SC will change from a slow pattern to one of significant change. These external shocks can radically alter an actor’s SC (ibid).

The method that is underlying the understanding of change within an actor over time and by significant shock is: using detailed historical and political research to show the influence of beliefs and constraints and dilemmas that the traditional values of SC bring. These values are identity, values, norms, and beliefs. (Johnson, 2009, p.254). By approaching this method with a hermeneutic mindset, I will be able to identify the changes happening to Japan’s SC.
These four elements taken by themselves will only give a smaller insight into the SC of a country. When combined, these elements will provide an understanding of an actor’s SC.

Using this version of SC as a method is not problem free. It limits us to the policy creating elites as they are the holders of Strategic Culture. We will not be studying the larger population and the way Japan’s SC is affected by them.

### 3.3 Thematic data analyses

To collect the necessary data to perform my thematic data analyses I have:

1. Used the search engine method, that I wrote about earlier, to quickly get access to sources.

2. Talked with one expert on Japan and one Japanese diplomat to avoid research bias. Over face-to-face personal correspondence and digital messages, I discussed various aspects of the Japanese society and got different recommendations for sources and important aspects to consider from the Japanese diplomat Hiroki Shindo, who is a personal friend (personal correspondence, 19-06 & 18-08, 2017).

   In my email conversation with the scholarly expert, Erik Isaksson, I sent him a document (Attachment 1) with an explanation of what I am doing, the purpose of the questions I had and then a list of questions about relevant aspects that are included in SC (the ones mentioned above). Isaksson is a master of arts in Asian languages and Cultures with a specialization in Japanese and a research coordinator with the Stockholm Japan Center at ISDP (personal correspondence, 10+13-07 & 08-08, 2017). I contacted different organisations and was in the end recommended by the ISDP to contact Isaksson.

   Their answers provided me with a place to start my research. After that, I collected the sources and began to read them all. The first set of sources led me to other sources that could contribute to my understanding of Japan’s SC, and I continued like that until I was satisfied. While collecting my sources, and reading them, I also had conversations with the two experts about what I was reading. The purpose of these conversations was to locate data that was relevant and to discard data that was not relevant or completely outdated. The issue with this method is that I to some extent limit myself to their understanding and views. Isaksson is objective as a scholar while Shindo could be subjective as he represents his country. I don’t
see this potential subjectivity as an issue as a large part of my work is around understanding Japan’s perspective.

The data I have collected is primarily second-hand sources, such as academic articles, entries from books on Japan, journalistic articles (some of them translations or summaries from Japanese articles) that I managed to find other sources confirming. My sources have all been critically studied by confirming them, checking their origins, looking at their purpose and other methods that are mentioned throughout this text.

The reason I have used this method is to be as objective as I possibly can be to understanding Japan’s SC and the changes happening to it. The foundation of my data selection is based on the opinions of a person who has dedicated his life to understanding Japan, and one that has dedicated his life to representing Japan’s values, norms, interests, society and is himself a possible policy-creating elite.

The sources are sometimes not so strong by themselves, as they are second-hand sources, old historical sources and at times translations of Japanese sources. Many mistakes and misinterpretations are possible here as the sources have been processed by various writers and re-written/translated into other articles. By being aware of this, finding confirming sources, seeking out Japanese sources via Google translate to confirm my English sources and at times confirming them with my experts I have hopefully managed to validate them. I have also been using Wikipedia articles on a few occasions. The reason for this is that the Wikipedia articles have collected different sources and made it easier for me to refer to them. I am aware of the risks that come with using Wikipedia and have therefore checked all the data against different sources to confirm their legitimacy.

After collecting my data, I inserted entire texts into a software called NVivo 11, a digital thematic analyses tool, to more efficiently visualise, categorise, make selections and perform my analyses within the tool.

Thematic analysis can be defined as: “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79).

This method is flexible, efficient and simple to use. It helps the user to better understand the material one is researching and give us a better insight to the actors as the method shows us clear patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.6).
As SC is built up by clear causal variables, a thematic analysis will make it simpler to see the patterns of causality that form the SC of Japan. These patterns also contribute to the reliability and validity of the analyses as the clear causal variables form patterns and are re-creatable by other methods and theories other than SC.

A thematic data analysis is suited for analysing large data sets (ibid), and it allows me to research questions that go past my own experience which in this case is important as I do not have any experience with Japan’s culture or society (Saldana, 2009, p. 36). The limitations of working with a thematic analysis are that I might miss nuanced data (Guest, 2012, p. 17) but by being aware of this issue, I am hoping to avoid this mistake.

I am going to use Braun and Clarke’s (2006) method:
1. Familiarizing myself with my data.
   Immersed myself in my data and became familiar with the data I found.
   I have inserted all my sources(data) into NVivo pro 11 read and reread my data a few times and take notes on the data. Here I also collected more data based on the information I found in my first data-collection with my search engine methodology.

2. Generating initial codes
   Produced the initial codes for my data, using NVivo pro 11.
   I systematically coded all my data in this step and looked for as many potential codes and themes as possible. Then I collected all my data together and put them in different lists. For example, collecting all the data about Japan’s history in one list.

3. Searching for themes
   At this point, I took the list of different codes and sorted them into potential themes. And-sub themes.

4. Reviewing themes
   Then, I looked over my themes and collapsed some of them into other themes and broke down some of them into smaller components.

This stage has two steps,
Step one: reviewing the themes in depth.
Re-read all my data extractions that are set into each theme to ensure that all my data form a coherent pattern. If not, I would need to rethink my themes or see if there is another theme that would suit the data better.

Part 2: reviewing the themes together

I have considered each theme's relationship to the others to see if the relationships between the themes reflect the meaning of my data altogether.

When I was finished with this part, I had an initial thematic map of my data.

5. Defining and naming themes

Thereafter, I captured the essence of what each theme is about and what aspect of the data each theme captures. Here I analysed each theme and its narrative to check if it fits into my overall narrative and identify possible sub-themes within the themes.

At this point, I finalised the naming of the themes. Each theme was then set under four main themes: “Historical Evolution of Japan”, “Foundational Documents and Elements “, “Geopolitics” and “Elites”.

After this step, I was with the help of my hermeneutic mindset able to see what my themes are and causalities between and within them. I was than able to make a final thematic map that represents Japan’s SC.

6. Producing the report

Thereafter I did my final hermeneutic analysis, presenting my thematic maps and wrote the report by providing sufficient evidence of each theme using clear examples from my data.

To present, discuss and analyse the variables of Japan’s SC I have presented my main themes in chronological order, as headlines, and have presented the data within them and discussed them using SC to then finalise Japan’s SC.

The themes represented in my thematic analyses are presented in a historical, chronological order to make it easier for readers with little previous knowledge of Japan to understand my reasoning. All the components presented in the analyses are components of Japan’s SC. Therefore, some of the historical components that might have been more suited to present in the background section of this thesis are still presented in the analyses as they are needed to analyse Japan’s SC. Thereafter, I combined the variables to present the SC of Japan.
4. Ethical considerations

In this thesis, I must be aware of ethical issues from my work. My research is about a culture I am not part of. I need to respect their culture, and therefore I have also made my research objectives particularly clear, and I am aware of not misrepresenting the cultures I am working with. To do this, I will be having a dialogue with people from said cultures to make sure that I have understood their cultures correctly.

I will also get informed consent from the researcher and diplomat I will be talking with (Guchteneire, 2004).

5. Result and Analyses.
5.1 Thematic Analyses - Strategic Culture

I am now going to present my take on the Strategic Culture of Japan by presenting my results from the thematic analyses.

As is the case with SC, change is a major factor within all its components. I have a main theme around the history of Japan and in that, I will bring up some of the changes in Japan’s SC components in recent history. I will, however also keep talking about a change in the other themes. The aspect of significant shocks is one important aspect that one should discuss when talking about SC. I will bring it up throughout the text and not give it its own theme as I find this to be more practical.

5.1.1 The Elite of Japan Defined.

To understand Japan's Strategic Culture, we need to understand their elites as it is the elites that hold, are affected by and affect nations SC. From my correspondence with the scholarly expert on Japan and the Japanese diplomat, and through my thematic analyses of the data I have collected, I have been able to identify two main elite groups in Japan.

These are the high-level Bureaucrats of Japan and LDP politicians. The high-level bureaucrats of Japan are a reoccurring element in my sources on the Japanese policy creations process and the discussions surrounding who rules Japan (Friedman, 2017). The LDP politicians, primarily the ones around PM Abe is the other elite that holds the SC of Japan (Scartozzi, 2017). They are a reoccurring group and have ties to all parts of society that is relevant for the SC of a country. The reason behind why these two are elites and a more in-depth analysis will come at the end of this chapter.
Throughout my analysis, I will analyse different aspects that affect the elite and ideologies and influences that are behind their actions, but in this theme, I will discuss the opinions of the elites, their relevance and influence.

I set out to find information about the political and the military elite within the country as they are usually the holders of SC, but I have not been able to find an actual standalone military elite that is relevant. It seems to me that the military elite is the same as the political and bureaucratic elite.

5.1.1.1 Politicians

Article 41 of Japan’s constitution states that “The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State” (Nihonkoku Kenpo, 1946). The Diet is Japan’s parliament and the Cabinet is led by the PM (ibid), currently Shinzō Abe (Harding, 2016), and contains other ministers of the state (Nihonkoku Kenpo, 1946). The ruling party is currently the Liberal Democratic party (LDP) (Strength of the Political Groups in the House of Councillors, 2017).

My thematic analysis has shown that almost all aspects of the policy making process are connected one way or another to the conservative powers within the LDP. They are the most influential elite group in Japan today and have become so by implementing different types of reforms which have removed power from other groups.

Albrecht Rothacher (2006) writes that there are two mainstream points of view in Japan. One that consists of former right-wing social democrats that embrace the pacifist tradition, and the second that are conservatives that propagate a less pacifist foreign relations approach (the LDP) (Rothacher, 2006).

Cesare M. Scartozzi (2017) writes that individual politicians need to get elected by themselves, as one elects individuals and not political parties. To win an election in Japan, you need a support base, name recognition, and financial support. One can get a support base from a support organisation, which are political organisations that bind supporters together and connect local district to legislators. Name recognition is extra important within urban districts as voters there generally vote based on political programs and image. Economic support can make up for name recognition and is, therefore, an important factor in getting new voters.
Because of these three necessities, Japan has political families who keep getting re-elected. If one is elected to the Diet, one's children should have an easier time to get elected when you step back from politics. They would inherit your support base, name recognition, and financial support. Therefore, not having to start from scratch (Scartozzi, 2017). These families are a part of the privileged political elite that are going to, with an 80% victory chance according to Scartozzi (2017), be re-elected for generations to come.

PM Abe is part of the conservative political elite of Japan. Coming from a political family containing a former PM (Scartozzi, 2017 & Oros, 2014) and with the backing of religious groups (Larsson, 2014), Abe has much influence.

These families, if Scartozzi is right, are also holders of the SC of Japan. They raise and indoctrinates future politicians and raise them to power. Their opinions and beliefs form Japan’s future politics and SC.

PM Abe and his supporters are propagating a Japan with a more active military role abroad (Oros, 2014). Abe followed his predecessor in wanting to revise Article 9 of the Constitution and has driven Japan to a more militaristic mindset (Das, 2015).

In the eyes of the conservative LDP political party, where Abe is based, Japan needs self-defence capabilities to maintain peace. They also mean that the Security Treaty with the U.S. is important as the treaty, combined with the JSDF, is what has upheld peace. They see peace as the most important thing and mean that one needs to make sacrifices to uphold it (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016).

The opposition is still against the militarisation of Japan, but as they do not hold any meaningful power in the Diet, they don’t have much influence to stop the move against a less pacifist Japan (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016).

5.1.1.2 Bureaucrats

The second group I located through my thematic analyses and conversations with my experts are bureaucrats. Bureaucrats from the imperial era have evolved and are still in place and work together with
other ministries and private institutions. The authority of the different ministries is accepted by the public, and it is here that the bureaucrats do their work. Universities are an important part of the socialisation of bureaucrats, and politicians, as the people that study together usually also end up working together. In Japan, there are a few top universities that most bureaucrats have studied at (Friedman, 2017).

The bureaucrats survived WW2 reforms, and the occupiers depended on them to rule the country (Muramatsu & Krauss, 1984).

There are also elites within the bureaucratic elite. They are the bosses of the ministries and usually highly influential and see their ministry as their domain that they shape to their preference (Rothacher, 2006, p.405-406).

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and the role of each in policy making is important in Japan as it is this relationship that forms the policies of the country.

There are two takes on the forming of policy within Japan. One that says that bureaucrats and politicians form it together with little influence from big businesses. The other includes big businesses as an important factor. While acknowledging its existence and possible influence, I will focus on the one that excludes big businesses (Muramatsu & Krauss, 1984).

One popular theory in the 1980s, according to Muramatsu and Krauss (1984), was that high-level bureaucrats had a large influence on political pressure groups and politicians. They are the ones said to start the process on different new bills and some even say that the Diet only function at the time was to vote on the bills sent to them. The bureaucrats were also highly involved in the legislative process as they were the experts of different fields that politicians lack knowledge in. They were invited to panels and committees to defend and talk about drafts of proposed bills. Many politicians within the LDP were (and are) also former bureaucrats and hold much power within the party (ibid).

In present day Japan, my analyses show that the bureaucrats are starting to lose influence over society as the government have and is implementing reforms.

One of the reasons of why they still have so much power in society is that there is still no one that can replace them. They became discredited after the 1990 – economic crises, which was blamed on them. Yet they were still the only one fit for the job (Rothacher, 2006).

Japanese bureaucrats have for a long time had a good relationship with the LDP and have
shared their values and ideas. In this logic, they should also share the values of the LDP when it comes to the use of force (Johnston, 2014).

The one thing that is clear is that the bureaucrats share a close bond with the LDP, but I have not found any articles describing the opinions of the Japanese bureaucrats in detail.

### 5.1.1.3 Japan Self-Defence Forces

The JSDF are another actor one should consider as they are the armed arm of the Japanese state. I will write more details about them later in the text. A four-star Admiral and General is the highest ranking military officer in JSDF, and they are the head of the operational authority. Their task is to follow orders from the minister of Defence, with directions from the PM, that is the Commander-in-Chief of the JSDF. There is also a Chief of Staff that supervises the service branches activities. In the case of war, they would assume command, but their power would be limited by policies and defence coordinations formed during peacetime (Japan Self-Defense Forces, 2017, 10, August).

SC stresses the importance of looking what actors get activated when a country is in a case of emergency. Some of these are not relevant while in peace but become active in the decision-making process when in a military crisis.

In the case of Japan, we can see that it is the Chief of Staff and the high-ranking officers that have this position. Their power is limited, and they need to follow the policies set out for them during peacetime.

Chief of Staff of the JSDF has made statements in support for PM Abe’s reforms of the constitution that would stipulate the JSDF into the Constitution. The personnel of the JSDF are prohibited from make political statements like that. Another incident that happened a month after included the Japanese (than) current defence minister (she resigned) stating her and the JSDF support to an LDP political candidate in a local election (Mainichi Japan, 2017).
Although these statements are not the unanimous opinion of the personnel in the JSDF, there could be ideological connections between the JSDF high-ranking officers and the LDP.

Bureaucrats are also the ones that are forming the policies and operations plans for the JSDF. The employees the JSDF are classified as special civil servants and therefore are under a bureaucracy. Officers have in recent years tried to get more influence over the organisation, and a power struggle is going on between the two groups (The Japan Times, 2016).

The National Security Council is another influence on the JSDF as it is the council that created the national security policy (Miller, 2014) that form the policies that the Bureaucrats create.

The political elites that are a part of the council form the activities of the JSDF through these policies. The council is yet another way the political elite has taken more power for themselves and away from bureaucrats.

5.1.2 Historical Evolution of Japan

In this theme, I will present the historical aspects of Japan that are relevant to SC. This includes the historical development of Japan, how Japan previously have used force, reactions to previous events, discussions about the role of force and use of military and changes in values to meet the emerging world. I am also writing about religion and the Japanese society as they are needed to understand some historical aspects. These aspects are core components in understanding Japan’s SC and what the cause of the change Japan has gone through historically resides.

5.1.2.1 Japan’s Exceptionalism

Japan’s image of being an exceptional people was an important factor to understand the reasoning behind Japan’s actions in the world wars. It is also one of the foundational pieces of understanding Japan’s conservative elite’s values in present-day Japan. It is a form of hierarchical patriotism bound to Japanese notion of a multilateral family in East Asia and their responsibility for this family.

Japan is a hierarchical society and hierarchy plays and has played an important role in everyday life (Benedict, 1947, p.43).
To quote Benedict: “Japan’s motto is: Everything in its place” (Benedict, 1947, p.87). This quote concludes the view Japan had of the world at the time before the world wars and until the end of them (ibid).

In the pre-war and world war era, Japan saw the world as an anarchistic place, following a classical realist mindset.

Benedict (1947, p.44) writes that to create order in the world, Japan wanted to establish a hierarchy led by Japan, as Japan already was a hierarchical society and had a good understanding of what “one’s proper place” in a hierarchy meant. Japan wanted to be the elder brother of East Asia and to, by uniting them, free them from western influence.

The national progress Japan had made was far beyond the progress of China and therefore, Japan thought, they should raise China like an elder brother needs to raise a younger one. (Benedict, 1947, p. 21). The meaning of what being an elder brother means in Japanese culture needs to be discussed.

The father and elder brother of the family are on top of the Hierarchy.
The eldest son of a family has responsibility for his younger siblings and knows what is best for the younger ones and do not need to show consideration to the younger brother’s opinions (Benedict, 1947, p.53).

Benedict (1947) uses the envoy of Japan to the U.S. as an example to show Japan’s mindset about giving everyone a proper place in the world.

On the same day of the Pearl Harbor attack, the envoy gave the U.S. secretary of state a statement: “It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government . . . to enable each nation to find its proper place in the world. . . . The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of the present situation since it runs directly counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable each nation to enjoy its proper station in the world” (Benedict, 1947, p.44).

5.1.2.2 Shinto

Benedict (1947) writes about another important aspect of Japanese society and one reason to Japan’s exceptionalism in the pre-war and world war era: Shinto and “State Shinto” (ibid, p.87-90).

To understand the conservative elites and a large part of Japan one first need to understand what it is and its meaning. Shinto is a reoccurring theme that is connected to others in many ways which will be noticeable later in this analysis.
Shinto has a few main pillars: Kami, shrines and various rituals. Kami is the belief in spiritual beings and powers that are concerned with humans. There are many different ones, and they have different shrines and rituals attached to them. Shinto tries to help humans with rituals that enable them to communicate with kami, that will, in turn, give humans happiness and prosperity (BBC, 2011).

The Emperor of Japan has a central role in Shinto. He is divine and is said to be descendant from the kami and that he is in contact with them. He is responsible for performing specific rites and sermonises (BBC, 2009).

State Shinto appeared in Japan in the Meiji era (1868-1912) and is a branch of Shinto that centralises the Emperor as an object of worship and a symbol of national unity and superiority. It is a form of Emperor worship that at the time was not classified as a religion by the Japanese government. It was more of a nationalistic duty, like saluting a flag, and was institutionalised within the government without violating the freedom of worship. Other parts of religious life were left to the individual and their freedom of worship while State Shinto was taught in schools and became a part of Japan’s history. (Benedict, 1947, p.87-90).

State Shinto was used to gain support for Japan’s involvement in the second world war. Ones “On” (simply translated to duty) to the emperor was used to rile up the people and gain support. Japan had, in the eyes of their people, the support of kami on their side and the guidance of the emperor (Benedict, 1947)

After the second world war, State Shinto was forbidden by the American occupiers (BBC, 2009).

In recent years, groups are working on getting State Shinto back into the Japanese society again (Mcneill, 2013). I will write more about these groups and their influence later.

5.1.2.3 The End of The Great War – Change of Strategic Culture

Japan lost the war and experienced a significant shock in the form of two atom bombs and capitulation. It is upon this loss and the SC that was formed from the significant shock that Japan experienced, that Japan’s SC is built up around today.

The defeat of Japan led to the abandonment of the militaristic ideology they had previously followed. The SC of Japan changed from a militaristic one to a fully pacifistic one. The
Japanese people saw it as if they changed the page to a new chapter where they left behind the errors of the previous one. This new chapter brought with it the American written constitution which outlawed war and a new sentiment of pacifism and democracy (Benedict, 1947, p.310).

After WW2, Japan needed to find a new SC and identity (Benedict, 1947, p.306). Previously Japan had tried to gain respect by their use of force, as it was the way a country got respect in the pre-war and war time, but after the war, Japan saw it as their duty to deserve respect from the peaceful countries of the world (ibid).

After the war and with the implementation of the new Constitution, Japan needed to find a new doctrine that would allow Japan to recover from the war and to align with the goals mentioned above. PM Yoshida Shigeru came up with a doctrine that would be called the Yoshida Doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine suggested that Japan should focus its national resources to economic production with the help of well-trained workers. Japan would adapt its stance on issues of security and international politics to the stance of the U.S. Japan would keep up a bare minimum of defence forces, which they could do within international norms, while they would primarily rely on the U.S. to defend them (Columbia University Press, 2005).

This policy was highly effective and was followed by Japan throughout the cold war. Japan managed to recover and become a large economic powerhouse while being in peace. In the 1990s, however, Japan experienced some issues with this policy due to its economic focus on export (Columbia University Press, 2005).

Although Japan never abandoned the Yoshida doctrine one can see that they started to move away from it. It is a key to understanding the change of Japan’s SC. As we will soon see, Japan started to strive away from their pacifist tendencies as the world changed around them and the international environment put Japan under pressure to assume a greater share of the international military burden (Columbia University Press, 2005).

5.1.2.4 Defence of Japan

The Japanese constitution does not allow Japan to hold any military forces or go to war. But as we saw with the Yoshida doctrine Japan has the right to defend themselves. Japan Self-Defence Forces were created in 1954 to with the minimal force necessary defend Japan (Oros,
This is the first move away from the absolute pacifist SC that Japan had at the end of the world war. To understand it, we need to look at what, at the time, was the largest influence on Japan’s foreign policy: The United States of America.

The Japanese and U.S. defence alliance that was first formed in 1951, right after the peace negotiations had ended, is an important part to understand Japan’s relationship to security and the U.S. This alliance put Japan in a position of dependence on the U.S. as the U.S. was tasked with defending Japan in the case of a war. Japan could only uphold a small defensive force (Kishi et al., 1960). The U.S. alliance with Japan is not only a militaristic one. It is also an exchange of policy and values (Doyla, 2008, p.50 & Calder, 2009, p. 172).

Japan’s total ban on military forces was changed in the 1950s when the U.S. feared the Communist expansion in Asia and urged Japan to create a defensive force. Japan changed their interpretation of the Constitution which allowed them to create the JSDF (Gady, 2015). The JSDF is highly limited in the type technology and human resources they have access to. They don’t have weaponry, like bombers, that is offensive, which makes them only effective at defending Japan (ibid).

The U.S. role in the alliance is to extend their deterrence to Japan through the full range of their capabilities. They have a combat ready force in the Asia-Pacific region, stationed in the Okinawa Island and maintain the ability to reinforce them in the case of a conflict (Japan MOD, 2015).

Japan’s conservative elite think there is/were an issue with their alliance and dependency with/on the U.S. The discourse surrounding the alliance has shifted from a positive one to a negative one and now back to a positive one again. The reason for this positive attitude that has re-emerged is China’s actions in the South and East China sea. Yoichi Funabashi, an important voice in leading parties foreign-policy circles, means that even if Japan still sees problems with the alliance, they think that they can solve the problems within the framework of it. He does not think the same applies to China (Sneider, 2013).

Because of the Japanese peoples negative and sceptic sentiment against militarism the JSDF has been controversial (Gady, 2015).
The Japanese people currently mostly see the JSDF as a disaster relief or peacekeeping force which has given the JSDF a better image (ibid).

There are guidelines and more agreements that I will discuss later, but at this point in the text, this is the most relevant part.

This negative sentiment can be seen in 2003 when public opinion was initially low against Japan deployed troops to Iraq to help the U.S. led reconstruction of Iraq (Holden, 2011). This was the first-time Japan had deployed a large military force outside their borders since WW2.

They were in Iraq doing humanitarian and reconstruction work and helping with support functions for the coalition forces. However, they were only allowed to use lethal force in self-defence and were defended by other forces (Holden, 2011, p.3).

At the time of the Iraq war, the U.S. doubted the commitment of Japan to their alliance. The House of Representatives voted to withdraw U.S. forces from Japan if Japan did not show more commitment to their alliance. This pressured Japan to get involved and eased up the public opinion as the Japanese saw a need to satisfy criticisms from abroad (Holden, 2011, p.16-17).

Japan’s intervention in Iraq shows clear traces of a change in SC. The vote in the U.S. became a shock which motivated Japan to take actions they would otherwise not have done within the SC they then had. We can also see their dedication to pacifism in Japan’s unwillingness to do anything else than humanitarian and reconstruction work.

This chapter has given a background to the SC of Japan, and insight to what has formed it into the one Japan has today.

In the next section, we will start to analyse the foundational documents and elements of Japan’s SC. They will deepen our understanding of the SC of Japan and patterns will become more clear. This chapter about the Historical evolution of Japan and the coming chapter on foundational elements and documents are connected to each other as the foundational aspects will show us some of the changes that Japan’s SC went through to become what it is today.

5.1.3 Foundational Documents and Elements

This theme will describe a few different important foundational aspects that have emerged
throughout my thematic analyses and were confirmed as relevant by my experts. These aspects explain the framework, limitations and indoctrination process of the policy making elite. It also shows the changes that have happened over the years and how they have affected the SC of Japan.
I will focus on foundational aspects that were created after the second world war.

5.1.3.1 The Constitution of Japan
The Constitution of Japan was introduced by the American occupiers in 1947 and was based on western ideals.
Japanese conservative leaders at the time believed that the Constitution would be revised once Japan regained its independence and therefore didn’t object to its content (Sieg & Tarrant, 2013).
Overall, the themes occurring within it shows that it is focused on making Japan into a democratic, peaceful and pacifist state with liberty and international cooperation in its core (Nihonkoku Kenpo, 1946).

Article 9 is one of the most controversial articles of the constitution. It propagates international peace based on justice and order and permanently renounces war as a right of Japan. It also forbids the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish this aim, war potential is forbidden from being maintained. The Constitution makes Japan a disarmed nation and one that is dependent on others for their security (Nihonkoku Kenpo, 1946).

Article 9 lays the foundation of Japan’s SC. All agreements, policies and actions regarding the security of Japan are in one way or another related to this article.
While the Constitution is an important source, one need to be aware of its origins as a document forced upon the Japanese people. It has been greatly embraced by the Japanese people and its relevance is apparent as it has not yet been removed, but its origins still needs to be considered when analysing Japan’s SC.
As we will soon see, the interpretation of the Constitution has been different over the years. Before we discuss these interpretations and changes, we need to discuss the peace negotiations between Japan and the allied powers and after that once again discuss Japan’s relation to the U.S.
5.1.3.2 San Francisco Peace

The peace negotiations in San Francisco between the Allied Powers and Japan in 1951 is another important subject to be able to understand the foundations to Japan’s SC. My selection from the agreement is based on recurring themes within my thematic analyses and on information that is needed to understand subjects I will discuss in other parts of the text.

The purpose of the treaty was to create new bases for peaceful and friendly international cooperation, to promote the involved countries common welfare and to maintain international peace and security. It was to solve the issues that had been created while the countries had been at war (Allied & Japan, 1951).

Japan agreed to become a part of the UN and to follow the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Japan was also to strive to realise the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Japan had to release all claims, trusteeship, rights or titles on Korea, Antarctic areas and several other islands. Japan was also to renounce all special rights and interests in China (ibid)

The peace treaty further binds Japan, the same way that Japan’s constitution does, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, not use force as a tool in their international relations and not to endanger international peace and security (ibid).

The Allied powers also recognise that Japan has the right to individual and collective self-defence and that they may voluntarily enter collective security arrangements (ibid).

This part of the peace treaty was an important part for Japan to be able to create their own self-defence forces and to be able to get into a security agreement with the U.S.

5.1.3.3 U.S. Security Agreement

We can see the changes in Strategic Culture in how the U.S.-Japan security agreement changed over time. The first security agreement was signed 1951 in San Francisco. It was focused around friendship, defence and deterrence (Kishi et al., 1960). In 1960 the treaty was revised and replaced with a treaty called: “Treaty of mutual cooperation and security between the United States and Japan”.

Once again, it emphasises democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (ibid).

It also recognises that Japan has the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence and consider that they have the common concern in the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Far East. The changes gave U.S. troops the right to be stationed on Japanese ground for other reasons than just defending Japan. The treaty changed from just being about the defence of Japan to be about the defence of the region.
The treaty was aware that Japan was limited by article 9 of their constitution and therefore could not apply military force, yet it required Japan to enhance their capabilities to resist attacks. (ibid).

In 2015 a new guideline was written and changed the scope of the alliance from being bound to East Asia to become a more global security treaty and was meant to create closer connections between the government’s security policies. The guidelines also address and allows Japan to participate in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions outside the close by area of Japan.
The purpose of the guidelines is to: create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies (Japan MOD, 2015).
The guideline are centred around repelling an attack at the earliest stage, de-escalation, diplomacy and if that fails defence and force.
Further, they assure that they will keep their forward deployment of combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region (ibid).

The treaty also recognises that Japan is vulnerable to persistent and emerging threats in the region. It also acknowledges that the security environment has become increasingly complex and that the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security.
When it comes to Maritime security, the governments want to cooperate with each other to uphold international law. They also emphasise the freedom of navigation law (ibid).

The security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. started to safe-keep Japan from external threats and was meant to create a bond of friendship between the two governments. It has since the start moved into becoming more of a regional, and now in recent years global, cooperation to preserve peace. The change in the security alliance illustrates Japan’s changing SC and Japan’s move to become a more global power, alongside the U.S.
5.1.3.4 Change in Constitution – JSDF

The reason that The U.S.-Japan alliance and the JSDF are legally possible is the change of interpretation of the Constitution during the cold war.

One important reinterpretation to the principles of the Constitution that has taken place is one in national security policy regarding collective self-defence. The reinterpretation has made it possible for the JSDF to participate in military exercises and military combat together with other states with a purpose other than directly defending Japanese homeland. Another interpretation also allows the JSDF to operate in the international areas surrounding Japan, outside of Japanese territory and for Japan to join U.S. in their missile defence system (Oros, 2014).

In 2015 two controversial security bills, the manifestation of the changes to the interpretation, have been passed in the Diet and allows the JSDF to participate in the bilateral defence of its allies even when Japan itself is not under threat.

They are still limited to only aid their allies if:

- Japan’s survival is at stake,
- the situation poses a clear danger to the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness to the people,
- all other non-military options have been exhausted, and
- the use of force is limited to the minimum necessary to deter aggression (Japan Mod, 2016).

The security bills also allow Japan to take part in activities in conflicts that threaten the peace and security of the international community if there is a U.N. mandate to do so (ibid).

With the approval of the Diet, Japan can engage in safety ensuring operations for the UN and are allowed to use their weapons (ibid).

Under the new legislations, the JSDF is also allowed to come to the rescue of other UN peacekeeping troops (Gady, 2015).

The current Japanese government are making further moves to change the constitution and Abe, and his cabinets goal is to completely remove article 9 of the Constitution (Sieg & Tarrant, 2013).

These changes show us a change away from the military pacifism of Japan. In the Iraq intervention, Japanese forces were not allowed to engage in combat if it was not in self-defence. Now they can aid their allied forces and use force under a UN mandate. This change can be a way for Japan to take on more responsibility in international conflicts or as a way for
Japan to normalise the use of force. Either way, it is a change within Japan’s Strategic Culture.

5.1.3.5 National Security Council
We can further see Japan’s ambitions when Japan in 2013 established a national security council (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016).

The National Security Council consists of Japan’s PM and other relevant actors within the Japanese government. Its goal is to establish a forum for strategic discussions under the PM and create a stronger political leadership (Japan MOFA, 2013). Its creation was justified with the changing security landscape around Japan and need to better coordinate their efforts for creating better external relations and national security.
In the National security strategy 2016 of Japan, one can find that Japan’s goals are that Japan will continue to be a peace-loving nation and contribute proactively, in the form of cooperation, in securing the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving their own security goals (Japan MOD, 2016).

With the creation of a new government organ and the new policy of 2016, we can see a Japan moving to secure peace by more proactive means. Their passive defence has party been abandoned, and they are moving away towards a more active role in the international community while also pursuing Japan’s own national security interests. It is a change in rhetoric, and the peace-loving Japan seems to take a new approach to maintaining peace.

5.1.3.6 Religious Groups
Religious groups in Japan are a foundational element in the socialization process of the policy elite. Under PM Abe and his cabinet, religious nationalism has grown to become a relatively central part of LDP policymaking. The religious nationalists are gaining more influence in the Diet and are pushing for constitutional reforms (Larsson, 2014).

One example, of this, is the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership that Abe and others in his cabinet support. The organisation works to return Japan to its traditional values, reverence for the emperor and for the spirit of those who died for the nation in the world wars (Larsson, 2014). By December 2014, the organisation contains 296 diet members and 16 out of 19
current cabinet members. Abe has also given important positions to people in these organisations, further establishing their influence on Japanese policy making (ibid).

Other religious organisations that Abe and other top elected officials are a part of or support effectively work with lobbying for different questions connected to the conservative ideologies. These organisations are pushing to get a new form of State Shinto back into the Japanese society (Larsson, 2014).

One such relevant organisation is Nippon Kaigi, where most Abe’s Cabinet is involved. They are best-known for their historical revisionism and constitutional reformism. One can also find religious elements within their discourse on “beautiful tradition” and the imperial family (Larsson, 2014).

If we look at Nippon Kaigi we can find 6 points that they have publicly written that they want to achieve:
They want to promote the worship of the imperial household at the heart of the state and people,
They want to eliminate the Constitution and other “problems” that limit Japan’s independence to protect its security. Nippon Kaigi seeks, therefore, to turn the Self-Defence forces into a normal army. They also want to nurture nationalism, respect and patriotism among young people and through bolstering their defence forces assume a global position of leadership and counterbalance threats posed by China and North Korea (Mizohata, 2016).

In the Diet, groups of Nippon Kaigi members are working on three projects:
history, education and family issues,
defence, diplomacy and territorial issues,
Constitution, Imperial Household and the Yasukuni shrine issues.
The Nippon Kaigi and the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League have meetings with each other to share views and policy courses. The group has over the years gained much influence in Japan and are growing (Tawara, 2017).

PM Abe shares the goals and beliefs of the Nippon Kaigi (Ryall, 2017) and seems to have received this sentiment from his grandfather who also has been a PM of Japan.
This group of conservative are a minority in Japan but have over the years managed to make
changes, start debates and gain influence (Oros, 2014). Even if this group of people within Japan are small, they have managed to get a majority within the parliament which has made them highly influential and central for the SC of Japan (Larsson, 2014).

It seems that PM Abe and his cabinet are actively moving to give Shinto related organisations a larger influence in the Japanese policy creation process. As policy groups are formed within the Diet by these organisations and members within the organisations are being given important positions we can see how Japan’s SC is being affected and slowly changed by these groups. My thematic analyses have shown similarities between the actions and discussions of the Japanese government regarding policy and the opinions and goals. For example, one can see a causality between the opinions and goals of Nippon Kaigi and discussion and moves of making Japan more independent in upholding their security and the moves to change the Japanese Constitution.

5.1.4 Geopolitics
In this theme, I will explore the geopolitics of Japan: the geographical issues, economic, military and political interests, threats to Japan and their relation to surrounding nations. A country’s geographical and geopolitical setting affect their view on the use of force. Geographic advantages and disadvantages play a role in the view of the actor on the role of the use of force. Depending on their relation to other nation in their vicinity, their needs for survival and other aspects affected by geography, one can see that actors use force differently and in different occasions (Greathouse, 2010).

5.1.4.1 Geography
Japan is a island nation with thousands of smaller islands and four large main ones. 125 million people live in Japan (Heinrich, n.d) and Japan is highly dependent on trade for its financial survival (Ujikane, 2017).

5.1.4.2 Disputed islands
Parts of Japan’s security concerns are connected to different territorial disputes. Japan’s Strategic Culture is partly formed by these concerns, and their foreign relations, are heavily influenced by them.
After the peace negotiations in San Francisco, there were still territorial issues remaining between Japan and its neighbours (Togo, 2012). I will only bring up a few of them that I find relevant for Japan’s current SC. One of these are disputes between Japan and South Korea; another is between Japan and Taiwan regarding the Okinawa island (Togo, 2012). Another is with Russia regarding the Northern Territories. These don’t seem to be active conflicts anymore, and their relevance seems to be mostly limited to the symbolic damage they do to diplomatic relations (ibid).

After WW2, the Allies returned the administrative rights of the Senkaku islands, situated in the East China sea, back to Japan. The Allies never took a position on who held the sovereignty over the Senkaku islands, which has led to that China (PRC and ROC) are claiming that the Senkakus are a part of Taiwan. Hara writes that the islands had never been disputed before and the claims by the Chinese came as a shock to the Japanese government (Hara. 2012).

The conflict over the Senkaku islands is one of the most important conflicts for Japan’s SC. It is a recurring theme within articles discussing Japan’s security policies, and it seems to be connected to many of Japan’s security decisions. One clear manifestation of this is Japan working to establishing an amphibious rapid deployment brigade that would be able to help with humanitarian relief and work as a deterrence against China when it comes to the Senkaku Islands (Slavin, 2016).

5.1.4.3 Yen zone

Japan’s ambition to unite East Asia reappeared ones more after the world war in the 1970s and lasted until 2010. Japan wanted to create a Yen zone that would unite the Southeast Asian nations together and make them independent of the U.S. alliance and improve relations. This ambition never became a reality (ibid).

Sneider (2013) writes that the turning point in Japan’s attitude towards creating a cooperation with its neighbours and solving issues with discussions was when in 2010 Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese fishing boat captain for ramming into them in the waters around the disputed Senkaku islands. China has, in the eyes of the Japanese government, given an unprecedented response to this by performing different forms of economic pressure. The
Chinese meant that the arrest was a political action that was meant to assert the Japanese claims on the islands (ibid).

The incident was considered as proof that the Japanese pacifistic defence restrictions would not be enough to defend their peaceful country (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016, p.282).

This incident was a significant shock to Japan and could be one of the starting points from where the change away from a pacifistic SC started to emerge.

5.1.4.4 Relations with China

Japan’s relationship with China is another aspect important to look closer at as China is one of Japan’s largest neighbours and largest trade partners (Hara, 2012).

The political relations between Japan and China are tense, yet there is a strong economic link between them (Rusdy & Muhamad, 2016).

In the eyes of Japan, China is attempting to change the status quo by using coercion. Japan sees China as a threat to Japan’s regional security environment, and many of their security policies and development are driven by this perception of threat (Oros, 2014, p.145).

Japan holds high political expectations for China to recognise their responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues (Japan MOD, 2016a).

Japan expectations don’t seem to be met by China, and Japan seems to hold the opinion that China is not respecting international norms and laws as they do not, for example, follow rulings regarding the SCS (Oros, 2014). International laws and norms are a recurring theme within Japan and their dedication to order, and one’s proper place is closely connected to this.

On the Japanese side, there seems to be a willingness to resolve conflicts via diplomatic talks and to create better relations. For example, PM Abe has stated that he holds interests in building stable relations between China and Japan as they are the two largest economic powers in the region (Sieg & Kapoor, 2015).
5.1.4.5 Threats to Japan

To understand the SC of Japan, we also need to understand the perceived threats behind why Japan has formed the policies and alliances they have. We can get this understanding by looking at the countries around Japan that are perceived as a threat. The behaviours of these countries affect Japan’s SC and they can be reasons of significant shocks, changes in Japan’s security environment and changes to policies. These are foundational elements and will hopefully bring some of the rest of this chapter together.

The primary perceived security threats to Japan are China (PRC) and North Korea. If we start by looking at North Korea, we can see that the root of the perceived threat is a repeated provocative rhetoric and behaviour from North Korea’s side. North Korea is seen as disregarding the international norms while also being a threat against Japan and the security of the region. The nuclear weapons of North Korea have been a major threat to Japan’s safety and have been used to justify the joint development of their missile defence system, together with the U.S. (Vasilenkov, 2013., & Japan MOD, 2016a).

When it comes to China, Japan perceives them as a significant threat to the security of the entire region. This perception is based on Japan’s view of China reinforcing its military capabilities without transparency, their active maritime advancement, the rapid shift in military balance and China’s attempt to change the status quo in the East and the South China Sea (Japan MOD, 2016a). Hagström and Hanssen (2016) argues that Japan think they must counter this sense of threat from China, by a show of force to secure Japan’s peacefulness (ibid, p.273).

In the eyes of the Japanese conservative politician Yamatani Eriko, also a member of the Nippon Kaigi (Hyun-Ki & Kim, 2014), China is acting like a hegemon while not following international rules (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016). China’s backing of North Korea is also seen as an issue as both the threats to Japan share a bound (Sneider, 2013).

China’s behaviour has led to Japan’s securitising China as a threat to Japan’s national security and Japan has gone as far as comparing China’s perceived militarism with how Japan had acted under the world war and pre-war era (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016). This securitization is apparent in different government publications and statements, and it seems to be one of the reasons Japan has moved away from its pacifistic tendencies.
5.1.4.6 Military Cooperation

Japan has a limited military influence in the region. Gady (2015) means that the JSDF would not be able to defend Japan alone in a long going conflict as they lack offensive weapons, have limited human resources and limited types of equipment (ibid). These limitations make Japan vulnerable and dependent on external help in the case of an attack on Japan.

Japan is seeking to develop and deepen other security cooperation in the region than the existing one with the U.S. (Oros, 2014). One example is Japan approaching South Korea and trying to solve their old wartime issues to create better relations between the two countries (Sneider, 2013, p.154).

Japan’s PM Abe is a driving force behind this move to create new alliances and better relations. He has also told officials from the ASEAN countries, the U.S and Australia that Japan wants to play a major role in maintaining regional security in East Asia and he has also offered Japan’s support to other countries to solve their territorial disputes (Japan Herald, 2014).

5.1.4.7 Economic Dependency

We can also see a great economic interdependence between the countries in East Asia, especially Japan and China (Hara, 2012).

The region holds some of the most economically expansive countries in the world yet they are all dependent on each other and their trade. There are multiple economic institutions such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that represent this dependency (ibid).

Japan’s dependency on their trade and the willingness to uphold it has been made clear in the naval operations in the Gulf of Aden against Somalian pirates. Japan is highly dependent on trade to get access to crude oil. They import 80% of their crude oil needs from the Middle East, and per political reporter Isabel Reynolds, most of it passes through the Gulf of Aden. The Gulf has had issues with pirates which have led to Japan getting involved with their navy to try to secure their maritime transport route (Reynolds,
This maritime operation can be seen as a demonstration of the role of trade in the SC of Japan. As Japan is dependent on its trade for their survival, Japan seems to be willing to use force to protect it and to uphold the freedom of navigation. This is further apparent when Japan performed naval exercises with the U.S. in the contested SCS (Shim, 2017).

5.1.5. Peace Identity

Throughout this thesis, I have shown an underlying commitment to peace within the different foundational aspects of Japan. This peace identity, a: “identity defined in terms of a normative commitment to peace” is relevant to look at (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016, p.267). Peace identity and pacifism don’t necessarily need to be the same thing (ibid). In present day Japan, there is a large disagreement about the question of Japan’s pacifism. Some are almost religiously devoted to it while others are against it and see it as a violation of Japanese trust and sovereignty (Oros, 2014, p.141).

5.1.5.1 Change of Peace Identity

To understand the change to SC that Japan is undergoing, one need to understand Japan’s change of peace identity.

The Japanese peace identity seems to be under change as conservative powers are moving to remilitarize the country. Not merely in the form of military capability, but also change the value system, culture and identity (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016). One group involved in this is Nippon Kaigi, who is organising political groups and lobbying for the conservative and nationalistic idea (Mizohata, 2016).

Even if Japan is still holding its position on peace, the conservatives seem to want to change the way peace is upheld. Japan’s international identity is changing from being a peace-state to becoming a global player and normal state (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016). One argument is also that Japan could be militarising because of the changing world and their commitment to peace. To be able to uphold peace in the new international security environment (Hagström & Hanssen, 2016). This change in peace identity is showing a willingness to use force to uphold peace in various scenarios already discussed.
Benedict (1947) writes that Japan’s motivations are situational. Japan will seek their place, Benedict means, in the world and depending on how the world looks, they will adapt themselves to it. Even if Japan was at the time a peaceful country in a world filled with peace loving nations, Japan could adapt to changes in the world, such as a more insecure global climate (Benedict, 1947, p.316). This could be another explanation for the rise of militarism within the Japanese elite. The security climate around Japan is becoming more insecure with China on the rise, making claims over the Senkaku islands and the SCS, and a North Korea arming up with Nuclear missiles and acting threatening (Szczudlik, 2017).

5.1.5.2 Proactive pacifism

Japan’s move away from a pacifist SC was unveiled by the current PM Shinzō Abe at the end of 2013 when he announced a five-year plan of military expansion. The plan's purpose was to make Japan’s defence a more internationally normal one and was described as a type of proactive pacifism. Meaning, having a military force to be able to deter enemies from attacking (Fackler, 2013). This policy has been apparent in many aspects of Japan’s security policies since then. Japan’s actions to create security alliances with other and their moves to improve their armed forces seem to be products of this new definition of pacifism.

5.2 Summarizing Japan’s Strategic Culture

Japan’s elite is moving away from their pacifist ideals to a more militaristic mindset, but they are aware of their military and juridical limitations. Their SC is highly defensive. As long as Japan or Japan’s allies are not attacked, Japan will not themselves deploy offensive force. In the case of a UN mandate, Japan might get involved in a conflict, but the likelihood of it being of other nature than defensive, humanitarian or logistic help is low. The elites, primarily the LDP and bureaucrats that support them, are socialised into the SC in different stages, by their families, religious organisations and universities.

The military enhancements they want to perform seem to be in the name of deterrence and a more independent defence force. Japan is more focused on the use of negotiation and of internationally established institutions to solve issues rather than military force. Never the less, Japan is aware that their enemies might not share the same mindset they have regarding international law and that Japan, therefore, need to show that they are willing and capable of defending the sovereignty of their nation. The U.S. security alliance is highly valued by Japan as it is one of the deterring aspects that keep Japan safe. Japan feels they need to show the U.S. that they are willing to uphold their end of the alliance and are therefore willing to
participate in actions regarding the SCS and conflicts not directly related to Japan. There is also a will of becoming independent from the U.S. protection that the elite is aware might not be possible at this moment. Protecting trade routes and ensuring freedom of navigation is another situation Japan could deploy forces because of their high dependency on trade to financially survive. Japan does also not want to normalise China's offensive behaviour and is, therefore, involving themselves in the SCS to prevent China from acting the same way in the East China Sea. The word proactive pacifism or proactive peace (meaning almost the same thing) is an interesting and relevant way of describing Japan’s Strategic Culture.

5.3 Change of Japan’s Strategic Culture – The seven sins to pacifism

Now that we have established Japan’s SC we can look back at our original question: What changes within Japan’s Strategic Culture has made, and allowed, Japan to move away from their previous seemingly pacifistic mindset?

The first changed aspect within Japan’s SC, which has made a move away from pacifism possible, is the change of interpretation of the Constitution. It has allowed Japan to participate in military actions not directly connected to defending Japanese territories and the ability to take part in UN-mandated armed conflicts. It is a change that conservatives have been working to achieve for many years and it has allowed for most other changes to take place.

The second relevant aspect is the increasing threat from China, with their actions regarding the Senkaku Islands and the SCS, and North Korea with their nuclear weapons program. The behaviours of the two countries have made the elite securitize them and to see them as a threat to Japan’s security.

Japan’s policy elite is trying to adapt to the security-climate change, which became apparent from the fishing boat incident in 2010, which has led to them making moves to counter the security threats, such as setting up a missile defence system and starting to create a marine force to deter China from forcefully taking islands. Japan is also working against normalising China’s behaviour in the SCS to prevent them taking similar actions or worsening the situation in the East China Sea. This is also the reason behind the first aspect.

The third aspect is related to the LDP aiming for Japan to take their proper place within the international community as a normal country with a normal army that can defend itself and
that can contribute to global peace and stability. This change has become active after the reinterpretation of the constitution but has been a goal of the conservatives for a long time.

The fourth aspect is Japan’s alliance with the U.S. and Japan’s dependency on it. The U.S. change in behaviour towards the SCS 2010 has also been a change of Japan’s SC because of Japan and the U.S. close policy relationship. Japan is also relying on the U.S. to give them support regarding the Senkaku islands, and therefore Japan is trying to make their alliance stronger by participating in activities together with the U.S. and to contribute to what Japan feels is their role in not letting China changing the status quo in East Asia. Japan is also trying to get more independent from this alliance by creating better relations with other countries and building up their military. All this is possible because of the change in interpretation of the Constitution.

The fifth aspect is the religious groups and conservative politicians that are taking more and more power in Japan and striving to reach their goals of restoring an independent, nationalistic Japan. They have through various actions managed to get more influence in the Japanese government and therefore managed to make changes that further changes Japan’s SC.

The sixth aspect is Japan’s dependency of trade and their dedication to the international law regarding freedom of navigation. China has made territorial claims over the SCS which Japan see as a threat to their trade as most of Japan’s oil and other base resources come through those waters.

The seventh aspect is the change in Japan’s peace identity to a more deterrence based approach to uphold peace, instead of one based on pacifism.
6. Discussion

The Strategic Culture of Japan is best described by PM Abe himself: Proactive pacifism. The SC of Japan is moving away from being completely pacifistic, and centred around defending Japanese territories, to also defend Japan’s interests, allies and trade. Japan is becoming a more global actor and is showing its determination by doing more and more direct military actions, in combination with diplomatic ones. The Japanese elite is looking to make Japan into a more militaristic country, and they are taking the opportunities they get to advance that goal. The changes to Japan’s SC can be seen in seven different aspects, namely: change of interpretation of the Constitution, increasing threat from China and North Korea, Japan aiming to take their proper place within the international community, Japan’s alliance with the U.S. and Japan’s dependency on it, religious groups and conservative politicians gaining more power, Japan’s dependence on trade and their dedication to Freedom of navigation, the change in Japan’s peace identity.

This study has been limited to my language barriers, limited word count and my inability to visit Japan and gain first-hand sources. I think to be able to accurately answer my research question one need to do a more in-depth analysis of the different aspects I didn’t manage to reach, such as possible economic and military elites.

Even if my research was limited, I hope I have been able to give an adequate explanation of the changes to Japan’s SC that one can build upon in future studies.

Research should further be done on many different aspects of Japan’s SC, such as the existence of an economic and military policy elite within Japan and their possible influence on Japan’s SC. One should also look closer to the regular people of Japan and how the changes that have happened have been possible in a democratic country so dedicated to peace and pacifism.

In a way, Japan still is a pacifist country, this reality is slowly changing, and one could see Japan becoming a new military superpower in the future. This development is important to keep an eye on, as well as the progress of conservatives like PM Abe who are trying to revive
Japan into a nationalistic empire, as it will undoubtedly affect the entirety of the East Asia region.

7. Sources


8. Attachment 1 – Interview Questions and Explanation.

Note – Translated from Swedish to English.

1. **Stage in the thesis:**
   Collecting data to establish the countries Strategic Culture

2. **Background:**
   I have not worked with Japan before so I lack a deeper understanding about them.
   In previous work when I have been in a similar situation I have noticed that the work
   becomes more objective when one from the start contact an expert on the field to start
   on the right track

3. **Purpose of the Interview:**
   To base my research on correct/objective data which is not based on my own
   subjective western perspective.

4. **Main question of the Interview.**
   What do I need to understand/read to understand Japan’s perspective?
   Which are Japan’s political and military elite and what are their perspective?

5. **More specifically.**

5.1 What important texts should i read to get an understanding of Japan’s culture/religion? Four Books and Five Classics?

5.1.1 Which foundational documents defines Japans culture?

5.2 Which are the most important historical events that had an effect on Japan’s development? Events that changed the political system, conflicts, crises etc.
   Have there been any significant shocks the Japan has experienced?

5.3 Are there any important political texts and events that define the country’s political structure?
   World wars,
   Occupation of Japan after ww2, 1990 – economic crises?
5.4 What geopolitical aspects should I look closer at to understand Japan’s geopolitics?

5.5 Who are Japan’s political and military elite (groups?)

5.6 Where can I find the above-mentioned elites opinions and point of view?

5.7 What are the most important events that have defined Japan’s attitude against Japan?